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ABSTRACT
As with the corporate impropriety which gave rise to the recent global financial 
crisis, the Catholic Church has been experiencing her own share of scandals; 
critics attribute the Church's scandals to her refusal to embrace the principles of 
good management and to her lack of a corporate governance framework which 
promotes accountability and transparency. Are management principles such as 
corporate governance and codes of good practice, usually the provenance of 
business, also applicable to a religious entity such as the Catholic Church?
This research adopts a qualitative, interpretive approach and uses semi­
structured interviews as the principal method of data collection; data is analysed 
by using thematic content analysis. Findings suggest that management 
principles and corporate governance are applicable to the Catholic Church. The 
Church appears to have a corporate governance framework of its own; 
however, it seems limited when compared to those used by corporations and 
regulatory authorities. Findings suggest that the Church's corporate governance 
mechanisms may be dated; effective compliance may therefore be difficult to 
achieve, thus possibly contributing to the long term decline in ecclesiastical 
performance.
Church managers may wish to consider whether their corporate governance 
framework is still relevant to the challenges of the 21st century; managers may 
wish to reflect on their existing management and leadership styles in terms of 
how they communicate with their clergy and society. Corporate governance
theories (e.g., agency theory and transaction cost economics) assume, 
theoretically, that executives are vice-ridden; however, no efforts are made to 
address this short-fall. Perhaps this explains why regulations and codes of good 
practice fail to prevent corporate impropriety? Regulators and academics may 
find it appropriate now to address the 'dissolute' nature of executives by 
incorporating a framework which is based on the moral virtues and individual 
personal accountability. The Catholic Church, an advocate of both, could be 
referred to for guidance.
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CHAPTER 1: AN OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
1.1 Introduction
This thesis examines corporate governance at the diocesan level of the Catholic 
Church in England. The purpose of corporate governance is to ensure that an 
entity, through its responsible officers, is compliant with relevant rules, 
regulations and good practice, the expected result of which is improved 
performance (Schleifer &Vishny,1997; Stiles, 1998; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; 
Filatotchev etal, 2007; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Brown & Caylor, 2004; Rye & 
Pettigrew, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Corporate governance is a 
management function which is generally the responsibility of the company's 
most senior officers: the board of directors (One Flundred Seventh Congress of 
the United States of America, 2002; Maitlis, 2004; Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2004; Filatotchev, 2005; Long, 2006; United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2006; Financial Reporting 
Office, 2008; Ong & Wan, 2008; Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants, 2008).
It may be asserted that the Church is not a ‘company’, in the business sense; as 
it is not a commercial, profit-making organization, the Church should therefore 
not be viewed through the ‘managerial’ lens the way that commercial 
enterprises usually are (Stuart and Lindsay, 1997; Cunliffe, 2009; Irwin and 
Roller, 2000; Felton and Reed, 2001; Barth, 2010; Meynhardt, 2010; Long & 
Mills, 2010; Merkl-Davies, Brennan & McLeay, 2011; Simpson, 2012). It may be
further claimed that as an ecclesiastical entity which is primarily concerned with 
the spiritual, the Church should not be subject to the secular principles and 
practices of management: corporate governance is consequently not applicable 
to the Catholic Church.
This thesis argues that good management practices, particularly the principles 
of corporate governance, are relevant and applicable to the Church, especially 
at this time in her history when critics condemn the Church for the lack of 
management and the lack of corporate governance; with increasing regularity a 
growing number of her clergy continue to face damaging allegations and 
criminal convictions. The argument that corporate governance principles are 
relevant and applicable to the Catholic Church is based on the following 
justification: the Church’s own law states that her administrators are “bound to 
fulfil their function with the diligence of a good householder” (Code of Canon 
Law, 1983: Canon 1284, section 1).
A closer examination of Canon 1284 of the Church's Code of Canon Law 
(Roman Catholic Church 1983) reveals that, under the diocesan Bishop’s 
ultimate responsibility, Church administrators are expected to be knowledgeable 
about functional aspects of management such as finance and cash-flow 
management; for example, managers are required to “collect the return of 
goods and the income accurately and on time,” “to protect what is collected” 
and to “pay at the stated time the interest due on a loan or mortgage and take 
care that the capital debt itself is repaid in a timely manner.” As with the parable 
of the good steward (Matthew 25:14-30), Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church
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1983) also expects Church managers to be financially well-versed: they are to 
“invest the money which is left over after expenses” and they are required to 
“keep well organized books of receipts and expenditures.”
In keeping with good audit practice, Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) 
exhorts Church managers to “draw up a report of the administration at the end 
of each year.” Canon 1284, section 3, provides further evidence that the 
Catholic Church is cognizant of, and adheres to, good management practices 
when she encourages her officers thus: “It is strongly recommended that 
administrators prepare budgets of incomes and expenditures each year; it is left 
to particular law, however, to require them and to determine more precisely the 
ways in which they are to be presented.”
Finally, though proclaiming to be divinely instituted, the Church, like Christ, has 
a human aspect (John 1;14; Lynskey, 1952:15); this aspect is subject to the 
laws of the land, as Christ himself was (Matthew 22:17-21; Luke 2:51). 
Organizationally, the tangible aspect of the Church is manifested in the 
following practical ways, for example: through the employment of people, the 
use of money; and the ownership of physical assets - such as edifices for public 
fellowship and worship. Through the deployment and engagement of these 
resources, the Church finds herself immediately subject to various acts of civil 
legislation which relate to employment, charities, taxation, and Health and 
Safety (Beal and Cusack, 2008). It is also notable that Canon Law (Roman 
Catholic Church 1983) obliges the Church to “observe the prescripts of both 
canon and civil law [...] and especially be on guard so that no damage comes to
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the Church from the non-observance of civil laws.” This obligation to observe 
the prescripts of civil law is also embodied in the Bible (Romans 13:1-2; Peter 
2:13; Titus 3:1).
From the discourse above, it is evident that principles of management are 
indeed relevant to the Catholic Church; as we have demonstrated, good 
management practice is actually enshrined in the Code of Canon Law (Roman 
Catholic Church 1983). The argument that management principles in general, 
and corporate governance in particular, are not applicable to the Church is 
arguably misplaced and not defensible. The following section explains how 
corporate governance has become a significant management issue for the 
Catholic Church.
4
1.2 Historical Background and Research Problem
In recent years, corporate governance has become a topical issue in the world 
of business; it has also gained prominence in the academic field and practice of 
management. The renewed interest in corporate governance is due to the 
recent economic downturn following the 'sub-prime crisis' which has unfolded 
since 2007 (Clark 2009). In his report to the members of the European 
Commission, describes the crisis, thus: “Since July 2007, the world has faced, 
and continues to face, the most serious and disruptive financial crisis since 
1929.” De Larosière (2009:6) states that the crisis has become “global, deep, 
even worsening.” In the UK, renewed interest in corporate governance, 
especially since the recent crisis, is exemplified by the publication of the 
government-sponsored Walker Review (2009); in his corporate governance 
review of UK financial sector, Walker (2009:19) noted that there were "... 
material deficiencies in the effectiveness of boards” which contributed to less- 
than-salutary performance and the general economic mayhem we now witness 
globally. In his report to the UK government, Walker (2009) made it exceeding 
clear that the cause of the problem was particularly attributable to the behaviour 
of board directors, rather than “black letter regulation” (Walker 2009:24). At the 
European Union (EU) level, concerns about the cause of the crisis led to a 
review of European financial institutions and the subsequent publication of the 
De Larosière Report (2009). De Larosière (2009:29) made clear that lack of 
effective corporate governance was “one of the most important failures of the 
present crisis.” De Larosière (2009:30) too refers to undesirable executive 
behaviour which was underpinned by an “incentive structure” which promoted 
greed and excessive risk-taking.
In the world of religion, the Catholic Church has been experiencing her own 
share of crises. It is not the scope of this thesis to explore nature and the 
“aetiology” (Kochansky & Herrmann, 2009:299) of these scandals. Detailed 
reports are readily available in the public domain; they describe the 
circumstances, allegations, and the convictions of members of the Church’s 
hierarchy (for examples, see BBC News online (2002); Guardian Newspaper 
online (2001); Weigel 2002; Bartunek, Hinsdale &Keenan 2006; Keenan 2011). 
Of relevance to this thesis, however, is the central criticism that there is no 
“corporate governance” or accountability in the Church (Catholic Office for the 
Protection of Children and Vulnerable Adults 2002; Post 2003; Leadership 
Roundtable 2004; Oakley & Russett 2004; Gluck 2003; Gluck 2004; Martin 
2006; West & Zech, 2006; Elson, O’Callaghan & Walker 2007; Velayutham 
2007; Barth 2010; Enofe & Amaria, 2011). The Church must, critics admonish, 
demonstrate accountability, transparency and disclosure -  the hallmarks of 
good corporate governance. For example, Cafardi (2004:12) warns: “I believe 
the answer to the Church’s current problems is accountability. . . accountability. 
. . and more accountability. If Church officials refuse to recognize accountability 
in the exercise of their authority and the result is harm to others, then the larger 
civil society will find ways to make them accountable, either in civil trials for 
damages or in criminal prosecutions.”
In his paper on Enron, Arthur Andersen and the Catholic Church, Doost, 
(2003:678) laments that though the Catholic Church is “the largest Christian 
denomination”, it is still devoid of, and he calls for, a corporate governance
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system which is of “an acceptable standard.” In his critique of the Church's 
(mis)management of the recent scandals, Post (2003:23) asserts that “the 
corporate governance failures of the 21st century [...] ultimately pale in 
comparison to the governance failure of the Catholic Church over the issue o f 
how it managed the recent scandals. In addition to advocating the adoption of 
"democratic principles", Post (2003:25) argues that the Church must adopt " 
more vigorous clergy and peer accountability as means to check the nearly 
absolute power granted to bishops"; there should be more "financial 
accountability" and this should be link "to financial management." In his paper 
on crisis management in the Catholic Church, Gluck (2003:1), notes that the 
Church does not have any “effective performance measurement system at any 
level; it has “no effective planning mechanism in place”; it lacks “even the 
rudiments of an effective human resource management process or system”, 
and the “church organization has no effective central point of leadership.” 
Martin's (2006:1) report on the recent Church scandals further demonstrates the 
need for “fiscal transparency.”
An examination of corporate governance reveals, amongst other things, that the 
mechanisms of corporate governance are designed for -  and therefore more 
suited to, publicly-listed companies whose boards are accountable to 
shareholders. Furthermore, the measurements used to evaluate a company’s 
performance are usually financial (Korac-Kakabads, Kouzmin & Kakabadse 
2001:26) and typically framed in secular terms, for example; the economic 
return on assets (ROA), return on investment (ROI), net asset value (NAV), and 
the amount of profits generated (EBITDA). At this point, the thesis concedes
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that this form of corporate governance is obviously incompatible with the 
Catholic Church whose “mission, orientation and goal” is the salvation of souls 
(Roman Catholic Church 2000:231; Pope Paul VI 1965; Roman Catholic 
Church 1983; Pope John Paul II 2003; Congregation for Bishops 2004). Clearly, 
the “salvation of souls” is a construct which is intangible and arguably difficult to 
measure.
Given the stark incompatibility of the Church’s purely spiritual mission and the 
tangible oriented measures of corporate governance, it behoves us to ask the 
following questions: what underlying assumptions do critics make when they 
urge “corporate governance” on the Catholic Church? When allegations are 
made against the “Church” or when reference is made to the “hierarchy”, who, 
specifically, is being referred to? Unlike companies, the Church has no board of 
directors and it is not controlled by shareholders with voting rights. Church 
doctrine and Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) provide that all 
authority lies exclusively in the person of the diocesan Bishop: how, then, do 
Bishops demonstrate accountability and transparency? This leads us to 
challenge another assumption which is fundamental to the research: does the 
Catholic Church actually have a corporate governance framework of its own? 
Surely, it is reasonable to suppose that a global institution (Vallier 1971; Reese 
1997; Young & Shea, 2007; Linden 2009) which is over 2000 years old should 
have mature processes and procedures which are well-defined and highly 
effective.
If, then, the Catholic Church has its own corporate governance, the following
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questions arise: (a) What, if any, empirical research has actually been 
undertaken in the field of corporate governance and the Catholic Church? (b) 
How would it be described and how does it compare with the models of 
corporate governance commonly found in the secular world of business? (c) 
How is it used to demonstrate compliance, and how should it be appropriately 
applied to measure ecclesiastical performance? And finally, (d) if the Church 
does not have a corporate governance framework of its own, what model would 
be appropriate to the Church’s organizational structure and mission?
Our research problem may be summarized by this overarching question: What 
is the corporate governance model of the Catholic Church and how can it be 
appropriately applied to the Catholic Church in general, and in particular to the 
Church in England?
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1.3 Research Objectives
Accordingly, our research objectives are as follows:
(a) To examine the purpose, models and key characteristics of corporate 
governance;
(b) To determine and evaluate corporate governance research of the 
Catholic Church hitherto undertaken;
(c) By referring to source documents, to examine the Church’s
organizational structure, which provides the foundation for its own 
corporate governance, in order to establish the extent to which the 
Church has a corporate governance framework of its own;
(d) To define the Church’s corporate governance framework and to analyse
it against the models identified in (a), above.
(e) To apply the (conceptual) framework (developed in this thesis)
empirically, so as to gain further insights into the problems of 
accountability and transparency in the Catholic Church
10
1.4 Significance of the Study
Literature review reveals that research on Church corporate governance is 
limited; Elson ef a /(2007:124) acknowledge that “very little research is available 
that addresses corporate governance in churches..." The discourse on Church 
research is usually from a functional perspective of management -  the 
'managerial lens', for example: from the perspective of accounting and finance 
(Booth 1993; Zech 2001 ; West & Zech 2006; Elson et a /2007); crisis 
management (Barth 2010; Garcia 2010); or marketing (Felton & Reed, 2001; 
Hoverstad, 2008), with hardly any acknowledgement of - or reference to, the 
Church’s intangible mission; the reality of the Church's unique structure is also 
conveniently ignored. Whilst critics exhort the Church to adopt “corporate 
governance”, there are no actual studies to indicate whether the Church actually 
possesses her own, lef alone one which describes a model that is appropriate 
to the institution.
This thesis contributes to the corporate governance debate by situating the 
topic within the context of a global religious organization. Though we recognize 
the Church’s universal nature, we confine the scope of our empirical research to 
the Church within England, at the diocesan level. In the UK, the Catholic Church 
comprises 22 dioceses in England and Wales (Bishops’ Conference of England 
and Wales 2010), and 8 in Scotland (Burns 2010), giving a total of 30 diocesan 
bishops. Whilst there are only 30 diocesan Bishops, there are many more 
auxiliary bishops. Appointed by diocesan Bishops, auxiliary bishops have 
limited authority and their delegated powers originate from the person of the 
diocesan Bishop himself. The clergy numbers approximately 3000 in England
(Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales 2010). The thrust of our research 
is focused at the diocesan level in England, for two main reasons: firstly, the 
scandals referred to were generally perpetrated at the local level, within specific 
dioceses which are under the ultimate control of the diocesan bishop. 
Investigations by the civil and ecclesiastical authorities are usually conducted 
within the diocesan level -  e.g.: the Dublin Report (Dublin Archdiocese 
Commission of Investigation 2009), the Ferns Report (Murphy, Buckley & Larain 
2005) and the Nolan Report (Nolan 2001).
Secondly, during our initial discussions with certain members of the clergy, we 
were given to understand that our research into the corporate governance of the 
Catholic Church, a particularly sensitive topic at the time, was unlikely to receive 
any acquiescence or support from the hierarchy. We learned that Bishops are 
not necessary renowned for their attitude towards disclosure and that, in 
practice, they were not obliged to disclose, under Canon Law (Roman Catholic 
Church 1983). When interviewing members of the clergy, the sensitivity of the 
research topic necessitated the use of the 'snowballing technique', though not 
exclusively; this data sourcing technique meant that names of possible 
interviewees were discreetly suggested and/or recommended by those who had 
been interviewed; these factors placed a practical limitations on the research 
efforts in terms of numbers, access, and geographic reach.
Our findings reveal, amongst other things, that the Church possesses a 
corporate governance framework, known as the diocesan curia; this body 
serves to “assist the Bishop in governing the entire diocese, especially in
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directing pastoral action, in providing for the administration of the diocese, and 
in exercising judicial power.” (Roman Catholic Church 1983; Canon 469). The 
curia may be likened to that of company’s board of directors. An evaluation of 
the diocesan curia suggests that it is reminiscent of the ‘principles-led’ model of 
corporate governance; this is because Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 
1983) gives the Bishop almost unfettered control over how he chooses to 
manage his diocese. The Bishop’s position, in terms of job description, authority 
and power, appears similar to that of a chief executive officer (CEO) and the 
chairman of a company; as an entity, his diocese may be likened to that of a 
company.
An examination of the diocesan curia conveys the impression that it may be 
deficient when compared to what is accepted as good practice in secular 
corporate governance; this is because the curia is silent in those key aspects 
which are commonly perceived to be critical to good corporate governance, 
namely: the formal mechanisms of accountability, compliance, and measures of 
performance. We discover that the Church’s concept of accountability is highly 
‘individual’ and ‘personal’: accountability emanates from the office and directly 
attributable to the person of the diocesan Bishop. Though he is appointed by 
Rome, the Bishop manages his diocese autonomously, in his own name; he 
does not manage his diocese as a representative of the Pope.
Critically, our study reveals that there is no evidence to suggest that a Bishop is 
accountable to his ‘constituents’ -  the clergy and the laity. Canon Law (Roman 
Catholic Church 1983) does not provide any mechanisms or procedures to
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suggest that the Bishop is obliged to demonstrate accountability, transparency 
and disclosure to his ‘stakeholders’ -  i.e.: those in his diocese whose spiritual 
welfare is entrusted to his care. In terms of performance, the primary objective 
of the Bishop’s ministry is the salvation of souls, not administration or 
management. These facts pose serious challenges to our thesis, giving rise to 
the following questions: though he is not bound by his office to do so, how can a 
Bishop provide evidence of accountability, within the confines of his ministry?
By way of ecclesiastical processes, procedures or precepts, what ‘mechanisms’ 
of accountability may be deemed appropriate to his ministry? Finally, how can 
an intangible construct such as the “salvation of souls” be operationalized and 
measured?
Perhaps for the first time, the study succeeds in conceptualizing a model of 
corporate governance which recognizes the Church’s hierarchical 
organizational structure and incorporates her mission of saving souls; it also 
develops formal mechanisms of accountability, compliance, and measures of 
performance which are based on Church doctrine and founded on the Bishop’s 
scope of responsibilities, provided for in Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 
1983). The thesis uses a qualitative-interpretive approach to test the model; 
semi structured interviews are used as the primary instrument of data collection, 
and thematic content analysis as the method for data analysis.
Consequently, this study builds on the seminal work of Brennan and Solomon 
(2008:889), who argue that the boundaries of corporate governance research 
be “extended” and “broadened”, in six key areas; according to Brennan and
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Soloman (2008:890) these six “dimensions” are: (1) “broader theoretical 
concept of accountability”; (2) “broader range of accountability mechanisms”; (3) 
“broader adoption of methodological approach”; (4) “broader sectoral analysis”; 
(5) “broadening globalization”; and (6) “broader time horizon”.
This study succeeds in extending the boundaries because it (1) draws upon the 
concept of individual personal accountability, underpinned by Canon Law 
(Roman Catholic Church 1983) and Church doctrine, as opposed to agency 
theory; (2) the study conceptualizes a corporate governance model within the 
context of the Bishop's responsibilities, rather than the typical board company, 
commonly referred to in our literature review; (3) the study uses a qualitative 
research method, as opposed to the positivist, quantitative-statistical approach 
which is the dominant method in corporate governance research; (4) the subject 
of our research is a major religious organization which is (5) global, and (6) 
draws on ecclesiastical documents whose genesis span centuries.
The insights gained demonstrate that corporate governance principles are 
relevant and can be appropriately adapted to the Church’s unique 
organizational structure and to the practical workings of her ministry. Our study 
also finds that the theoretical assumptions made in existing corporate 
governance frameworks -  for example: in agency theory and transaction cost 
economics, assume -  negatively, that managers are by default corrupt and 
prone to vice; if true, this helps explain why scandals abound in spite of the 
lessons learnt since the days of Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (One Hundred 
Seventh Congress of the United States of America , 2002) and countless
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research on corporate governance; in the current brand of corporate 
governance, rules and organisational processes are central (Walker, 2009; De 
Larosière, 2009), rather than the individual person. The next section provides 
and brief outline of the measures taken to assist in our research efforts; it also 
serves to structure our thesis in a manner which is coherent to the reader.
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1.5 The Research Plan
In Chapter 2, we survey the current literature on corporate governance in 
business. Noting the predominant theory underpinning corporate governance, 
we identify the key characteristics of corporate governance and evaluate the 
fundamental components of corporate governance. The chapter also identifies, 
discusses and contrasts the two primary models of corporate governance, 
namely the principles-based model and the rules-based model, characterised 
by the Combined Code of Corporate Governance (Financial Reporting Council 
2008) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (One Hundred Seventh Congress of the 
United States of America 2002), respectively. Finally, an evaluation is made of 
the seminal work of Brennan and Solomon (2008); the authors argue that the 
existing boundaries of corporate governance research should be extended and 
propose a six-dimensional framework for future research.
Building on these findings, Chapter 3 begins with a review of the literature on
the topic of corporate governance in the Catholic Church. Referring to source
documents such as the Code of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) and
other ecclesiastical publications, this chapter seeks to determine the true nature
of the Church’s organizational structure in order to identify the doctrinal source
of authority, and thereby pinpoint the locus of episcopal accountability. Chapter
3 also introduces two key documents: the Quinquennial Report (the Report) and
the Form for the Quinquennial Report (the Form). The Report is the only
evidence of accountability which is required of the diocesan Bishop; however, is
it a private document which is submitted to the Pope only; it is therefore not
publicly available. The Form, published by the Congregation for Bishops,
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contains clear guidelines as to what Bishops must include in their Report; the 
Form is therefore a very important document because it provides us information 
about the structure and content of the Bishop's Report; it provides insights as to 
how the effectiveness of the Bishop's diocesan curia is evaluated by Rome. The 
Form confirms that it is possible to formulate matrices which measure the 
episcopal performance.
Chapter 4 seeks to synthesise the salient points highlighted in our literature 
review on corporate governance in business and in the Catholic Church. By 
doing so, an ecclesiastical model of corporate governance is developed. The 
concepts of mechanism, compliance and performance are conceptualised 
within the context of the diocesan curia, episcopal responsibility and the 
Bishop's pastoral ministry. The constructs within the model enable to 
formulation of the research questions, which are then operationalized.
Chapter 5 highlights the key research issues which arise from the difficulties 
and practical constraints experienced during the pilot phase of our research.
The challenges and issues highlighted in this chapter help provide an 
understanding of the methods which we eventually adopted for our research 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Burgoyne 1991:33). The chapter explains how this 
research was originally predisposed to, and favoured, the adoption of the 
quantitative approach. Flowever, because of the practical constraints 
experienced -  access to data, “time and resources” (Bryman & Bell, 2007:79), it 
was necessary to adopt a qualitative approach.
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Given the research issues highlighted and discussed in the previous chapter, 
we propose to use a qualitative-interpretive research approach which involves 
the use of semi-structured interviews as the primary method of data capture and 
thematic content analysis as the method for analysing data. Chapter 6 provides 
an overview of our research methodology; it explains further our reasons for 
using a qualitative approach. We examine Timms' (2001) research into the 
English Catholic Church's management at the diocesan and parish levels. 
Timms' (2001) research method appears similar to ours; by examining Timms' 
(2001) research, we illustrate those methodological issues which must be 
recognized and addressed in our own research methodology.
The research findings are presented in Chapter 7. A brief reminder is given of 
the research questions which the findings relate to. RQ1 seeks to examine how 
effectively Bishops use existing ecclesiastical mechanisms of corporate 
governance in the management of their diocese, in particular: the Council of 
Priests and College of Consultors. RQ2 is about the Bishop's compliance with 
his tria-munera, namely: teaching, sanctifying, and governance. In RQ3, we 
seek to evaluate episcopal performance.
In Chapter 8 we discuss in the practical and theoretical implications of the 
issues which arise from the key findings highlighted in the previous chapter.
Most notably, these themes include the apparent limitations of the diocesan 
curia in terms of the absence of ATD; the relevance of the Council of Priests 
and the College of Consultors; and the considerations which loom in the 
continuing tension between Church law and Civil Law. Of utmost concern is the
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quality of the relationship between the Bishop and his presbyters. This issue is 
discussed within the context of current episcopal performance results, and in 
terms of the Bishop's leadership and management style.
Chapter 9 concludes our research by describing how, by locating corporate 
governance within the context of a global religious organisation, this work 
provides further insights and contributes to existing knowledge. Reference is 
made to the two limitations identified in existing corporate governance theory. 
The theoretical implications of our findings suggest that the frontiers of 
corporate governance research can be broadened in two other ways. 
Knowledge from other disciplines could be drawn on to provide further insights 
to thereby address the theoretical weaknesses highlighted by our findings. The 
limitations of our research are acknowledged and discussed. Finally, 
recommendations are made of other areas within this research topic which 
merit further examination.
20
The research plan is summarized in the table below:
Table 1.1: Summary of Research Plan. Source: author's
Start: Plan
|
Introductipn
1
Chapter 1
Literature review of Corporate Governance in Business Chapter 2
Literature review of Corporate Governance in the 
Catholic Church
Chapter 3
Development of the Conceptual Framework & Research 
Questions (RQs)
Chapter 4
Pilot Research and Research Issues Chapter 5
|
Research Methodology Chapter 6
Research Findings Chapter 7
▼
Discussion and Implications of Research Findings Chapter 8
T
Conclusion
|
Chapter 9
End: Submit
The following chapter begins our review of corporate governance in business.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN BUSINESS
2.1 Introduction
Mallin (2007:11) refers to corporate governance as a “phenomenon of the last 
fifteen years or so”, stating: this aspect of management “has only recently come 
to prominence in the business world.” Balgobin (2008:8) is of a similar view: 
"The term ‘corporate governance’ has become an integral aspect of business 
vocabulary in the last decade." Likewise, Solomon (2010:4) observes that the 
recent “global financial crisis and credit crunch ... have further catapulted 
corporate governance onto the centre stage.” Dewing and Russell, (2008:978) 
note the recent interest in corporate governance, on a global scale: “Recent 
decades have seen a world-wide growth of interest in corporate governance.” 
For the purpose of clarity, the term “business” is taken to mean those 
companies, also referred to as “proprietary” (Sullivan & Diacon 2003:115) or 
“stock corporations” (Rost etal, 2008:4), usually publicly listed on the stock 
exchange, which fall under the purview of a corporate governance framework 
such as the Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council 2008), the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act (One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America 
2002), and the OECD Code of Corporate Governance (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 2004).
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2.2 Corporate Governance in the Non-Profit Sector
The non-profit sector comprises a host of “NGOs or non-governmental 
organizations, public-service organizations, clubs, societies and unions” (Wells 
2012:83). Also included are “voluntary and community” agencies (Taylor 
2011:347) as well as “religious entities” and “faith-related” organizations (Sosin 
& Smith 2006:533). A review of the literature suggests that corporate 
governance research in the non-profit sector is driven and influenced 
considerably (Taylor 2011:347) by developments within the 'for-profit' (Luoma 
2010) or the 'secular' sector (Sosin & Smith 2006). Hyndman and McDonnell 
(2009:6) explain: “the conception of governance (usually referred to as 
corporate governance in the for-profit sector) used in the literature relating to 
businesses may provide useful indications of what governance might 
encompass with respect to charities. In this respect, two related paradigms are 
often used: principal-agent theory (or agency theory) and transaction cost 
economics (TCE).” This view is similarly echoed by many other researchers 
(Wells 2012; Jobome 2006; Cornforth & Edwards 1999; Luoma 2010). Luoma 
(2010:2), for example, acknowledges the accepted “trend of nonprofit 
organizations to borrow from the corporate governance procedures and 
practices of their for-profit counterparts.” In his corporate governance research 
into management pay in large UK non-profits, Jobome (2006:333) adopts a 
theoretical framework which is based on agency theory; similarly, Wells 
(2012:84) refers to the OECD's (2004) Code of Corporate Governance when 
she introduces the concept of non-profit corporate governance in her research 
paper on non-profits.
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The UK non-profit sector, sometimes referred to as the “third sector” (Chapman 
et a /2010:613; Martin 2011:909; Spear, Conforth and Aiken 2009:248), has 
come under scrutiny in recent years. Cornforth and Edwards (1999) explain that 
government reforms introduced during the Thatcher era, where “contracting out 
of public services” and privatization were the rigour, have had a significant 
impact on “the delivery of public services” (Cornforth & Edwards 1999:346).
This change has had the effect of introducing “private sector management” 
ideology into public sector government; consequently, the electorate has come 
to expect third sector entities to demonstrate the same level of efficiency, 
professionalism, and accountability as those displayed by listed companies.
The UK non-profit sector has its own code of corporate governance; first 
published in 2005, the recently revised Good Governance: A Code for the 
Voluntary and Community Sector (The Code Founding Group 2010) is 
influenced by developments “arising out of the economic downturn; 
proportionate governance and behavioral governance” (The Code Founding 
Group 2010:6). An evaluation of the Good Governance Code (2010) reveals 
that it is based on accepted good practice (Taylor 2011:348) and -  where 
appropriate, includes relevant sections of legislation which apply to the non­
profit sector. The Good Governance Code (The Code Founding Group 2010) is 
reminiscent of the UK private sector's Combined Code (Financial Reporting 
Department 2010); it is 'principles-based' and has six “high level principles” (The 
Code Founding Group 2010:9). Notably, the principles are aimed specifically at 
the board level: corporate governance is a board level responsibility, even for 
non-profits; it also recognizes that non-profit entities -  like their private sector
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counterparts, are dissimilar and experience different operating environments 
and varying challenges. Consequently, the Good Governance Code embraces 
“flexibility” and adopts an “apply or explain” approach: this approach is similar to 
the “comply or explain” ethos expounded by the Combined Code. As the Good 
Governance Code (The Code Founding Group 2010) is a relatively recent 
introduction, it is unclear how well embedded the Code's principles are in the 
boardrooms of UK non-profits. As Wells (2012:89) argues, in order to develop a 
“governance framework” which is grounded in the etiology of the non-profit 
sector, much “more research is needed.”
The US experience appears to be analogous to that of the UK; the practice has 
been to off-load or to outsource the provision of social services - traditionally the 
province of government, to community and voluntary agencies (Sosin & Smith 
2006). In their corporate governance research on religious non-profit entities, 
Sosin and Smith (2006:533) reveal the increasing importance of these religious 
organisations in the non-profit sector: these religious “agencies are now widely 
expected to deliver uniquely beneficial services and to mobilize social capital to 
compensate” for the growing decrease in “some governmental program.” As 
with the UK, the corporate governance literature of NFPs is very much driven by 
legal developments within the “secular” (Sosin & Smith 2006:534) world of 
business (Hasenpflug 2012).
Hasenpflug, (2012:420) contends that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) was 
“specifically aimed only at the for-profit sector...”; however, in the wake of the 
scandals -  both in the private sector (Enron, for example) and nonprofit sector
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(United Way and the American Red Cross), the ensuing debate was about: 
“whether non-profit entities should not be held accountable to the same or 
similar standard.” In the US, Nezhina and Brudley (2012) found that “about half 
the surveyed nonprofits” had already “adopted provisions of the act and 
experienced effects in proportion to the level of adoption.” The researchers also 
found that “one in four of the nonprofits attributed benefits of better financial 
controls and reduced risk of accounting fraud to the adoption of the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act” (Nezhina & Brudley 2012:321). It appears that corporate governance 
in the US non-profit sector is driven by developments within the for-profit sector, 
for example: the Sarbanes Oxley Act (One Hundred Seventh Congress of the 
United States of America 2002). However, as with Wells (2012), Smith and 
Richmond (2007:84) argue that more corporate governance research into the 
US non-profit sector “is needed in order to examine the effect of improved 
corporate accountability on donor funding. This form of research is timely and 
practical for the nonprofit sector, particularly in the wake of economical 
downturns that have negatively impacted fundraising.”
Given that the much in the non-profit sector is driven by developments in the 
business, for-profit sector, the following section provides a review of the 
literature on corporate governance in business.
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2.3 Agency Theory
It is company law and the regulatory environment which give a company its 
structure and corporate governance mechanisms; for example the company 
board, its legal, organisational structure and disclosure requirements such as 
audits and financial returns (Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008; Abraham, 2008). 
Bauwhede and Willekens (2008:106) state that “the legal tradition on which a 
country's legal system is based is a significant determinant of the level of 
mandatory disclosures.” Examples of disclosure requirements are provided by 
Abraham (2008) in his thesis on disclosure practices and firm performance; 
these include annual reports, press releases and quarterly financial reports, as 
well as meetings between the management, analysts and institutional investors.
Whilst she notes the growing prominence of corporate governance as a subject 
of interest and an evolving discipline, Mallin (2007:11) acknowledges that “the 
theories underlying the development of corporate governance, and the areas it 
encompasses, date from much earlier and are drawn from a variety of 
disciplines;” these include: “finance, economics, accounting, law, management, 
and organizational behaviour.” Excellent reviews of the theoretical frameworks 
underpinning corporate governance are provided by Mallin, (2007:12); Brennan 
and Solomon (2008:886); Solomon, (2010:8). Theories commonly found in 
corporate governance literature include: transaction costs economics, 
(Williamson 1988; Earl &Potts 2011); stakeholder theory, (Jensen 2001; Egels- 
Zanden & Sandberg 2010; Kwanji 2006; 155); resource-based theory 
(Nicholson & Kiel 2007); and stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis 1991; 
Donaldson & Davis 1993).
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A closer examination of stakeholder theory reveals that this 'theory' is “a 
conceptual blend, concocted from a variety of disciplines and producing a blend 
of appealing sociological and organizational flavours” (Solomon 2010:15). 
According to Solomon (2010:15), 'stakeholder theory' is not so much a theory, 
but rather “a broad research tradition, incorporating philosophy, ethics, political 
theory, economics, law and organizational social science.” This view is also 
shared by Jensen (2001) who argues that stakeholder theory is vague because 
it is “incomplete as a specification, ” and is founded on “sociology, 
organisational behaviour, the politics of special interests, and managerial self 
interest” (Jensen 2001:229). The theory claims that “managers should make 
decisions so as to take into account the interests of all the stakeholders in a 
firm”, states Jensen (2001:15); whilst this plausible, Jensen (2001:15) baulks 
when “stakeholders in a firm” is also taken to include “terrorists, blackmailers 
and thieves.” The 'vagueness' of stakeholder theory lends itself to 
misinterpretation and confusion (Egels-Zanden & Sandberg, 2010).
Agency theory, however, appears to be the leading theoretical framework in the 
current epistemology of corporate governance (Roberts, McNulty & Stiles 
2005). Lan and Heracleous (2010:294) observe that agency theory: “has 
become a cornerstone of the corporate governance field, not only in terms of its 
impact on the literature but also in terms of policy and practice." This seems to 
be the general consensus amongst scholars; many acknowledge that this 
theory is “the dominant theoretical approach within corporate governance” 
literature (Rost et a /2008:2); this view is echoed by Donaldson and Davis,
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(1993:218); Schleifer and Vishny, (1997:740); Filatotchev (2005:9); Williams et 
al, (2006:54); Roberts et al, (2005:7); Ryan and Schneider, (2003:398); Seal, 
(2006:389); Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman and Dykes, (2005:1507), Zhang, (2010:2); 
and Spira, (1998:10), amongst others.
Agency theory applies in the case of a company, where the separation of 
ownership and control makes it necessary for owners to engage professional 
managers to manage the entity (Clarke 2004:153). In this case, the owners of 
the entity become 'principals' - and the managers, their 'agents' (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976:5). According to this theory, agency conflicts arise when 
managers do not -  or appear not to -  manage the entity in the best interests of 
the owners; as agents, managers owe their principals a fiduciary duty of care 
(Eldomiaty 1998:50; Li 2008:13; McColgan 2004:26; Kwanji 2004:181). An 
excellent assessment and review of agency theory is provided by Eisenhardt 
(1989). Eisenhardt, (1989:58) explains that this theory “is concerned with 
resolving two problems” which occur when “(a) the desires or goals of the 
principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to 
verify what the agent is actually doing.”
Managers have considerable powers because they exercise direct control over 
the operations of the entity and they control the flow of market sensitive 
commercial information (Verrecchia 2001:173); managers are therefore able to 
abuse their executive powers (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Fama & Jensen 1983). 
The recent corporate scandals, also known as “managerial expropriation” 
(Dedman 2003:336), are examples of management malfeasance (Wearing
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2005; Clark 2009). Essentially, agency theory provides that there should be 
checks and balances which make it possible to verify whether managers are 
acting in their owners’ best interests (Sullivan & Diacon 1999:363); also, the 
theory assumes that managers are less likely to breach their fiduciary duty, if 
their interests are aligned with those of their principals (Florackis 2007:68).
The need for ‘checks-and-balances’ gives rise to mechanisms of corporate 
governance (Clarke 2004:154); the desire to align managers’ interests with 
those of their owners leads to the wide-spread use of company-specific, 
performance-based measurements (Cadbury 1992; Rediker & Seth 1995:86). 
Mechanisms of corporate governance, internal to a company, include the 
company’s board of directors, the various board committees (Spira & Bender, 
2004; Tipuric, Tusek & Filipovic 2009), and related compliance procedures and 
processes (Holm & Scholer (2010). External mechanisms of corporate 
governance include individual and institutional shareholders (California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System 2008) who have voting rights (Holland 1999), 
rating agencies, regulators, the takeover market (Sinha 2004), and legislation 
(OCED, 2004). In terms of performance, managers are commonly judged 
according to financial and efficiency measures; key performance indicators 
(KPIs) include: share price profitability; the efficient deployment of resources 
and the economic return on assets (Demirag, Sudarsanam & Wright 2000; 
Denis & McConnell, 2003; MacNeil & Li, 2006; Abdullah, 2007; Fisher & 
Downes, 2008).
Audits are also another form of corporate governance mechanism (Tipuric et al
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2009; Li 2008; Spira 1998); for example, the increasing importance and the 
changing role of internal audits are discussed in-depth by Savcuk (2007). 
Savcuk (2007) elevates the status of internal audits from a nondescript, low 
level assurance activity to that of high level strategic function; Savcuk 
(2007:283) argues that the growing levels of risk, uncertainty and change on a 
global scale make audits even more indispensable as a "strategic" management 
function for companies that operate trans-nationally. The following section 
seeks to identify the distinguishing features of corporate governance.
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2.4 The Key Concepts of Corporate Governance
Corporate governance is defined by Cadbury (1992, paragraph 2.5) as: “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled.” Cadbury (1992) 
makes clear that corporate governance is merely one of the many 
“responsibilities of the board”; other obligations “include setting the company’s 
strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their 
stewardship.” Effective corporate governance is founded on “openness, integrity 
and accountability.” Accountability is a key feature of corporate governance, 
acknowledges Keohane, (2008), who suggests that for there to be 
accountability, the following must be present: standards, information and 
sanctions; these in turn suggest the need for transparency and disclosure 
(Roberts etal, 2005; Gill, 2008; Orin 2008).
Cadbury (1992, paragraph 1.1) states that “effective accountability” is “the 
essence of any system of good corporate governance.” “Disclosure” is also 
another important element of corporate governance; this is because the 
disclosure of information in a timely and appropriate manner: "prompts boards 
to take effective action and allows shareholders and others to scrutinise 
companies more thoroughly" (Cadbury 1992, paragraph 3.2).
The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, commonly
referred to as the “OECD”, defines corporate governance as: “a set of
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders
and other stakeholders (OECD, 2004:11). According to the OECD (2004:11),
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“an effective corporate governance system, within an individual company [...] 
helps to provide a degree of confidence that is necessary for the proper 
functioning of a market economy.” One consequence of good corporate 
governance is lower capital costs where “firms are encouraged to use resources 
more efficiently, thereby underpinning growth.” A company's corporate 
governance framework does not exist in isolation; it is influenced by many 
factors which are external to the company. These include “the legal, regulatory, 
and institutional environment” (OECD, 2004:12). Schleifer and Vishny, 
(1997:738) too, make similar references to the external environment; however, 
they also recognize that corporate governance is also influenced by the 
“political process” as well.
Interestingly, the UK's Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Financial 
Reporting Council 2008), commonly referred to as the “Combined Code”, does 
not provide a stock definition of corporate governance. However, it states the 
purpose and the expected positive outcome of practising good corporate 
governance: “Good corporate governance should contribute to better company 
performance by helping a board discharge its duties in the best interests of 
shareholders...” (Financial Reporting Council, 2008:1). What is the expected 
negative outcome of not practising good corporate governance? In the words of 
the Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council 2008:1): “if it is ignored, the 
consequence may well be vulnerability or poor performance.” Amongst other 
things, the Combined Code provides detailed guidelines regarding the 
composition, structure and duties of the board; the board is obliged to 
demonstrate accountability and disclosure; the Code also provides guidelines
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regarding the board's relationship with its shareholders. For a more elaborate 
discussion on and overview of boards, see Ong and Wan (2008), Albert- 
Roulhac and Breen (2005), and Albert-Roulhac (2007).
The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN, 2009:2) believes that 
companies which "live up to high quality corporate governance standards [...] 
will be better able to take the decisions which will protect and enhance value for 
their long-term shareholders." Like Cadbury (1992), the ICGN (2009:2) assigns 
the responsibility for corporate governance to a company's board of directors; it 
states: "Boards with high standards of corporate governance will be better able 
to make robust strategic decisions, to challenge and promote the effectiveness 
of management’s operational oversight of the business and to oversee the 
approach to risk management. This process enhances investor returns over 
time."
Abdullah (2007:4) provides a relatively short definition of corporate governance 
in his thesis on corporate governance and firm performance: "In general 
corporate governance comprises regulation and best practice under which a 
company's management is accountable for the efficient management of the 
business and the attainment of its business objective and legal compliance." 
Abdullah's (2007:4) reference to compliance may be embellished by Demirag et 
al (2000:348) who regard corporate governance as: “a framework for effective 
monitoring, regulation, and control of companies, which allows alternative 
internal and external mechanisms for achieving the underlying objectives.” 
These mechanisms include those that are internal to the firm and its
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organization, and those external to the firm, such as credit rating agencies (Kim 
& Norfsinger 2008; Duff & Einig, 2009; Cox 2007; Strier 2008), the statutory and 
regulatory environment (Kim & Prescott 2005), and market forces such as 
corporate take-overs (Kini, Kracaw & Mian, 2004; Sinha 2004).
Denis and McConnell (2003:2) define corporate governance “as the set of 
mechanisms—both institutional and market-based—that induce the self- 
interested controllers of a company (those that make decisions regarding how 
the company will be operated) to make decisions that maximize the value of the 
company to its owners...” Denis and McConnell, (2003:2) note that mechanisms 
may be within, and without, the company, namely: “internal mechanisms of 
primary interest are the board of directors and the equity ownership structure of 
the firm. The primary external mechanisms are the external market for 
corporate control (the takeover market) and the legal system."
Finally, Solomon (2010:6) defines corporate governance as: “the system of 
checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensure 
that companies discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in 
a socially responsible way in all areas of their business activity.” The central 
purpose of corporate governance is highlighted by Mallin (2007:1) who affirms, 
with reference to the recent corporate scandals, that corporate “collapses” are a 
result of the “lack of effective corporate governance...”; “good corporate 
governance can help prevent such collapses happening again and restore 
investor confidence.”
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Our overview of the various perceptions of corporate governance, in the 
paragraphs above, enables us to make the following observations: in Cadbury 
(1992), one theme which emerges is the mechanisms of corporate governance, 
when Cadbury (1992) refers to this method of management as a "system" of 
direction and control, and to “responsibilities of the board”. Another theme is 
that of disclosure: "accountability”, “reporting to”, and “openness”. In the case of 
the OCED (2004), corporate governance 'mechanisms' is also a recurring 
theme: this involves a "system" of "relationships", the “board”, “shareholders” 
and “stakeholders”. We discover the "consequence" of corporate governance 
on performance, namely: "confidence" and "growth". The positive 
“consequence” of good corporate governance on performance is also affirmed 
in the Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council 2008), namely: "better 
company performance". Conversely, the absence of good corporate 
governance results in "poor performance." The Combined Code asserts that 
one result of good corporate governance is an "efficient, effective [...] 
management" which helps the "board discharge its duties", that is: positive 
performance.
The ICGN (2009) too shares the now familiar view that corporate governance is 
a board responsibility. The performance theme is repeated here: good 
corporate governance ensures the "effectiveness of management's operational 
oversight"; this in turn results in enhanced "investors’ returns over time." The 
mechanisms of corporate governance and compliance are also obvious in 
Abdullah (2007:4), when he describes corporate governance in terms of: "legal 
compliance", "rules" and "best practice." The implied purpose of corporate
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governance is "efficient management" -  as per the OECD's (2004) definition 
above, which results in the "attainment o f  a company's business objectives.
As with Abdullah (2007:4) and the OCED (2004), Demirag et al (2000:348), 
refer to the mechanisms of corporate governance as: "a framework for effective 
monitoring”, and to compliance as: "regulation", "control"; furthermore, 
according to the authors, corporate governance has a definite impact on 
performance: the company is able to succeed in "achieving the underlying 
objectives." The emphasis on "mechanisms" is further reinforced by Denis and 
McConnell (2003:2), in their definition of corporate governance as consisting of 
an effective "set of mechanisms" which results in positive performance, namely: 
the maximization of a company's value for the benefit of its owners. Solomon 
(2010:1) too emphasizes the “mechanisms” aspect of corporate governance, 
with reference to: "the system of checks and balances, both internal and 
external to companies", as well as "accountability".
From the foregoing discourse, it is now obvious that corporate governance is a 
board level responsibility which is critical to good management (Haspeslagh 
2010:376). Udueni (1999:64) confirms that the board of directors are “the 
highest decision making unit of the public corporation.” The concept of good 
corporate governance can therefore be summarized into three key principles 
(Bozec 2005:1926), namely: (1) the mechanisms of corporate governance; (2) 
compliance with corporate governance; and (3) performance: good corporate 
governance -  effective mechanisms and compliance - is expected to have a 
positive impact of on a company's performance, or in the words of Jensen
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(2001:299): “value maximization.” Whilst good corporate governance is said to 
have a positive impact on performance, we also know that a “whole host of 
factors drives corporate performance” (Ward, Brown & Rodriguez 2009:657), for 
example: the company's own strategy, its resources, the industry in which it 
operates, and the external environment in which it finds itself (Porter 1985; 
Filatotchev 2005; Lasserre 2007; Johnson, Scholes & Whittington, 2008).
This leads us to ask: does good corporate governance really affect 
performance? What empirical evidence is there to prove the relationship 
between the three key constructs of corporate governance? In the following 
section, we sample the available research findings to analyse the link between 
corporate governance mechanisms, compliance and firm performance.
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2.5 Critical Evaluation of the Relationship between 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Compliance and 
Performance
Our literature review indicates there exists a large body of evidence which 
supports the argument of a link between corporate governance and firm 
performance (Colley et al, 2005). Equally, there is also a body of research 
which argues that there is no relationship between the two. This section, 
beginning with Adams, Mansi and Nishikawa (2010), contains a sample from 
our review which supports the view that there is a relationship between 
corporate governance and performance. The later part of this section, beginning 
with Dalton et al (1998), contains a sample of the literature which argues 
against such a view.
Adams et al (2010) analysed the relationship between the internal mechanisms 
of corporate governance and firm performance. The role of the board, according 
to Adams et al, (2010:1261), is to monitor and evaluate the performance of 
“senior management.” “Board structure” and “composition” is therefore “central 
to board effectiveness.” Using index mutual funds companies as the focus of 
their research, their data involved a sample of 148 mutual funds, covering a 
period of 9 years, from 1998 until 2007. Via hypothesis testing and regression 
analysis, Adams et al, (2010:1264) found that board composition and structure 
are "linked to superior performance." Adams et al (2010:1264) also found 
evidence to support their "hypotheses that organizational form [...] as an internal 
governance mechanism plays an important role in determining operational 
performance."
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Bozec (2005:1921) analysed the relationship between board characteristics on 
firm performance i.e.: structure (size) and composition (independence) and 
composition, combined with market competition. Bozec (2005) used a sample of 
25 Canadian State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), covering a 4 year period, from 
1976 to 2000. Bozec (2005:1923) used five financial indicators to define 
performance: return on revenue, return on assets, and efficiency measures 
expressed in terms of sales, net income, and the ratio of assets turnover. Using 
quantitative analysis, his study concluded that there is a positive relationship 
between internal corporate governance mechanism and firm performance. 
However, for this form of mechanism to be effective, the firm, specifically the 
board, has to be effectively exposed to the competitive environment.
Using linear regression models, Campbell et al (2011:475) examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance in terms of board 
structure and size and the "returns to acquirer shareholders." They analysed 
132 Real Estate Investment Trusts companies (REIT), covering a period of nine 
years, from 1997 to 2006. They used "variables as proxying for internal and 
external control devices." Amongst other things, Campbell et al, (2011:454) 
found that the size of a board affects a firm's value: "larger boards are 
associated with greater valuation loss." This is because large boards tend to 
"lack focus and cohesion" and this affects "effective monitoring." Board 
structure, in terms of whether directors are allowed to own shares and the 
duration of tenure, also affects a company's performance; they found that 
directors who have a vested interest in the company via share ownership are
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more likely to protect the company's valuation. The duration of tenure also has 
an impact on company performance: long engagement contracts, “usually an 
indication of entrenchment, is detrimental to shareholder value.”
In the previous section on agency theory, we explained how managers exercise 
considerable power because they possess and control commercially sensitive 
information. The dissemination and timely disclosure of such information is 
important because it is used especially by investors for decision-making 
purposes. The incomplete or untimely disclosure of information leads to a 
condition known as ‘information asymmetry’. Chiang (2005:95) examines 
information asymmetry in terms of "information transparency" and its impact on 
a company's financial performance. In corporate governance, information refers 
to company details such as "board size, board ownership, institution ownership, 
financial transparency, information disclosure, and board and management 
structure and process."
Ghiang (2005) hypothesizes that the more 'transparent' a company is about 
such information, the more positive is its performance. Using multiple 
regression modelling on 225 high-tech companies listed in Taiwan, Chiang 
(2005:99) tests his hypotheses and finds that "corporate transparency does 
have a significant positive relationship with operating performance." Chiang's 
(2005) findings are also supported by Abdellatif (2009) in his investigation into 
information asymmetry and company performance. Using quantitative analysis, 
Abdellatif (2009:218) found that: “the higher the quality of corporate governance 
the lower the degree of asymmetric information.” Superior financial performance
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is not the only benefit of good corporate governance. According to Chiang 
(2005:95), other benefits of compliance with good corporate governance include 
the prevention of fraud. The importance of good corporate governance in 
reducing or preventing fraud is also supported by Levi and Morgan (2002) in 
their paper on corporate governance and corporate crime.
Transparency is the research theme of Siala et al, (2009:16) who analyse "the 
impact of the combination of the external audit reputation and of internal 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance"; specifically, they 
investigate "the effect of interference between external audit reputation and 
certain other governance structures known for their role in reducing the effect of 
agency conflict (particularly ownership structure and the board of directors) on 
performance." They use hypothesis-testing and regression analysis on 467 non- 
financial Canadian firms, from 11 industries, covering a period of 2 years, from 
2002 to 2004. Amongst other things, Siala etal, (2009:25) find that: “transparent 
and reasonable governance structures exert a positive impact on a company." 
These structures include an audit committee which is highly competent; 
‘competency’ is ensured by the presence of "an expert in accounting or 
finance."
Setia-Atmaja (2009) investigated the effect of corporate governance from the 
aspect of owner-concentration on factors such as board and audit committee 
independence. He tested his hypotheses on 316 listed companies in Australia. 
Setia-Atmaja's (2009:707) empirical research suggests that the degree to which 
a board is independent affects the value of a firm. Likewise, Abdullah's (2007)
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thesis on corporate governance and firm performance sought to analyse the 
relationship between firm performance and board structure. Abdullah's 
(2007:151) empirical findings conclude, inter alia, that there is “evidence of 
relationship between board independence and board size with firm 
performance.”
Wang (2010) examines the relationship between the quality of disclosure, a 
proxy for a firm's internal control, and the careers of Chief Financial Officers 
(CFOs). Using hypothesis testing and regression analysis on a sample of 
companies which come under the purview of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, Wang 
(2010:917) finds that there is an "increase in the levels of CFO salary, bonus, 
and total compensation in the post-SOX period compared to the pre-SOX 
period for firms with strong internal controls, and a significant decrease in those 
areas for firms with weak internal controls." Wang (2010:917) also finds that 
there is "significant increases in CFO turnover rates only in firms with weak 
internal controls."
Holm and Scholer (2010) analyse the effect of transparency and board 
independence on disclosure. Using hypothesis testing and multiple linear 
regression on a sample of 100 companies listed on the stock exchange of 
Copenhagen, Denmark, with data published 2004, Holm and Scholer (2010:40) 
find that "the more the company is exposed to the international capital market, 
the more likely is the company to choose a high level of corporate governance 
transparency.” Their results lead Holm and Scholer (2010:34) to conclude: "The 
effect of increased disclosure is improved transparency"
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Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) examine the disclosure of corporate 
governance information by companies listed on the FTSE Eurotop 300. 
Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) hypothesize that share ownership affects the 
level of disclosure; they also hypothesize that the legal environment also 
influences the level of disclosure; disclosure is important because it reduces a 
firm's cost of capital. Amongst other things, Bauwhede and Willekens 
(2008:113) findings support the argument that companies disclose more 
corporate governance information in order to reduce information asymmetry and 
to reduce agency costs; one of the key reasons managers engage in disclosure 
is to improve the level of trust between the company and stakeholders. Their 
study also confirms that the size of a firm affects the level of disclosure.
Abraham (2008) provides examples of corporate governance disclosure 
practices; these include annual reports, press releases, quarterly financials, 
analysts meetings and conference calls. The author found that one reason why 
companies disclose corporate information voluntarily is because this is 
positively viewed by investors. Voluntary disclosure overcomes the problem 
posed by information asymmetry i.e.: the lack of timely and up-to-date 
information, from management, to stakeholders such as investors and 
regulatory authorities. Abraham's (2008:12) findings confirmed that “there is a 
positive relation between equity offers and disclosure ratings...” Another 
motivation for disclosure is managerial 'self-preservation': the perpetual threat of 
job losses “is one explanation for increased disclosure, in order to explain away 
poor stock performance" (Abraham, 2008:13).
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Dedman (2002:349) finds that compliance with good corporate governance has 
a positive effect on board and management processes; these positive effects 
were evident in terms of reduced "accounting manipulation" and "that top 
executives are more likely to be disciplined for poor performance." Referring to 
the Cadbury Report (1992), precursor of the Combined Code, (Financial 
Reporting Council 2008), as the benchmark of good corporate governance, 
Dedman (2002:350) observes that compliance with the Report's principles of 
good practice serves to "improve the way boards operate."
In his investigation into the relationship between corporate governance 
compliance and firm performance, Shabbir (2007:57) found that “more 
compliant firms enjoy a higher total shareholder return (TSR)...” Eldomiaty's 
(1998:201) thesis into corporate governance compliance and company 
performance found that a firm's identity (market perception of the firm) affects a 
firm's performance and “its relative position in the marketplace.” He 
conceptualised the factors which influences a company's identity as being its 
client list, its “reputation for innovation and change”, its network of partners and 
competitors, and its external intermediaries. An example of a firm's performance 
indicator used by Eldomiaty (1998:203) is the company's return on asset (the 
ROA).
The way boards operate (board process), and their impact on a company’s 
performance is also the subject of much corporate governance research; ‘board 
process’ includes the level of activity generated by board directors, for example:
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in terms of the number of times board meet. Evans, Evans and Loh (2002:18) 
analysed board process by investigating the frequency of board meetings, 
amongst other things. Using hypothesis testing and regression analysis on 65 
poorly performing Australian companies, the researchers found that “companies 
going through prolonged periods of decline respond by increasing the number 
of board meetings.” Evans et al (2002:11) conclude that: “meeting frequency 
was influential in improving operating performance...” This is because regular 
meetings enable directors to “to confer, set strategy and monitor management.”
The relationship between how frequently boards meet and their impact on firm 
performance is also investigated in an earlier piece of research by Vafeas 
(1999). Using hypothesis testing and regression analysis, Vafeas (1999:125) 
analysed 307 companies in the US, covering a four year period, from 1990- 
1994, using each company’s annual proxy statements as proxy for board 
meetings. Performance was measured financially, using indicators such as the 
“ratio of capital expenditures to sales and by research & development to sales,” 
and market capitalization.
Consistent with Evans et al (2002) above, Vafeas (1999:140) found that "boards 
respond to poor performance by raising their level of board activity, which in 
turn is associated with improved operating performance." The relationship 
between frequency of board meetings and firm performance is particularly 
analysed and confirmed by Brown and Caylor (2004). In their statistical analysis 
of 2,327 companies, Brown and Caylor (2004:27) found, amongst other things, 
that one of the “factors associated most often with good performance are all
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directors attended at least 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse for 
non-attendance.”
Empirical research by Wan and Ong (2005:285) on 212 companies found that 
board process is correlated with board performance. The same research found 
that the structure of a board does not affect the way it operates ("board 
process"). The authors conceptualise board process by the following constructs: 
the degree of effort expended by board members in discharging their board 
duties ("general effort norms"), the skills displayed and used by board members 
("usage of skills"), constructive engagement ("cognitive conflict") as opposed to 
"affective conflict". For board members, these translate in practice into more 
and better preparation for board meetings, meaningful engagements (“debates”) 
and greater utilization of the skills which they bring to the table. These result in 
“higher quality strategic decisions” (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999).
Donaldson and Davis (1991) investigate board structure (CEO-Chairman 
duality) on company performance in terms of shareholders returns. Donaldson 
and Davis (1991) adopt agency and stewardship theories to develop four 
hypotheses; agency theory argues against duality, whilst stewardship theory 
argues that the shared roles of chairman and CEO are compatible and 
welcomed. Using hypothesis testing on a sample of 321 US publicly listed 
companies, from a cross-section of multiple industries, Donaldson and Davis 
(1991:54) provide evidence that board composition (the absence of duality) has 
a positive impact on company performance.
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Harjoto and Jo (2008) analyse the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance; the mechanism they focus on is board structure, that is: 
the leadership of the board, and its influence on the value of the firm and 
operating results. Harjoto and Jo (2008) use hypothesis testing and multiple 
regression analysis on a sample of 2,681 firms in the US, covering a period of 
10 years, from 1995 to 2005. Harjoto and Jo (2008:152) find sufficient evidence 
to support the view that there is a relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance, namely: "that too much concentration of CEO power is 
followed by decrease in firm value and operating performance."
Nanka-Bruce (2011:28) analyses the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance in terms of board composition (size) and structure 
(share ownership and leadership); the firm's performance is defined in terms of 
'technical efficiency' (“TE”); TE is defined as: "the situation where, given an 
existing technology, a firm cannot produce a larger output from the same inputs 
or the same output with less of one or more inputs without increasing the 
amount of other inputs." Using hypothesis testing and various statistical 
techniques, he analyses a sample of manufacturing companies from the US 
and Europe. Nanka-Bruce (2011:35) concludes that corporate governance 
compliance "can contribute to a better TE by increasing the shares of large 
external shareholders who have signalled credibly against expropriation of 
minority investors, and using small insider-dominated or balanced boards with 
unified leadership."
The take-over market, also commonly referred to as “M&A” (mergers and 
acquisition) is another form of corporate governance mechanism which is
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external to the firm. Kini et al (2004) analysed a "sample of 279 successful 
corporate takeovers of U.S. targets" covering the beginning of 1979 to the end 
of 1998. Using quantitative analysis, they found that when a company's internal 
mechanisms of corporate governance are weak, the "corporate takeover market 
acts." The take-over market is therefore an example of an external corporate 
mechanism which intervenes when “internal control mechanisms are relatively 
weak or ineffective” (Kini etal, 2004:1512).
Not all empirical research supports the view that there is a proven relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms compliance, and firm performance. 
Herewith, beginning with Dalton et a /(1998), we present a sample of the 
research on corporate governance which argues that there is no conclusive 
evidence to support this link. Dalton et al (1998) conducted a meta-analysis of 
various empirical studies which investigated the relationship between various 
mechanisms of corporate governance and firm performance. Specifically,
Dalton et al, (1998:270) meta-analysed "54 empirical studies of board 
composition" and "31 empirical studies of board leadership structure.” The 
results of their meta-analysis "suggest no relationship of a meaningful level"; 
their analysis of the relationship between board structure and firm performance 
revealed "no evidence of a substantive relationship" (Dalton et al, 1998:282).
Whilst Demirag (2004:20) recognizes that accountability is an integral "part of 
the governance process", he observes that research on the link between 
accountability and company performance "is limited"; Demirag (2004:19) 
asserts that there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that “improved
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governance and enhanced accountability could result in better performance.”
He suggests that this is because the concepts of accountability and 
performance "are very complex” and that they are “not fully understood...” 
Demirag (2004:23) mentions the need for “access and transparency to state 
regulatory mechanisms.”
Gill et a/'s (2009) review of the literature on corporate governance and firm 
performance focuses on three aspects of mechanisms, namely board 
characteristics, disclosure and directors' share ownership. Like Demirag 
(2004:23), Gill et al (2009) note that "transparency" is an integral part of 
corporate governance if there is to be effective disclosure of information. 
However, Gill et al, (2009:21) are doubtful about the link between these 
variables and conclude that: "there is no concrete answer to the relationship 
between the corporate governance mechanisms and a firm’s performance."
Sullivan and Diacon's, (1999:363) research on corporate governance examined 
“the relationship between internal and external governance mechanisms” of 
mutual and proprietary insurance companies; their quantitative research was 
restricted to the insurance companies based in the UK. Questionnaires were 
sent to 181 companies; 129 replies were received, representing a response rate 
of 71 percent. Their research focused on three aspects of internal mechanisms: 
“board composition and leadership", the use and make-up of board committees 
(remuneration and audit), and company-external auditor relationships. Their 
findings failed to prove any substantive differences between the mechanisms of 
mutual and proprietary insurance companies.
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Korac-Kakabadse et al (2001:24) surveyed the research on the relationship 
between board governance and company performance, and determined that 
there is no conclusive evidence to suggest a definite relationship between the 
mechanisms and compliance of corporate governance, and performance. The 
researchers acknowledge that whilst "there is a growing literature linking 
corporate governance to company performance, there is, equally, a growing 
diversity of results." At best, Korac-Kakabadse et al (2001:24) admit, 
compliance with corporate governance has some influence on how a company 
operates: "corporate governance has, at least, an indirect effect on company 
performance."
Nicholson and Kiel (2007) adopt a case-study methodology in their analysis of 
corporate governance and performance. They utilize a small sample of seven 
small to large companies in Australia, arguing that corporate governance is a 
"complex and evolving" subject and attempts to comprehend the "process" 
aspect of management requires "a methodology that could analyse rich data 
within specific contexts." Nicholson and Kiel (2007:590) hypothesized that the 
high quality of a company's corporate governance, for instance board structure, 
has the “corporate process effect” of ensuring high compliance, which in turn 
results in high performance. Similarly, if a company's corporate governance is 
less than desirable, this has the “corporate process effect” of low compliance, 
which in turn results in low performance. However, their findings proved 
negative. Amongst other things, Nicholson and Kiel (2007:600) concluded that 
“our findings have failed to identify a positive relationship between” corporate
51
governance and performance.
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) examine the relationship between board 
structure and firm performance to determine whether board independence, 
ownership, and leadership, i.e. separation of roles of the CEO and chairman, 
affects firm performance. They analysed a sample of 250 public listed UK 
companies, using data for the fiscal year 1994. Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998:384) anticipated that "these board monitoring characteristics are 
expected to lead to higher corporate performance." Using hypothesis testing 
and statistical analysis, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998:403) admitted that their 
results failed to demonstrate "an unconditional empirical link between board 
structure and firm performance."
Weir and Lang (2000) examined the relationship between corporate governance 
and performance in terms of board structure i.e.: duality, independent directors, 
and board committees. Taking a sample of 200 non-financial listed UK 
companies, they looked at data for two different financial years - 1992 and 
1995; the return on asset (ROA) and raw market returns were the two financial 
indicators used to measure performance. Amongst other things, Weir and Lang 
(2000:279) concluded: "results show that complete compliance with the model 
proposed by Cadbury does not appear to result in superior performance..."
Williams et al (2006) investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance in terms of duality, board independence, 
share ownership and the performance of IPO (initial public offerings)
52
companies. They used hypothesis testing and regression analysis on a sample 
of 190 healthcare and biotechnology companies; return on equity (ROE), return 
on assets (ROA), and economic value added (EVA) were used as measures of 
performance. Generally, Williams et al (2006:66) found that "there was no 
significant statistical" relationship between these corporate governance 
mechanisms and the performance of the sample IPO companies.
Though their findings were somewhat limited, the Williams etal, (2006) argued 
that their results would help company owners decide when during the life-cycle 
of the company would be the best time to focus on aspects of corporate 
governance matters: “Although our findings may be limited in this regard, they 
do suggest greater flexibility (on a contingent basis) for these entrepreneurs, 
with, perhaps, the important question not whether one should employ these 
mechanisms but when (i.e., under what circumstances should the entrepreneur 
employ these vehicles, if any)" (Williams et al, 2006:68).
We may summarize this section by concluding that the key constructs of 
corporate governance are: (a) mechanisms, (b) compliance, and (c) 
performance (Handley-Schachler, Juleff & Paron 2007). We also note that 
accountability, transparency and disclosure are an integral part of corporate 
governance (Archambeault, Dezoort, & Holt 2008). This conclusion could be 
presented in a simple diagram, as follows:
Table 2.5: Characteristics of Good Corporate Governance.
Source: present author
Mechanisms •  Compliance • Performance
(Evidence of ATD)
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2.6 Inconclusive Empirical Findings in Corporate 
Governance Research
We observe that the research into corporate governance, whilst extensive and 
broad, is contradictory and inconclusive (Florackis 2007:3). This brings us to 
ask: “Why?” One possible reason why there does not seem to be any 
conclusive evidence to confirm the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance is primarily because corporate governance is essentially a 
human endeavour which is very dependent on individual human beings -  the 
directors (Heracleous2001:166); corporate governance outcomes are the 
collective result of their behaviours (Walker 2009), values, and interactions 
(Pettigrew & McNulty 1998).
In as much as company directors, as human beings, are unique, so too are 
companies: all face different situations and dissimilar levels of complexities 
(Heracleous 2001). It is therefore reasonable to assume that the study of such a 
social and process-oriented setting would require an approach in which 
individual and collective real-life board-room behaviours (Udueni 1999), values 
(Spira & Bender (2004), dynamics (Long 2006; Seals 2006:391) and contexts 
(Nicholson & Kiel 2007:600), could be observed, captured and analysed 
(Pettigrew 1992; Demirag 2004:19; Roberts etal, 2005).
Unfortunately, the reality is that boardroom research is a “black-box”, where 
unfettered access is almost non-existent (Leblanc & Schwartz 2007:843). This 
is because boardroom deliberations are highly confidential and commercially
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sensitive (Spira 1998:39). Understandably, companies are reluctant to allow 
access; even if access were granted, a single snapshot of one or several board 
meetings may not be enough to gain sufficient data or evidence for the 
phenomenon which is being analysed (Maitlis 2004:1275; Pettigrew 1992:164).
The near impossibility of observing board process explains why much of 
corporate governance research appears to be quantitative in approach and is 
characterised by the considerable use of financial indicators as proxies for 
various types of firm performance (Sadaqat et al 2011). It is reasonable to 
argue that financial proxies -  highly defined and absolute, are not necessarily 
reliable indicators of human behaviour (Roberts et a /2005). Proxies, whilst 
convenient, useful, and informative, are incapable of describing a director's 
integrity and normative values, which eventually dictate executive behaviour 
(Donaldson 2012).
In addition, though researchers may follow the research methodology of those 
whose work they choose to replicate, it is usually very difficult to be certain, 
without physically comparing the actual data sets or seeking clarification from 
the researchers, whether the data sets are actually comparable (Donaldson and 
Davis 1993:221). Very often, research data is hardly included in the journal 
articles reviewed. Attempts to determine comparability of values and construct- 
definition between different researches can be messy, confusing and time- 
consuming.
Heracleous (2001) suggests another possible reason why empirical research
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produces conflicting results; these can be attributed to how research is 
designed and operationalized. Heracleous (2001:166) asserts that corporate 
governance researchers do not seem to acknowledge the notion of 
“complexity”; by “complexity” Heracleous (2001:166) means that companies 
operate in different environments and in circumstances which are generally 
complex. Consequently, no two companies are the same. However, this factor 
does not seem to be taken into account -  or is ignored - when research is 
operationalized. To improve the face validity of operationalisation, Heracleous
(2001) proposes qualitative research methods such as direct observation and 
in-depth interviews to identify and measure those aspects of complexity, for 
example - behaviour, which influence corporate governance outcomes.
The views expressed by Heracleous (2001) are shared by Filatotchev (2005:27) 
who argues “that there is a clear imbalance in the amount of research devoted 
to corporate governance” of companies which take into account the different 
circumstances and organizational context which companies experience. Udueni 
(1994:64), who appears to agree, explains: “Conflicting findings can be traced 
to the operationalisation” of the constructs which conceptualise corporate 
governance. 'Board composition' is an example of a construct which “has been 
operationalized and measured in several different ways and this has often led to 
confounding and inconsistent findings” (Udueni 1994:64). Substitutability and 
multicollinearity where one construct or factor could be easily substituted for 
another, are design considerations which, Udueni (1994:70) argues, 
researchers appear to have generally ignored.
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This leads to the problem of “endogeneity” (Vafeas & Theodorou 1998:404), or 
the question of “casual inference” (Tosi 2008:163), namely: do the factors and 
characteristics of corporate governance affect firm performance or are these 
affected by firm performance? Empirical findings on causal direction in 
corporate governance research are not conclusive; it is not uncommon to 
encounter 'caveats' regarding the issue of causality in many pieces of research, 
for example: Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004:40) present their evidence on 
management entrenchment and firm valuation but note briefly, that their findings 
do "not establish causality” because still more research on causal inference 
“needs to be done."
Similarly, whilst Holm and Scholer (2010:33) "acknowledge the endogenous 
nature of many (or most) corporate governance relationships," they justify the 
validity of their findings by arguing that "the interpretation of our findings should 
be considered in light of a major caveat related to causality." "Causality", Holm 
and Scholer (2010:33) explain, "is not our main concern." Likewise, Brown and 
Caylor (2004:32) present their findings on "corporate governance and firm 
performance" but caution that "our results do not necessarily imply causality.” 
Brown and Caylor (2004:32) argue that “Our caveat regarding absence of 
causality is consistent with other studies."
Certainly, “understanding causal relationships” is one of the challenges faced by 
“academics and code makers who want to understand” more about the 
relationship between good corporate governance and positive firm performance 
(Haspeslagh, 2010:375). Donaldson and Davis (1991:59) too conclude that
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there is “the need to do more research on causality.” However, does this mean 
that the validity of corporate governance research is lessened or made less 
relevant if it does not contain any data or test on causal relationship? Others 
like Balgobin (2008) argue not; even though “the causal relationship between 
governance and performance are mixed,” Balgobin (2008:11) reminds us that 
regulators still insist on compliance and evidence of ATD, and that “investors do 
shy away from firms and national or market environments where corporate 
governance is less established.”
Finally, whilst Piesse (2005:33) acknowledges the “conflicting empirical 
evidence” in her review on firm performance and corporate governance, she 
suggests that corporate governance research should focus more on other 
sectors in order to gain further insights into other aspects of mechanisms and 
types of performances. For instance, an “area that has been largely neglected 
in corporate governance research is the examination of organisations that 
operate with different objective functions. The not-for-profit sector is becoming 
increasingly important...; this has interesting implications for corporate 
governance and relative performance outcomes” (Piesse (2005:49).
We conclude this section with the views of Gilles and Morra (1997:4): “We could 
easily conclude, after perusing these carefully carried out regression analyses, 
that no statistically significant relationships exist between types of governance - 
when defined in terms of board organization - and firm performance. By 
extension, one could conclude that governance does not really matter. And yet, 
there is a reluctance to accept such a conclusion because most experienced
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directors are certain that there is a relationship between board structures, 
compositions, operations and results. The question is not so much whether 
governance matters, but whether a general statistical approach, particularly 
regression analysis, to studying corporate governance is appropriate. If it isn't, 
is there a better approach?” In the following section, we take the opportunity to 
evaluate two of corporate governance models most frequently referred to.
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2.7 Models of Corporate Governance
Two models of corporate governance are commonly referred to: the principles- 
led and the rules-based models. The principles-led model of corporate 
governance incorporates widely accepted principles of good practice, but seeks 
to avoid an approach which could be characterised as restrictive and highly 
prescriptive; the principles-led paradigm recognizes that companies are 
different, operate under different circumstances, and experience different levels 
of complexities. One attraction of the principles-led model of corporate 
governance is that it offers considerable latitude in the way that principles of 
good practice can be interpreted and adapted to the unique circumstances of 
each company. In contrast, the rules-based model of corporate governance is 
highly prescriptive; this model attempts to provide for varying eventualities and 
circumstances; its mind-set is to avoid doubt and to penalise violations.
2.7.1 Principles-led Model of Corporate Governance
The UK's Combined Code of Corporate Governance (Financial Reporting 
Council 2008) and the OECD Code of Corporate Governance (2004) exemplify 
the principles-led model of corporate governance. The Combined Code traces 
its pedigree to the Cadbury Report (1992); it is the latest version of the UK's 
continuing efforts to refine best practice (Dewing & Russell 2008:981). The 
Combined Code is the result of on-going refinements of previous Codes and 
Reports -  for example: the Cadbury Report (1992), Turnbull (1999), to name 
but a few. There is no denying the seminal importance of the Cadbury Report 
(1992). "Indeed, it seems that not only has the Cadbury code spawned a far-
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reaching agenda for corporate governance reform in the UK, but its 
recommendations are also being disseminated throughout the rest of the world" 
(Solomon 2008:51). The Cadbury code was also influential in the development 
of other codes such as the OECD's Code of Corporate of Governance (Balgobin 
2008:8; OECD 2004:5).
2.7.2 Rules-based Model of Corporate Governance
The United States' Sarbanes-Oxley Act (One Hundred Seventh Congress of the 
United States of America 2002) epitomises the 'rules-based' approach of 
corporate governance. The Act (2002) was promulgated “with an alacrity 
induced by general outrage” following the Enron scandal in 2001 (Clarke 
2004:159). Jones (2008:437) acknowledges the “haste” with which the Act 
(2002) was passed, but argues in favour of the law, stating that “even if the 
implementation was less than perfect,” this law served to “institute structural 
reforms to create constraints on misconduct that the pre-existing self regulatory 
regime failed to provide.” Prentice and Spence (2007), champions of the Act 
(2002), assert that haste was necessary because of the circumstances which 
took place within the context a high profile scandal involving several large 
corporates such as Enron and Arthur Andersen; these scandals would have 
wide and far ranging implications in the US and internationally. The Act (2002) 
was hastily introduced in order to restore the confidence desperately needed 
by investors, politicians, the markets, and voters. It was therefore necessary for 
the US legislators to be seen to be doing something.
Critics of the Act (2002) argue however, these circumstances were no excuse
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for bad laws which fail to achieve the objectives for which they were designed 
(Romano 2005). The Act (2002) is blamed for the dramatic decline of public 
listings on the US stock exchanges; the US had a 50 percent share of global 
public offerings in 2000, but only 5 percent in 2006 (Niskanen 2007). Tyler, 
Dienhart and Thomas (2008:43) criticise the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as “a set of 
the very sorts of rigid command-and-control-based compliance requirements 
that are demonstrably less effective than a values-and-integrity approach”; Tyler 
et al (2008:43) are doubtful that an increase in regulation will necessarily reduce 
corporate scandals by a similar degree; Tyler et al (2008:43) argue that the 
“stifling restrictions” of the Act (2002) are needlessly excessive and must 
therefore be “re-evaluated.”
Balgobin (2008) too is critical of governments' attempts, especially the US, to 
eradicate corporate scandals by introducing more regulations and guidelines 
which are complex and onerous; he is especially weary of the extra-territorial 
nature of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Instead, Balgobin (2008:18) prefers the 
flexible approach such as the one expounded by the OECD model (2004), 
asserting that it has “taken us closer to a universal appreciation of the desired 
outcomes of sound corporate governance systems, while not specifying the 
routes nations must take to achieve these results. This has, thus far, given 
countries the flexibility required to develop context-specific solutions rather than 
adopt ill-fitting ones.” For discussion on the impact and the effects of the Act
(2002) on the accounting profession and the financial world, see Petra and 
Loukatos (2009).
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2.7.3 The Combined Code (2008) and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), 
Compared
Though the Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council 2008) and the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of 
America 2002) -  “the Act “are widely referenced in corporate governance 
literature (UNCTAD 2006; Jones 2008; Long 2006; Rye & Pettigrew 2005; 
Walker 2009; Nwanji 2006), no direct comparison appears to have been made 
between the Combined Code and the Act to determine their respective 
characteristics. The Combined Code contains 2 sections and three 
accompanying schedules. It should be noted that almost all of the Combined 
Code’s principles relate directly to the company, specifically: the board of 
directors, issues of remuneration, audits, and the company's relations with 
shareholders. The second section, containing 2 pages only, is directed at 
institutional shareholders. The Combined Code contains a total of fourteen 
Principles and Supporting Principles, and fifty-one Code Provisions.
In comparison, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains 11 titles and 57 chapters. 
Three of these chapters are “short titles” (ss 801, 901, and 1101) and can 
therefore be ignored for the purpose of this comparison. The ‘chapters’ in the 
Act could be likened to the Code’s ‘supporting principles’. Unlike the Code, the 
Act covers aspects of governance which are external to the company. For 
example, the Act provides for penalties, something which the Combined Code 
does not. For instance, Section 903 of the Act is concerned with “criminal 
penalties for mail and wire fraud”, whilst Section 904 mentions “criminal 
penalties for violations of “ some other Act; if convicted, violators will “be fined
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under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both” (Section 807).
At the outset, the Combined Code is keen to clarify that it "is not a rigid set of 
rules." Whilst companies are expected to "comply wholly or substantially," the 
Combined Code recognises "that non-compliance may be justified in particular 
circumstances if good governance can be achieved by other means." It allows 
companies an appreciable amount of flexibility on the condition that the 
justifications for "non-compliance" are "explained to shareholders." The 
Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council 2008:1) labels this type of 
corporate governance the "comply or explain approach"; this flexible method of 
corporate governance "has been in operation since the Code's beginning in 
1992."
The Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council 2008:1) also claims that the 
"flexibility" offered by the 'comply or explain' approach "is valued by company 
boards and by investors in pursuing better corporate governance."
Nevertheless, the Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council 2008:2) is 
aware that the 'comply or explain' approach which it advocates could be easily 
abused and be superseded by a corporate governance regime which is rigidly 
compliant-focus; therefore, it warns: “Companies and shareholders have a 
shared responsibility for ensuring that ‘comply or explain’ remains an effective 
alternative to a rules-based system.”
The Combined Code is generally company-focused; it is concerned mainly with 
the internal workings of the company. The Combined Code makes no reference
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to the company's external environment or to those who may have a vested 
interest in the company's affairs. In contrast, the Act is far-ranging and takes 
into account a wide array of the environmental factors within which the company 
operates; for instance, it gives formal recognition to the various categories of 
stakeholders who may have a vested interest in the company, but are not 
necessarily shareholders. The table below highlights examples of the relevant 
sections of the Act; the company’s legal environment is referred to, in terms of 
other regulators, with penalties included. Stakeholders identified and provided 
for in the Act include: investors, whistle-blowers, and pensioners; the Act also 
intrudes upon the company's organisational culture by making provisions for the 
company's ethics.
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The Table below highlights the key features of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Table 2.7.3: Key Features of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (One Hundred 
Seventh Congress of the United States of America 2002). Source: 
present author
Environmental Factors Relevant Chapters of Act
Legal/Regulatory Environment: the establishment of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) (s101); enforcement 
(704);
penalties (s 304, s805, s903, s1106)
Multiple Stakeholders: Investors (s308); whistle-blowers 
(s806, s1107); securities analysts 
(s501); brokers and dealers (604); 
public accounting firms (s103, s701), 
credit rating agencies (s703), and 
pensioners (s306, s904).
Organisational Culture: Ethics (s406)
It is notable that the word “ethical” is mentioned once only in the Combined 
Code (Financial Reporting Council 2008:18), in relation “to the provision of non­
audit services by the external audit firm.” The Combined Code (Financial 
Reporting Council 2008:5) states that the “board should set the company’s 
values and standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders and 
others are understood and met.” However, no definition or further guidance is 
provided about what “values and standards” mean. In contrast, the Act 
mentions “ethics” on numerous occasions; The Act (One Hundred Seventh 
Congress of the United States of America 2002: section 404) goes further than 
the Combined Code by providing for a “code of ethics” and defining it as: “such 
standards as are reasonably necessary to promote (1) honest and ethical 
conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest 
between personal and professional relationships; (2) full, fair, accurate, timely,
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and understandable disclosure in the periodic reports required to be filed by the 
issuer; and (3) compliance with applicable governmental rules and regulations.”
Though this thesis is not about ethics, we refer to Orin (2008:142) who notes 
that the Act is “a daring effort to legislate morality.” The Act's code of ethics 
(One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America 2002: section 
404) is meant to be a “blueprint for internal corporate governance: one that 
formally delineates standards of acceptable conduct for all of a corporation’s 
officers, directors, and employees, including its internal accountants” (Orin, 
2008:142). However, Orin is doubtful that companies possess the depth of 
knowledge or the moral conviction necessary to teach their employees ethics. 
The reason, Orin (2008:145) explains, is that ethics as a subject has never 
been an integral part of education's curriculum; it has also never been taught “in 
any sort of systematic, formalised, or reliable way.”
In reality, Orin (2008:146) opines, “most people have received or will receive 
little to no formal education in ethics, but for the most elemental lessons of 
kindergarten.” It is therefore doubtful how meaningful these so-called 'codes of 
conduct' will be to company executives and board directors. Though many 
companies own and publish codes of conduct, Orin (2008) contends that these 
are inadequate because they do not directly address moral values of individual 
executives, nor do they “provide actual solutions to individual problems” (Orin, 
2008:148).
An opposing view is taken by Dewing and Russell, (2008), who argue that
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regulatory bodies possess the ability to make individuals personally 
accountable, and therefore to shift the emphasis from 'corporate' to 'individual' 
governance and accountability. Dewing and Russell (2008:979) refer to the 
UK's Financial Services Authority's (FSA) attempts to “safeguard the interest of 
stakeholders, such as consumers, depositors and policyholders, in particular” 
by the “introduction of the FSA’s approved persons’ regime which applies to 
individual senior managers at or below board level, including non-executive 
directors.” Due to the “welter of internalising and enforceable principles and 
codes, rules and regulations” contained therein, the approved persons' regime 
has the effect of making individuals personally accountable and compliant. 
Dewing and Russell (2008) argue that this regime make it possible to achieve 
“the individualization of corporate governance and the construction of auditable 
selves,” Dewing and Russell (2008:995).
Finally, though the Combined Code and the Act are comprehensive, stand­
alone pieces of guidelines and legislation - respectively, both make extensive 
references to the rules and legislation of other bodies. The Combined Code 
refers to the Financial Services Authority's (FSA) Listing Rules (LR) and the 
Disclosure & Transparency Rules (DTR). Amongst other things, LR 9.8.6 states 
that a company must describe how it “has applied the Main Principles set out in 
Section 1 of the Combined Code, in a manner that would enable shareholders 
to evaluate how the principles have been applied” (Financial Reporting Council 
2008:25). Section 7.2.10 of the DTR mandates that a company “which is 
required to prepare a group directors’ report within the meaning of Section 
415(2) of the Companies Act 2006 must include in that report a description of
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the main features of the group’s internal control and risk management systems 
in relation to the process for preparing consolidated accounts” (Financial 
Reporting Council 2008:27). Though the Combined Code is not prescriptive, at 
first glance, and grants companies the option to comply or explain, it is argued 
that the Code resorts to the rules and regulations of other bodies elsewhere to 
enforce compliance.
The Act too makes frequent references to the Stock Exchange Act of 1934, and 
the rules of the Stock Exchange Commission (SEC), amongst others. For 
example, CEOs and their chief financial officers (CFOs) are required to “certify 
that the periodic report containing the financial statements fully complies with 
the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that information contained in the periodic 
report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results 
of operations of the issuer” (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, section 1350 (b)). Other 
pieces of legislation include the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
1813), and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act: section 
604).
We conclude this section by acknowledging that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and the Combined Code, though different in approach, are not perfect; both 
have their detractors and critics. Much has been written, for example, about the 
high compliance costs associated with the implementation of the Act (Elson & 
Lynn, 2008; Stewart etal, 2009; Cosgrove & Niederjohn, 2008; Jeffrey, 2008). 
The Act places onerous reporting and disclosure requirements on a company's
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senior executive officers, the board, and on external stakeholders such as the 
company's auditors (Jones 2008:1071; Brown & Caylor 2004).
MacNeil and Li’s (2006:487) study of companies under the purview of the 
Combined Code finds that “only 34% of FTSE All Share companies were fully 
compliant” with the then Combined Code (2000). MacNeil and Li (2006:487) 
suggest that this is because investors are tolerant of “non-compliance”, and 
continue to be, so long as companies produce “superior financial performance 
(in terms of share price).” This non-compliance makes the 'comply or explain' 
approach a mockery, in their opinion. MacNeil and Li (2006) conclude that the 
Combined Code should actually be made part of company law. Whether this 
form of enforced compliance will effectively improve corporate governance is 
open to debate.
It may be argued that it is not for the Act and the Combined Code to legislate for 
the meaning of 'ethics'; however, it could also be argued that this is actually the 
implicit intent of the Code, and “a daring effort” (Orin 2008:142) by the Act. 
Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the Code and the Act share a common 
intent, namely: to ensure 'good' corporate governance', the practice and 
compliance of which should result in superior performance, and/or the 
prevention of fraud, corporate scandals and other transgressions which damage 
confidence, destroy wealth, and create uncertainty (Petra & Loukatos 2009).
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2.8 Extending the Boundaries of Corporate Governance 
Research
The arguments discussed in our review for alternative investigative approaches 
to corporate governance, is best summarised by Brennan and Solomon’s 
(2008) in their impressive review of corporate governance research; the authors 
call for a radical rethink of the ways in which research is conducted. Brennan 
and Solomon (2008:889) note that empirical research is dominated by agency 
theory and that the mechanisms of accountability are rooted in company law 
and legislation, for example: Board directors, auditors, and listing rules. 
Corporate governance research methodology is predominantly positivist, 
econometric, and hypothesis-testing; research is commonly focused on listed 
companies, within the context of corporate failures or scandals; the authors also 
note that the bulk of popular research and articles concentrate on the “Anglo- 
Saxon” markets of the first world economies; lastly, they note that the time 
frame is usually post-Cadbury and post-Enron.
Consequently, Brennan and Solomon (2008:890) argue that the boundaries of 
corporate governance research should be extended further; Brennan and 
Solomon (2008:890) urge researchers to: (1) adopt a “broader concept” of the 
existing “theoretical framework of accountability”; (2) examine a “broader range 
of mechanisms accountability” and analyse “different governance mechanisms”, 
including “governance regulations at the level of the individual”; (3) adopt other 
analytical techniques; these can include “newly developed econometric 
techniques, focus groups studies, content analysis, and archival analysis.”; (4) 
investigate other sectors and contexts, including the “charity, public and
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voluntary sectors” which “provide a rich source of data and a wide variety of 
mechanisms of accountability which require research.” ; (5) transcend the 
geographical divide; and (6) apart from the Cadbury and Enron era, consider 
other time periods which offer examples of "mechanisms of accountability and 
governance [...] which long pre-date the establishment of the limited company." 
The authors' arguments -  and their proposed research framework - is 
summarised in the table below:
Table 2.8: Broadening the Frontiers of Corporate Governance Research 
(adapted from Brennan & Solomon (2008:890)
/  Broader concept X . 
r  o f accountability N
Stakeholder theory / 
Enlightened shareholder theory 
Broader accountability 
Resource dependency theory 
S. Stewardship theory >  
\  Institutional theory /
I. Theoretical framework 
and accountability
Agency theory 
Accountability 
Shareholders
/B roader range of accountability mechanbmsV
Governance regulations (at level of individual) 
Social and environmental reporting 
Socially responsible investment 
Accountability mechanisms in different sectors and
\  different economiesInternal audit y
Risk management /
   T
2. Mechanisms of accountability
Governance regulations (country level)
Boards o f directors 
Transparency (financial reporting, disclosure) 
Audit committees 
External audit 
Role o f institutional Investors
Broadening globalisation '
Developing economy studies 
Comparative analyses 
. Influence o f culture ,
/B r o a d e r  adoption o f methodological
approach >
Interpretive 
Qualitative methodologies 
Questionnaires, interviews, case studies, field 
studies, archival and statistical analysis /
3. Methodological approach 
and techniques applied
Positivist methodologies 
Econometrics 
Hypothesis testing
Frontiers o f Corporate 
Governance Research 4. Sectors and context
Listed companies
6. Time horizon
20th century studies 
Post-1992 studies 
Post-Enron studies
5. Globalisation
Anglo-Saxon market studies 
Developed economy studies
Broader time horizons
Longitudinal studies 
Pre-Cadbury Report
Broader sectoral analysis
Family businesses 
Subsidiaries 
Public sector 
Voluntary sector 
Charity sector 
Firm life cycle stages 
Mergers, takeovers 
Firms going public. 
Privatization, 
Demutualization, 
^Takeovers, mergers, acquisitions^ 
Factory closures, strikes
This thesis seeks to build on the work of Brennan and Solomon (2008) by 
locating -  as far as is applicable - the thesis' research within the research 
framework proposed by the authors. Adopting the framework as a guide, this 
thesis extends the boundaries of corporate governance research and 
contributes further insights to the existing body of knowledge corporate
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governance, in the following ways:
(1) Broader theoretical concept of accountability: Canon Law (Roman 
Catholic Church 1983) and related church documents;
(2) Mechanisms of accountability: Key performance indicators related to the 
Bishop's tri-munera, and his personal accountability;
(3) Broader adoption of methodological approach: Interpretive e.g. 
interviews and archival (encyclicals and Council documents), apart from 
statistical;
(4) Sector and Context: The Catholic Church -  a religious organisation, 
within the context of organised religion;
(5) Globalisation: membership of 1 billion (world population: 6 billion), with 
physical presence in many countries, in existence (still) for 2000 years, 
may qualify the Catholic Church as “global”; the thesis however, will 
focus on the English branch; and
(6) Time horizon: The Church's Code of Canon Law, encyclicals, and 
various ecclesiastical publications are examples of "mechanisms of 
accountability and governance [...] which long pre-date the establishment 
of the limited company" (Brennan & Solomon 2008:897). Apostolorum 
Successores, the “Directory for the Pastoral Ministry of Bishops”, 
(Congregation for Bishops 2004), a guide published by the Congregation 
of Bishops, is an example of such an ecclesiastical document. It is 
designed to help Bishops “to exercise more fruitfully every aspect of their 
complex and difficult pastoral ministry in the Church and in the modern 
world.” Though published in 2004, the Congregation of Bishops
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acknowledges that much of what has been written in Apostolorum 
Successores (Congregation for Bishops 2004:9) “belongs to a rich 
tradition: from the sixteenth century onwards, [...] with a view to offering 
Bishops comprehensive pastoral manuals to assist them in their 
ministry.”
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Based on the framework proposed by the authors, our research may be 
summarised by the table below:
Table 2.8.1: Broadening the Frontiers of Corporate Governance Research: 
Management in the Catholic Church -  Corporate Governance (adapted from 
Brennan & Solomon (2008:890)
Broadening the Frontiers
Corporate Governance 
Research
Corporate Governance in 
the
Broader Time Broader SectoralBroader Globalisation
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2.9 Conclusion
Company law and the regulatory environment provide a company its structure 
and corporate governance mechanisms (Bauwhede & Willekens 2008; 
Abraham 2008; Denis & McConnell 2003; MacNeil & Li 2006; Abdullah 2007; 
Fisher & Downes 2008). Corporate governance is a strategic function which 
improves performance (Seal 2006). In this chapter, we established that 
mechanisms, compliance and performance are key concepts of corporate 
governance. We also established that accountability, transparency and 
disclosure (AID) are central to good corporate governance. Though empirical 
evidence is conflicting, this does not mean there is no relationship between the 
mechanisms-compliance of corporate governance, and firm performance. 
Neither does it mean that corporate governance is irrelevant.
“Common sense tells us that there is a relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. The fact that various empirical macrostudies 
in corporate governance have been unable to identify it does not mean that this 
relationship does not exist" (Gillies & Morra 1997:77). Indeed, in spite of the 
conflicting empirical outcomes, governments, regulators, investors and 
stakeholders continue to look for evidence of accountability, transparency, 
disclosure, and compliance with good corporate governance.
Due to the seemingly pervasive influence of agency theory (Schleifer & Vishny
1997; Filatotchev 2005; Williams et a /2006; Roberts ef a /2005; Ryan &
Schneider 2003; Seal 2006; Gomez-Mejia et a /2005; Zhang 2010), we surmise
that when critics accuse the Catholic Church of a lack of corporate governance,
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or when they ascribe corporate governance to the Catholic Church, they 
presume a corporate governance paradigm which is based on agency theory. 
Thus informed by our review of corporate governance in business, the next 
chapter explores corporate governance within the context of the Catholic 
Church.
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
3.1 Introduction
This chapter begins with a review of the literature on corporate governance in 
the Catholic Church, specifically. There is a dearth of published material on this 
aspect of management. According to Elson et al (2007:124): “very little research 
is available that addresses corporate governance in churches.” However, it is 
notable that the application of the managerial lens (Stuart & Lindsay 1997; 
Cunliffe 2009; Irwin & Roller 2000; Felton & Reed 2001; Barth 2010; Meynhardt 
2010; Long et a /2010; Merkl-Davies et a /2011; Simpson 
2012) to the management performance of the Catholic Church is nothing novel.
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3.2 Governance of Religious Organizations
Benevene and Contini (2011:895) affirm that "research and studies on 
management of religious congregations as particular organizational forms are 
still very scarce." The same applies to the governance of religious 
organisations: in their research into religions and urban governance, Chapman 
and Lowndes (2008:58) observe that most of the “research on faith and civic 
engagement comes from the USA and is concerned with Christian churches.” 
Using population “data from 2001”, Chapman and Lowndes (2008:58) note that 
Christianity is “the main religion in Britain (72%).” Anglicans make up 68% of 
Christians, whilst Catholics number 14%, with Presbyterians comprising 7% of 
the Christian population. According to the researchers, 2.5% of the British 
populace are Muslims.
Although their research is expressly on “corporate governance in religious 
organizations”, Elson et al (2007:121) appear to restrict their investigation to the 
various denominations of the Christian religion. Elson et al (2007) direct their 
research on whether churches in their sample possess adequate fiscal 
oversight; Elson et al (2007) focus their investigation on the usual mechanisms 
of corporate governance of accountability -  eg: independent board of directors, 
documented policies and procedures, and financial management practices. 
Their research was based on a sample of 221 churches, within the state of 
Georgia, using questionnaires as the data collection method. Interestingly, not a 
single Catholic Church was represented in Elson et a/’s (2007) study. 
Nevertheless, Elson et al (2007:129) conclude that much more research is 
required on the corporate governance of religious organisations; for example: in
the documentation of policy and procedures, the communication of these 
policies and procedures to all employees, and the training that is necessary in 
the preparation and compliance of financial reports.
The corporate governance research by Duncan, Flesher and Stocks (1999) into 
various Christian denominations suggests that a church's organisational 
structure influence the sophistication and rigour of its internal controls. Though 
their research was narrowly confined to aspects of internal accounting controls, 
Duncan et al (1999) conducted their investigation within the context of -  and 
acknowledging - the differing ecclesiastical structures and church sizes. 
According to Duncan et al (1999:149), there are generally three types of church 
structures -  also known as “polity”.
In a ‘congregational’ church structure, the church is governed by the majority 
will of the congregation; each church is autonomous and each congregation is 
“sovereign.” The Southern Baptists exemplify this type of church structure. In 
churches which follow the ‘episcopal’ structure, power rests with the highest 
ranking Bishop; in this structure, there are various rankings of clergy and 
congregations are governed by Bishops in various geographical regions.
Liturgy, doctrine and practices are almost standard throughout. The authors 
regard the Methodist denomination as characteristic of this church structure. 
Churches which adopt a ‘presbyterian’ structure are governed by a group of 
‘presbyters’ who are elected by each congregation. In a convocation of the 
governing bodies, all presbyters are regarded as equal and decisions are made 
by majority votes. The Presbyterian Church epitomises this structure.
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Based on a stratified sample of 1200 churches from all the three denominations, 
via a questionnaire survey, Duncan et al (1999) found that churches with 
episcopal structures achieved the highest scores. This was followed by those 
that were ‘presbyterian, and ‘congregational’. The researchers concluded that: 
“churches belonging to a denomination with a formal hierarchical structure 
would have stronger systems of internal control in place.” (Duncan et al 
1999:157).
Though erudite and pertinent, it is notable that Duncan et al (1999) did not 
include the Catholic Church in their sample. The Catholic Church is arguably a 
more fitting example of a religious organisation which is highly 'episcopal' in 
structure, rather than -  as Duncan et al (1999) suggest - the Methodist. This is 
because the Catholic Church has a much developed 'hierarchical' structure 
(Lynskey 1952; Reese, 2004), to the point of being described as 'feudal' (Gluck, 
2004). It is therefore appropriate at this point, to explore in greater detail, the 
Catholic Church's foundation and structure; an indepth exploration is provided is 
following section.
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3.3 Extant Literature on Corporate Governance in the 
Catholic Church
The evaluation of its own performance by an external agency is not a 
phenomenon which is new to the Catholic Church: a formal analysis of the 
Church's management performance was published in 1956 by the American 
Institute of Management. In what it claims to be “the first occasion that a 
complete statistical management study of the Church is available,” the Institute 
studied the Church's management performance in order to determine “what 
administrative lessons might be learned from the Church’s nineteen centuries of 
varied problems and remedies” (American Institute of Management 1956:2).
The three Management Audits it published (AIM, 1956; 1960; 1962) focused on 
the Church as a global institution, with the Roman Pontiff as the head of the 
entity, and the Roman curia as his board.
The Audit (AIM, 1956:1) asserted that there “can be no doubt that the 
management principles and practices of today's business corporation were 
largely inherited from old world organisation”; the Audit (AIM, 1956:2) included 
“religious, political, educational, and military institutions” in its definition of “old 
world organisation”, asking: “Has good management in the Church been at all 
times apparent?” The Audit (AIM, 1956) used ten indicators to evaluate the 
Church's performance. For the purpose of our thesis, “Trustee Analysis” is the 
indicator closest to our topic of corporate governance. The Audit (AIM,
1956:17) declared: “The corporate structure of the Roman Catholic Church is 
unique among religious bodies, particularly in respect to a board of trustees.” 
This is because, “from an operating point of view there is no board of trustees”;
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though it noted that the “corporate structure of the church is both medieval and 
authoritarian”, it acknowledged that members are free to leave at any time.
In the “Trustee Analysis” assessment of the Audit, the Church scored 525 out of 
a possible 800 points, with 600 being the “Minimum Rating for Excellence”
(AIM, 1956:1); this is the only area of the audit that the Church failed. A possible 
reason for the failing score is a key concern highlighted by the Audit (AIM, 
1956:17), called 'succession planning' in today's management speak: "What 
concerns us most, is the advanced age of Cardinals and the fact that they so 
largely seem to represent an Italian clique that perhaps thinks more in terms of 
a restoration of the Holy Roman Empire than a strong episcopate in the 
Provinces.” The absence of 'diversity' (in an organisation which is transnational 
or “global” in today's parlance) could have been another concern inherent in the 
comments made by the Audit (AIM, 1956:17); however, the absence of any 
reference to diversity could be attributed to the fact that this term was not part of 
the management vocabulary then.
The Audit (AIM, 1956:17) noted that Pope Pius XII appears to have recognised 
the problem by the recent selection of “new Cardinals, the majority not Italians, 
and many of these were entirely new sees in the provinces.” The Church 
achieved an above-minimum score of 700 in 1960 (AIM, 1960:1) and the same 
in 1962 (AIM, 1962:1); since the first Audit (AIM, 1956), “vast strides have been 
made in the right direction and five of the new cardinals now have top positions 
in the Roman Curia” (AIM, 1960:7). Unfortunately, the Audits (AIM, 1956, 1960,
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1962) did not describe in detail the research methodology used, except to state 
that information sources included official and unofficial published material, with 
“research conducted in various countries” and in “more than 30 languages” 
(AIM, 1956:2).
Martindell (1962), provides a general overview of the Management Audit; the 
journal article identifies Martindell (1962) as Chairman of the Board of the 
American Institute of Management. Martindell (1962:164) describes the 
Management Audit series as “a procedure for systematically examining, 
analysing, and appraising a management’s overall performance.” Amongst 
other things, we learn that the Audit's research data was obtained through 
questionnaires and “supplemented by interviews” with stakeholders within and 
outside of the organization. Industry information was also obtained to 
benchmark the findings.
It is notable that the Audit's (1956, 1960, 1962) evaluation of Church 
performance does not include a feature on the Church's spiritual objectives. The 
Audit (1956) choses however to acknowledge the Church's temporal 
contribution to the wider needs of society: “On a strictly service basis, with 
frugality and careful handling of expenses, the Church, since the beginning of 
the century, has met each challenge with a facility of some kind. If schools are 
needed, no matter where, they are established. If hospitals, churches, or 
foundling houses are required, they are provided. This is the great marvel of the 
Church organization” (AIM, 1956:10).
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In more recent times, the corporate governance structure of Benedictine 
Abbeys was analysed by Rost et al (2008) to determine what lessons could be 
learned by businesses. Whilst acknowledging that agency theory is the popular 
theoretical approach, Rost ef al (2008) sought to provide an alternative solution 
to the agency problem by evaluating the governance practice of the Benedictine 
Order. Rost et al (2008:5) opined that, with over 1000 years of history, the 
Benedictine Order should have “more experience in solving agency problems 
than stock corporations." Rost e ta l(2008:7) surveyed all Benedictine abbeys in 
Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria and German speaking Switzerland, with a sample 
of 133 monasteries, their main source of information being archival data.
Rost et al, (2008) concluded that it is possible for stock corporations to adopt 
the monastic model of corporate governance. They argued that the adoption of 
the Benedictine methods of corporate governance would have prevented the 
corporate governance problems experience by companies such as Enron. 
However, Rost et al, (2008) cited a number of perceived limitations which they 
felt are inherent in the Benedictine's corporate governance practice. According 
to Rost et al, (2008:22), the monastic approach is defective because its 
members are conditioned into “group think”; the leadership is prone to 
“dictatorship”, and the “lifelong commitment” required of the monks is a severe 
disadvantage because it no longer permits them freedom.
We argue that it is difficult for stock companies to adopt the monastic model of 
corporate governance, as proposed and described by Rost etal, (2008). Their 
criticism of the monastic model is an indication of their failure to appreciate the
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essential difference between a religious order and a stock corporation. Rost et 
al, (2008) failed to appreciate that what motivates an individual to join a 
religious order as a monk is different from that which drives others to join a 
typical stock corporation as employees. As commercial entities, corporations 
are usually competitive and profit-driven: 'profit-maximization' and 'maximizing 
shareholder value' being the common aims (Jensen & Meckling 2009; 
Eisenhardt 1989). Understandably, the executives who seek professional 
careers, by virtue of their employment, align their own success with that of their 
employer's (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Maitlis 2004; Eisenhardt 1989:65; Fama 
& Jensen 1983).
In contrast, a person who joins a Benedictine monastery deliberately chooses to 
forsake the lifestyle and the trappings of success that stock corporation 
executives typically aspire to. A monk is someone who: "... has left his family to 
seek God. To take such a step today, the individual needs to be independent- 
minded, even adventurous, because he gives up so much that is taken for 
granted: he [will have] no freedom to choose what he does, no power of 
ownership, no freedom to be intimate with a loved one" (Dollard, Marett-Crosby 
& Wright 2002:vii). This view is further echoed by Furfey (1954:68): “No one can 
be forced to become a religious or to enter a religious community against his 
will. Before a young man binds himself permanently to the obligations of the 
[religious], he must have proved himself during several years of preliminary 
training which offer him plenty of opportunity to change his mind.”
Much of the rhetoric about the need for corporate governance in the Catholic
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Church stems from arguments that the Church's management and structure are 
inadequate, outdated, and ill-suited to the concepts of accountability and 
transparency (Post 2003; Gluck 2004; Oakley & Russett, 2004; Russett 2004; 
Steinfels 2004; Oakley 2004; Fogarthy 2004; Heft 2004; Reese 2004). For 
example, Russett (2004:196) likens the Church's “institutional structure” to that 
of a “monarchy”; this because it is “extraordinarily centralized and hierarchical.” 
Russett (2004:196) does not make clear what type of “monarchy” he is referring 
to, except that it is reminiscent of a period in history where “secular monarchs 
often claimed to be ruling by divine right.” Russett (2004:127) associates the 
monarchical structure of the Church “with the rise of absolutist monarchies from 
the late sixteenth into the nineteenth centuries.” Russett (2004:196) argues for 
“democracy” so that mechanisms of accountability can be introduced to curb the 
unfettered powers of Bishops and Priests. Democracy, according to Russett 
(2004:126), is the solution; however, as yet, “the church is not a democracy, 
because it lacks institutions of democratic accountability, and that is the 
problem.”
Critics believe the Church would possess true accountability if it adopts modern 
management practices and if it embraces fundamental change. For example, 
Post (2003:25) argues that the Catholic Church can -  and should -  “incorporate 
modern management ideas” into the way it manages and governs itself; it 
should also “apply new tools for a new era of institutional accountability.” Post 
(2003:25) feels that there is an urgent need for debate about the Catholic 
Church’s existing “structure, processes and culture.” Post (2003:25) regards the 
Church’s culture as “dysfunctional.” Like Russet (2004), Post (2003:26)
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prescribes a similar solution to the Church's problem, namely: the adoption of 
democracy, the rejection of authoritarianism, and a change of leadership. Within 
this new paradigm, Post (2003:26) argues that the laity will have a significant 
role to play in the Church. Oakley and Russett (2004:10) concur with the views 
of Post (2003). The Catholic Church’s management structure is, according to 
Oakley and Russett (2004:10), “static, radically hierarchical, and ahistorical”; 
this in turn inculcates a “culture of silence and denial.” These critics state that 
the Church should therefore aspire to a structure which is “organic, communal 
and respectful of history.” Such a model, Oakley and Russett (2004:10) assert, 
is conducive to a culture of “conversation, consultation and collaboration.”
Steinfels (2004:26) acknowledges that there is a distinct of lack of accountability 
in the Catholic Church; the challenge is to design ecclesiastical mechanisms 
that will enable the hierarchy to demonstrate “verifiable” accountability. Steinfels 
(2004:26) opines that the “evolution of accountability” should begin with the 
structures already in place -  namely, those already provided for by the Code of 
Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983). However, these structures could be 
made more effective: “Clarity” is a key feature of accountability. Also required is 
the disclosure of relevant and timely information which should then be 
independently verifiable. Steinfels (2004:29) however, is opposed to relying on 
rules and guidelines, exclusively; aware of its limitation, Steinfels (2004:29) 
asserts that rules and guidelines are not a panacea; something more 
fundamental than these is also necessary, namely: the spiritual formation of the 
clergy.
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Oakley (2004:77) argues that the Church will be able to demonstrate true 
accountability only if it changes its structure. Oakley (2004:80) summarizes the 
problem facing the Church, thus: “To put it bluntly, what is lacking is some firmly 
institutionalized governmental mechanism capable of imposing practical 
constitutional restraints on the freewheeling exercise of primatial authority.” The 
effect of an absence of a constitutionalized mechanism of check-and-balances, 
argues Oakley (2004:80) is to make “nugatory” all those diocesan governance 
structures provided for by Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983). To 
Oakley (2004:87) the existing so-called monarchical structure of the Church, 
coupled with the present “modern imperial papacy” governance structure, is a 
recent development in the history of the church; it “is the achievement of the 
past two hundred years, at most.” Oakley (2004:87) states that “the ideology of 
absolute papal monarchy” is only a recent development in the Church's history; 
it “came after Vatican I to be identified with Catholic orthodoxy itself.”
Oakley (2004:82-83) advocates a conciliarist form of government, also known 
as “constitutionalism”, where “power was divided between the head of a 
corporation and its members, with the authority of the head not deriving 
necessarily from but limited nonetheless by the power that remained inherent in 
the members.” Referring to ecclesiastical history, Oakley (2004:78) discloses 
that the Church's structure and governance are “an essentially conciliar mode of 
governance” from the medieval ages until the first Vatican Council. Therefore, 
he argues, this mode of governance is not a new ideology or a novel 
phenomenon; typical of the European Church experience then, it was likened to 
the “classic relationship between a Bishop and the canons of his cathedral
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chapter.” Within the Church at the time, “this particular corporational model 
helped deliver, not admittedly democracy or one or other form of “simple 
republicanism” but a more intricate and “complex doctrine of mixed or limited 
government,” replete with its own checks and balances, or, as it is sometimes 
called, “a doctrine of divided sovereignty.”
The demands for structural change and accountability come from another 
section of the Church -  the laity, who Fogarthy (2004:117) describes as being 
highly educated, sophisticated, and more demanding than their forebears. 
Fogarthy (2004:117) advocates “a return to provincial councils.” According to 
Fogarthy (2004:117), this is a viable proposition because: “canon law provides 
for a metropolitan with the consent of the majority of his suffragans to convoke a 
provincial council. “ Provincial councils are a credible alternative because they 
are independent of the Bishops and do not require the approval of the Floly See. 
This local council could adopt a governance process similar to universities and 
colleges where they undergo an accreditation and/or validation process.
Heft (2004:127) suggests that one way to address the “absence of downward” 
accountability is to broaden the recently emphasized concept of the church as a 
communion to include - “not just of the Bishops with one another and with the 
pope, but also the entire hierarchy with the laity.” Heft (2004:127) cites 
examples of structures which facilitate communications: plenary, provincial and 
particular councils. However, structural changes alone are not sufficient; 
genuine accountability and meaningful reform of a sustainable kind requires 
something more enduring and personal. Like Steinfel (2004), Heft (2004:123)
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makes clear that simply “changing the structures and accountability” alone is 
not enough. What is equally important is the call to live a life of holiness and a 
life of continuous conversion. This is possible, argues Heft (2004:122), who 
explains that: “Over the centuries, and especially through various monastic 
practices -  the regular confession of sins, reliance on spiritual direction, 
frequent participation in the Eucharist -  clergy, religious, and laity were able to 
sustain the lifelong process of conversion.”
Gluck (2004, 2003) is also highly critical of the Catholic Church’s organizational 
structure; Gluck, (2004:1) criticises the Catholic Church for being feudal in the 
way that it is managed: the Bishop is a “feudal lord”, “who serves at the 
pleasure o f a monarch -  the pope. “Once appointed, each Bishop has nearly 
absolute power over the operations of the church in his bailiwick [diocese], 
subject only to the lightest of oversight from the pope.” Being “highly 
autonomous” is not necessarily a negative thing; Gluck (2004:2) feels that there 
is much to be gained if there is central coordination for functions that are 
common throughout the whole Church - for example: centralised purchasing. 
Gluck (2004) is also critical of the Church's defective style of management 
because of the near absence of direct supervision and the ubiquitous low levels 
of disclosure within its hierarchy.
Reese (2004:148), a Jesuit priest, advocates the reformation of the structure 
and governance of the Church. He wants the laity and priests to be closely 
involved in the selection of Bishops, in the formulation of diocesan policies, and 
“increased authority for Episcopal conferences.” Reese (2004:148)
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acknowledges that Vatican II created new governance structures which 
encouraged the participation of the clergy and the laity; however, these 
structures are mainly consultative, save for the Finance Councils. The most 
significant reform advocated by Reese (2004:149) is this: how possible would it 
be to “return to the ancient custom for the selection of Bishops that was 
articulated by Leo I (440 -  461) who said that no one could be a Bishop unless 
he was elected by the clergy, accepted by the people, and consecrated by the 
Bishops of his region?” Reese (2004:149) cautions that the appointment of 
Bishops by the pope exclusively is a relatively new development which “has no 
basis in church tradition.”
The arguments above convey the impression that the absence of Church 
corporate governance and accountability is due to the Church's existing 
structure, described as monarchical, old-fashioned, and hierarchical (Russett & 
Oakley 2004; Lynskey 1952), Indeed, West and Zech (2006:5) highlight the fact 
that “from a doctrinal perspective” the Catholic Church is “highly centralised 
under the authority of the pope and his Bishops.” This requires us to examine 
the Church's structure in order to determine how and why this is the case. 
However, it is necessary first to investigate the basis which gives rise to the 
Church's structure - the Code of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983).
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3.4 The Code of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 
1983)
In chapter two, we observe that a company's structure and the mechanisms of 
corporate governance are derived from company law and the regulatory 
environment (Bauwhede & Willekens 2008; Abraham 2008; Denis & McConnell 
2003). The same applies to the Catholic Church (Lynskey 1952; Roman 
Catholic Church 1983; Arrieta 2000; West & Zech 2006; Young & Shea 2007). 
The foundation of the Church's existence and its structure is derived from 
doctrine and ecclesiastical legislation, enshrined in the Code of Canon Law 
(Roman Catholic Church 1983). Young and Shea (2007:593) describe the Code 
of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) -  hereafter “Canon Law (Roman 
Catholic Church 1983)” - as the “codified representation of church theology in 
legal language.” It is the “primary document governing the Catholic Church” and 
it gives the Catholic Church directions for “good management and financial 
practices” (West & Zech 2006:5).
Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) is an important source document for 
our thesis because it prescribes the Catholic Church's organisational structure 
(Zech & Gautier 2004). Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) is the 
“principal official guide to the administration of the Church” (Lynskey 1952:4) 
and it is concerned with the whole life of the Church, including its “government” 
(Lynskey 1952:33). A scholarly overview of Canon Law history is provided by 
Peters (2001) who informs us that canon law has functioned as an independent 
ecclesiastical discipline for nearly 1000 years; it is an ancillary of Church 
theology whose genesis can be traced further back by another half century. For
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an in-depth commentary on the provisions of Canon Law (Roman Catholic 
Church 1983), see Coriden, Green and Heintschel (1985). The following 
sections examine the structure of the Church, using Canon Law (Roman 
Catholic Church 1983) as the main source, for reasons explained above.
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3.5 Structure of the Catholic Church
Our analysis of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) indicates that the 
Catholic Church is first and foremost a spiritual entity whose primary purpose is 
the salvation of souls (Canon 768, §1; Canon 389). The head of the Catholic 
Church is the Pope ( Canon 331; Matthew, 16:18; Ephesians 2:20). Lynskey 
(1952:16) explains that the Pope's supreme authority is derived “in direct 
succession from Christ’s designation of Peter as chief among the Apostles.”
The Pope's power and authority is absolute (Canon 332). Within the hierarchical 
constitution of the Catholic Church, the power to appoint Bishops rests with the 
Pope, exclusively (Canon 377 §1). This means that the Pope “chooses 
episcopal candidates without the necessary involvement of others in the 
process” (Coriden et al, 1985:321).
The Catholic Church which we refer to in this thesis is a theological construct
(Canon 145 §1); it should not be confused with Vatican City, a sovereign state
commonly referred to as 'the Vatican'. It happens that the head of the Catholic
Church is also head of the Vatican. Young and Shea (2007:589) describe the
Vatican as a “sovereign monarchical-sacerdotal state”. It came into existence in
1929 and is the last remaining absolute monarchy in Europe. The Vatican is a
“unique entity” because the “state’s monarch is also the spiritual leader of the
Roman Catholic Church throughout the world.” The Pope is the elected
absolute temporal monarch of the state, and he alone has full legislative,
executive, and judicial authority (Young and Shea, 2007:593). Though it has a
political dimension, the primary concern of the Church is spiritual. Lynskey
(1952:85) clarifies that the Pope is “primarily a spiritual sovereign, and only
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secondarily a temporal ruler.” To emphasise the Pope's primary concern with 
the spiritual, Lynskey (1952:85) compares the Pontiff's role with the sovereign of 
Great Britain: the latter is “primarily a temporal ruler, and only secondarily a 
spiritual leader.” For a scholarly overview of the Vatican as a sovereign state, 
see Young and Shea (2007).
In ecclesiastical parlance, the term “hierarchy” has special meaning: it relates to 
'order' and to 'jurisdiction'. Lynskey (1952:17), described by Meng (Lynskey 
1952:1) “as a professional political scientist of high repute,” explains that the 
term 'order' means the “power to sanctify the faithful by sacred rites.”
'Jurisdiction' means the power “to govern the faithful for the attainment of the 
supernatural end for which the Church is established,” namely: the “eternal 
salvation” of souls. In the hierarchy of order, “the bishops constitute the top of 
the pyramid, with the bishop of Rome one of their number.” In the case of the 
latter (jurisdiction), “resident bishops constitute the base of the pyramid, the 
Pope its crown” (Lynskey 1952:31). Though they are distinct from each other, 
both power of order and of jurisdiction are intimately linked; one is necessary to 
the other because “jurisdiction presupposes order, and moderates its exercise” 
(Lynskey 1952:31).
Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) makes clear that only those who are 
ordained have the power to govern the Church (Canon 129 s1). Appointed by 
the Pope, a diocesan bishop is responsible for the diocese to which he is 
assigned (Canon 134 §1; Canon 376). His diocese (Canon 368) is a defined 
area (Canon 372) which is made up of the various parish churches within that
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geographical confine (Canon 374). The parish priests who form the 
presbyterate, are appointed by the diocesan bishop and come under his direct 
control (Canon 385 §2). Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) states that 
the diocesan Bishop is personally responsible for the governance of his 
diocese; though appointed by the Pope, the Bishop governs his diocese with full 
“legislative, executive and judicial power” (Canon 391 §1, §2).
Diocesan Bishops do not govern their respective geographical territories as 
representatives of the Pope (Coriden et al 1985:325; Arrieta 2000:207; Lynskey 
1952). This means that the diocesan bishop's powers are “ordinary, i.e., related 
to his office; immediate, i.e., directly exercised over those entrusted to his care 
without an intermediary; and proper, i.e., exercised in his own name” (Coriden 
et a /1985:325). Finally, Canon 393 makes clear that the “diocesan bishop 
represents his diocese in all its” legal matters; he is the “official legal 
representative of his diocese” (Coriden etal 1985:331). Perhaps this explains 
why the diocesan bishop is usually involved legally, whenever scandals occur in 
his diocese.
Duncan, Flesher and Stocks (1999) researched the internal financial controls of 
various Christian denominations in the USA. As first mentioned in chapter 3, the 
term “polity” is used to describe a church's organisational structure, of which 
there are three types: congregational, episcopal, and Presbyterian (Duncan et 
a /1999:147). In a ‘congregational’ church structure, the church is governed by 
the majority will of the congregation; each church is autonomous and each 
congregation is “sovereign” (Duncan et a /1999:147). The Southern Baptists
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exemplify this type of church structure. Churches which adopt a ‘Presbyterian’ 
structure are governed by a group of ‘presbyters’ who are elected by each 
congregation. In a convocation of the governing bodies, all presbyters are 
regarded as equal and decisions are made by majority votes. The Presbyterian 
Church epitomises this structure.
Power rests with the highest ranking Bishop in churches which follow the 
‘episcopal’ structure; in this structure, there are different ranks of clergy and the 
congregations are governed by Bishops in various geographical regions.
Duncan et a /(1999) regard the Methodist denomination as characteristic of this 
church structure. However, it is arguable that the Catholic Church's structure is 
closest in comparison to Duncan et el's (1999) episcopal structure; as it is 
monarchical and hierarchical (Russett & Oakley 2004), the Catholic Church 
could have been used as a more accurate example of a highly defined 
episcopal church structure. Members of Congregational and Presbyterian 
churches are analogous to shareholders with voting rights; shareholders' will, 
and therefore democracy is possible. Though erudite and pertinent, Duncan et 
a/'s (1999) research sample of 1200 churches did not include even one Catholic 
Church in their survey. Nevertheless, Velayutham (2007:36) observes that other 
Christian denominations are more likely than the Catholic Church to be “less 
authoritarian, more congregational, participatory and individualistic.”
From Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983), we gain an understanding of 
the theological and doctrinal foundation upon which the Church's ecclesiastical 
structure arises (Arrieta 2000:63). We are also able to appreciate better the
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criticisms made against the Church: that its structure is monarchical and out­
dated, and that it is not a democracy. It is also possible to explain why, under 
existing Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983), it appears unlikely that the 
Church will be able to adopt a democratic structure. Doctrinally and 
theologically, the hierarchical nature of the Church dictates the (arguably 
restrictive) manner in which authority and ecclesial power is passed, from Pope 
to the diocesan bishops he appoints. Wuerl (2004:18), a Diocesan Bishop, 
warns that whilst there is a need for “accountability in the church”, “we must be 
careful not to use a political model for a reality that transcends human political 
institutions.” An ecclesiastical model of corporate governance “already exists,” 
Wuerl (2004:18) argues; it is provided for in Canon Law (Roman Catholic 
Church 1983). It is now to Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) which we 
turn, to analyse the evidence for Wuerl's (2004) claim.
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3.6 The Bishop’s Board: The Diocesan Curia
Our examination of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) indicates that 
the diocesan bishop has a corporate governance framework within which he is 
able to exercise his responsibilities; called the “diocesan curia”, this body 
comprises "those institutions and persons which assist the bishop in the 
governance of the whole diocese, especially in guiding pastoral action, in caring 
for the administration of the diocese, and in exercising judicial power" (Canon 
469). It should be noted however, that “the appointment of those who exercise 
offices in the diocesan curia" is exclusively the prerogative of the diocesan 
bishop himself (Canon 470). For example, Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 
1983) requires the appointment of a vicar general who assists his Bishop in the 
governance of his diocese. However, the bishop has the discretion to appoint 
more if he deems it appropriate, and he "can freely remove them" if he so 
desires, without consultation (Canons 476, 477).
Canon law expert and clergy member Arrieta (2000) refers to the diocesan curia
as the governance structure of the Catholic Church. “The diocesan curia is the
principal instrument at the disposal of the Bishop for the governance of the
diocese,” asserts Arrieta (2000:221); he states that it is “incumbent on the
diocesan curia [...] to watch over and permanently guarantee the discipline and
the practice of governance and administration in the local Church.” Though the
curia is made up of the offices and organs stipulated in Canon 469, Arrieta
(2000) points out that the curia could also include other bodies, apparatus, and
offices which the Bishop deems necessary for the governance of his diocese;
this power of discretion is exclusive to the Bishop (Canon 391). However,
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Arrieta (2000) makes clear that these additions are barred from being parallel 
structures to those provided for by Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983); 
neither can these additions supersede those prescribed in Canon Law (Roman 
Catholic Church 1983).
Arrieta (2000:224) is keen to clarify that the ultimate aim of the curia’s function 
is the salvation of souls: “we must immediately emphasize that the work of the 
curia cannot be conceived exclusively under the dimension of merely 
administrative and bureaucratic activity. The activity of the curia always has a 
pastoral content” (Arrieta 2000:224). Arrieta's (2000) point is augmented in 
Apostolorum Successores (Congregation for Bishops 2004), an ecclesiastical 
document, which reminds the Bishop that though the salvation of souls is a 
critical aspect of his job, successful performance is dependent on his own 
spiritual life: “the fruitfulness of his pastoral effectiveness” is completely 
“dependent on” the Bishop's own “moral authority” which is “bestowed by his life 
of holiness.” (Congregation for Bishops 2004; 158).
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The Bishop’s corporate governance structure may is represented 
diagrammatically as thus:
Table 3.6: Diagrammatic Presentation of the offices which comprise the 
Bishop's Diocesan Curia. Source: present author
Bishop
Episcopal Council 
(Optional)
Finance Officer 
(Mandatory)
Vicar General 
(Mandatory)
Moderator
(Optional)
Finance Council 
(Mandatory)
Episcopal Vicars 
(Optional)
Presbyteral Council 
(Mandatory)
Chancellor
(Mandatory)College of Consultors 
(Mandatory)
As can be discerned above, Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) states 
that the Moderator is an optional appointment (Canon 473 §2). The Bishop may 
establish an Episcopal Council, if he so wishes, but he is not obliged to. The 
appointment of the Vicar General is mandatory (Canon 475 §1). The Bishop is 
also required to establish a Finance Council (Canon 492), and to appoint a 
Finance Officer (Canon 494). Canon 495 mandates the establishment of a 
Presbyteral Council -  also known as the Council of Priests, whose membership 
comprises his diocesan priests. The Presbyteral Council is likened to “a senate
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of the Bishop and which assists the Bishop in the governance of the diocese.” It 
is to be noted however, that this Council possesses only a consultative vote.
The Council's own statutes are to be approved by the diocesan bishop (Canon 
496).
The Bishop is to appoint a number of priests from the Council of Priests to serve 
on another body known as the College of Consultors (Canon 502 §1). The role 
of the College of Consultors however, is somewhat vague; Canon 502 simply 
states: “to which belongs the functions determined by law.” However, the 
Bishop is obliged to consult the College of Consultors before he appoints the 
Finance Officer (Canon 494). Likewise, whilst it is the Bishop's prerogative to 
remove the Finance Officer, he is minded to do so only after he has “heard the 
College of Consultors and the Finance Council.” Finally, the incorporation of the 
Diocesan Pastoral Council, though provided for in Canon 511, is entirely at the 
discretion of the Bishop.
The ecclesiastical document, Apostolorum Successores, (Congregation for 
Bishops 2004), confirms that the Bishop is allowed to supplement the diocesan 
curia with institutions which he deems appropriate. The Bishop may for 
example: appoint more than one Vicar General (Congregation for Bishops 2004, 
178), even though one is specifically prescribed in Canon Law (Roman Catholic 
Church 1983); he is able to establish other offices or commissions, temporary or 
permanent as the pastoral/apostolic needs arise (Congregation for Bishops 
2004, 181); importantly, he is able to convoke, preside over, and dissolve the 
Presbyteral Council, and to decide against the unanimous opinion of his
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councillors (Congregation for Bishops 2004, 182); he is able to do likewise with 
the Diocesan Pastoral Council, which only possesses a consultative role 
(Congregation for Bishops 2004, 184). Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 
1983) does not provide any guidelines regarding curia (or board) process; it is 
silent about to whom the Bishop is accountable, and about what constitutes 
matters of accountability and disclosure. The next section seeks to determine 
ecclesiastical accountability as provided by Canon Law (Roman Catholic 
Church 1983).
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3.7 The Diocesan Bishop's Job Description: the Tria- 
munera Christ!
The Bishop's job description is provided for in Canon Law (Roman Catholic 
Church 1983); his responsibilities are characterised by the “tria munera Christi”
- the threefold office of Christ (Arrieta 2000:208), namely: munus docendi - 
teaching (Canon 386), munus sanctificandi - sanctifying (Canon 387) and 
munus regendi - governing (Canon 391). Where appropriate, our reference to 
Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) is also supplemented by other 
ecclesiastical documents which pertain directly to the Bishop's job description 
and to the performance of his ministry. These documents include “The Bishop, 
Servant of the Gospel of Jesus Christ for the Hope of the World,” known as 
Pastores Gregis (Pope John Paul II 2003), hereafter referred as “PG (2003)"; 
and the Directory for the Pastoral Ministry of Bishops -  Apostolorum 
Successores, (Congregation for Bishops 2004), hereafter referred to as “AS 
(2004). The Directory "has been prepared by the Congregation for Bishops in 
order to offer to the “Shepherds of Christ’s flock” a useful guide that will help 
them to exercise more fruitfully every aspect of their complex and difficult 
pastoral ministry in the Church and in the modern world” (AS, 2004:9).
Pastores Gregis (2003) is an in-depth exposition by Pope John Paul II about the 
Bishop's personal responsibility for the salvation of souls; the document is a 
cogent reminder offered by the Pope that the successful achievement of 
Bishop's pastoral ministry is directly related to the Bishop's own spiritual life 
(Pope John Paul II 2003:31). AS contains much of the same reminder found in 
PG, but it is similar to an operations handbook commonly found in large
105
organisations; written especially for Bishops, the document is an invaluable 
source of practical advice on every aspect of the Bishop's job description. 
Published by the Vatican's Congregation of Bishops, AS provides extensive 
guidelines regarding the Bishop's performance of his pastoral ministry.
3.7.1 Munus docendi: The Bishop's Obligation to Teach
Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) states that as teacher, the Bishop is 
required to "propose and explain to the faithful the truths of the" Catholic "faith 
which are to be believed and applied to morals" (Canon 386). As it would be 
difficult for the Bishop to teach all those within his diocese, "homilies" (preaching 
from the pulpits by priests) and catechesis are two principle means by which the 
bishop extends his teachings. The Bishop must therefore ensure that the 
homilies and catechesis given by his priests and catechists are doctrinally 
sound (Canon 780).
For example, in compliance with Canon 767, the Bishop must ensure that "the 
homily, which is part of the liturgy itself and is reserved to a priest or deacon, is 
pre-eminent; in the homily the mysteries of faith and the norms of Christian life 
are to be explained from the sacred text during the course of the liturgical year." 
The Bishop is required to ensure that those who teach "impart to the faithful the 
doctrine which the magisterium of the Church sets forth concerning,” amongst 
other things, “the unity and stability of the family and its duties, the obligations 
which people have from being joined together in society, and the ordering of 
temporal affairs according to the plan established by God."
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3.7.2 Munus sanctificandi: The Bishop's Obligation to Sanctify
To "sanctify" is to make holy, by means of the liturgy and the sacraments, those 
entrusted to his care (Canon 387). Bishops are the ones who "in the first place 
exercise the sanctifying function; they are the high priests, the liturgical 
dispensers of the mysteries of God, and the directors, promoters, and guardians 
of the entire liturgical life in the church entrusted to them" (Canon 835). A 
Bishop is required "to promote in every way the holiness of the Christian faithful 
according to the proper vocation of each." This places on the Bishop the 
obligation to be a living example "of holiness in charity, humility, and simplicity 
of life" (Canon 387). The Bishop is required to promote and celebrate constantly 
"the sacraments" of which there are seven (Canon 840), because that is the 
primary means by which "the Christian faithful entrusted to his care grow in 
grace." Canon 389 §2 makes it the Bishop's duty to ensure "that the prayers 
and pious and sacred exercises of the Christian people are fully in keeping with 
the norms of the Church."
3.7.3 Munus regendi: The Bishop's Obligation to Govern
The Bishop governs his diocese in his own name (Canon 391): he exercises 
legislative, executive and judicial power "either personally or through the judicial 
vicar and judges according to the norm of law." Amongst the other obligations, 
the Bishop is required "to promote the common discipline of the whole Church" 
and to ensure "the observance of all ecclesiastical laws"; he is also required "to 
exercise vigilance so that abuses do not creep into ecclesiastical discipline, 
especially regarding the ministry of the word, the celebration of the sacraments
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and sacramentals, the worship of God and the veneration of the saints, and the 
administration of goods" (Canon 392).
In particular, the Bishop is required to pay particular attention to his diocesan 
priests; these priests -  presbyters who make up the presbyterate -  exercise an 
“indispensable role [...] assisting the bishop to fulfil the various aspects of his 
pastoral office” (Coriden et al 1985:327). Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 
1983) states that the “diocesan bishop is to attend to the presbyters with special 
concern and listen to them as his assistants and advisers; he is to protect their 
rights and see to it that they correctly fulfil the obligations proper to their state” 
(Canon 384). Given that the presbyters are his immediate assistants and 
advisers, the Bishop is to ensure that they are given all the “means and 
“institutions” necessary “to foster their spiritual and intellectual life”, as well as to 
“make provision for their decent support and social assistance” (Canon 384).
With regards to the well-being of his diocesan priests, Coriden et al (1985:327) 
advise that the Bishop would do well to take into account “the importance of an 
enlightened personnel policy respecting individual talents and professional 
goals and fostering appropriate pastoral adaptation and personal satisfaction.” 
Visitation, keeping in touch with his presbyterate, is therefore an important 
aspect of his ministry; the bishop is required to visit his diocese every five years 
(Canon 396).
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3.8 The Bishop’s Quinquennial Report
The diocesan bishop is also required to submit "to the Supreme Pontiff’ a report 
“on the state of the diocese entrusted to him", every five years (Canon 399). 
Known as the "Quinquennial Report", the obligation to submit this document to 
the Pope stems from the "concern for ecclesial accountability and the papal 
responsibility to promote the good of all the churches" (Coriden et a /1985:335). 
From a corporate governance view point, this Report is significant because it 
appears to be the only instance provided by Canon Law (Roman Catholic 
Church 1983) where evidence of “ecclesial accountability” is required of the 
Bishop.
In the course of our research, we were informed that the Quinquennial Report is 
a personal document of the bishop; it is therefore not published. Attempts were 
made to secure copies of Reports which were to be used as archival data 
(Bercovitch & Houston 2000; Bercovitch 2004) for our research; unfortunately, 
we were unsuccessful. We were fortunate however, to be given by a member of 
the clergy, a copy of a 25-page document entitled Form for the Quinquennial 
Report (the 'Form'), published by the Congregation for Bishops. The Form (no 
year or other details indicated) provides clear instructions regarding the 
structure of the Quinquennial Report; it indicates distinctly what information is 
required of the Bishop.
It is obvious from the directives contained in the Form that the Quinquennial
Report is actually concerned with the Bishop's management of his diocese -  in
other words his performance. On reflection, the Bishop's Quinquennial Report is
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remarkably similar to a company's annual report; for example, as is typical of 
annual reports, the Form specifies that the Report begins first with details of the 
Bishop: full name, rank in the hierarchy, nationality, mother tongue and other 
languages spoken fluently and extra-diocesan appointments; the same 
information is also required of his management team (Form, page 5).
In addition to data on the financial state of the diocese, the Form for the 
Quinquennial Report specifies that the Bishop is to provide the Supreme Pontiff 
the Bishop's own assessment and forecast of the future of his diocese (Form, 
page 25); this is typical of the information provided customarily by company 
chairmen and CEOs in their annual reports; it is also reminiscent of the practice 
where companies provide investment analysts quarterly financial forecasts 
(Bauwhede & Willekens 2008; Abraham 2008). The Form provides evidence 
that the evaluation of the Bishop's performance by “the Holy See” (Coriden et al 
1985:335) follows a method which is 'secular' and it is no different to that 
highlighted in our review of company performance, in the previous chapter. It is 
therefore indefensible to argue that the Bishop's performance is above scrutiny 
and cannot be subject to evaluation methods which are associated with the 
managerial lens (Long et a /2010; Merkl-Davies et a /2011; Simpson 2012).
According to the Form for the Quinquennial Report (Index, Page 3), there 
should be 23 chapters in the Bishop's Quinquennial Report; each chapter 
evaluates many aspect of his performance in terms of his pastoral ministry, 
discussed in section 3.6 above. It is notable that each chapter is invariably 
prefaced by a section entitled “Statistics”; in addition to the various types of
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numerical data requested, two figures in particular are frequently required: the 
opening figure, as of January 1st, for the first year of the quinquennial; and the 
closing figure, as of December 31st, of the last reporting year. It is notable that 
statistical data holds a prominent place in the Quinquennial Report. The 
reliability and validity of statistical data are clearly recognized by Rome; the 
Form (page 3) warns Bishops that the “value of these statistics will depend 
upon the accuracy with which they have been compiled.”
Comparative statistics, which are to be supplemented by “a more detailed 
exposition”, provide the Supreme Pontiff a basis for evaluating the Bishop's 
performance; in the management of their diocese, Bishops must “not only 
describe any difficulties which might have arisen, but also their underlying 
causes, and those means which have been employed during the quinquennial 
period to resolve them” (Form, page 3). The Form for the Quinquennial Report 
is therefore significant and highly relevant to this thesis: though we may not 
have access to Quinquennial Reports, we can certainly be guided by the Form's 
directives in our development of an ecclesiastical corporate governance 
framework which is appropriate to the Catholic Church. By cross-referencing the 
Form to the relevant parts of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) 
discussed in previous sections above, we are able to determine the 
mechanisms and the indicators which the Church herself uses to evaluate the 
Bishop's performance. In the following sections, we determine the 
measurements of the Bishop's performance, with reference to his board 
(diocesan curia) and his functions (three-fold munera), relying on the guidelines 
that are contained in the Form.
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3.9 Evaluation of the Bishop’s Diocesan Curia
The Form specifies that the Bishop is required to report on the “institutions” 
which assist him in the governance of his diocese (Form, page 3). These 
institutions are part of the Bishop's diocesan curia, as described in Canon 469. 
Amongst others, mention is specifically made of the College of Consultors and 
the Council of Priests. The Bishop is required to disclose the “composition” of 
the College and the Council, and the “frequency of meetings”; he is to disclose 
the “records of minutes”, and to describe the range of “issues considered.” As 
discussed above, the Council of Priests -  known also as the Presbyteral 
Council -  is described specifically as “a senate of the Bishop which assists the 
Bishop in the governance of the diocese” (Canon 495). In the same section of 
the Report, the Bishop is also asked to describe his own “understanding of the 
Presbyteral Council's nature as a senate of the Bishop” (Form, page 5).
We note that the Supreme Pontiff is especially interested in the Bishop's own
attitude towards his 'senate'; presumably the Bishop's attitude provides an
indication of how central this “senate” is to the Bishop's governance. The
Supreme Pontiff also wishes to know the range of issues considered by the
senate. Critically, the Bishop is also asked to assess the performance of the
various offices that make up his diocesan curia; the Form asks the Bishop for
his “evaluation and personal judgement on the effectiveness and efficiency of all
the above listed offices, agencies and tribunals.” 'Performance', 'frequency of
meetings', 'effectiveness' and 'efficiency' are corporate governance-
management constructs which we encountered in the previous chapter. We
note that these are the very same constructs by which the Bishop is evaluated
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by the Supreme Pontiff.
3.10 Evaluation of the Bishop’s Obligation to Teach
Chapter 6 of the Quinquennial Report is concerned with the Bishop's 
performance in terms of his personal responsibility to teach. As discussed in 
earlier sections above, the Bishop is allowed to delegate his teaching 
responsibility to his priests and to catechists, though he remains personally 
responsible. Amongst other things, the Bishop is required to provide an 
account of how he ensures “the orthodoxy and moral life of the catechists” he 
appoints; he must disclose what measures he has undertaken to ensure their 
“doctrinal and spiritual formation” (Form, page 12). The Form also directs that 
the Bishop includes an account of his judgement on the “suitability and 
effectiveness” of the teaching materials which he approves for use by 
catechists.
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3.11 Evaluation of the Bishop’s Obligation to Sanctify
The Bishop is required to promote and celebrate constantly the liturgy and the 
sacraments because that is the primary means by which "the Christian faithful 
entrusted to his care grow in grace" (Canon 840). Specifically, the Form 
specifies that this chapter of the Quinquennial Report begins first with statistics 
on the sacraments including: the number of Baptisms; First Holy Communions; 
Confirmations; Marriages; Extreme Unction and Sunday Mass attendance. It is 
interesting to note that the sacrament of Penance is not requested in this 
section of the statistics; however, we note that in the narrative section which 
follows, the Form directs the Bishop to disclose “the frequency of the reception 
of the Sacrament of Penance.” Specifically, the Report must disclose what 
measures the Bishop has taken to ensure in the clergy and the laity, the 
“formation of conscience concerning the meaning of sin and the preaching of 
conversion” and preaching “ the necessity of confessing mortal sins before 
reception of Holy Communion” (Form, page 9).
In his Report, the Bishop is required to “express a judgement” regarding how 
the sacraments are celebrated by the clergy and the laity (Form, page 8). For 
example, the Bishop is to describe how Sunday Masses are celebrated without 
abuse. Amongst other things, the Bishop should state what progress has been 
made “of the induit to use the Missale Romanum 1962”, popularly known as the 
Tridentine Rite. With regards to Holy Orders, the Bishop is obliged to ensure 
that those seminarians who become priests are properly investigated before 
they become ordained.
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3.12 Evaluation of the Bishop’s Obligation to Govern
Chapter 7 of the Quinquennial Report is concerned about the Bishop's 
relationship with, and the management of, his clergy (Form, page 12). Following 
the now customary statistical section on the number of priests, deacons, and 
other related data, the Bishop is required to evaluate the “state of the clergy of 
the diocese”. The Bishop is required to demonstrate how closely connected he 
is with his priests and how knowledgeable he is about their personal lives; 
specifically, the Bishop must show he knows how well his priests: live a “life of 
piety”, celebrate Mass frequently, fulfil their pastoral duties; how they feel 
towards “clerical celibacy”, behave with others in private; and their attitude 
towards the “Directory for the Life and Ministry of Priests” (Form, page 13). 
Finally, when a priest leaves the priesthood, it is a significant event; the Bishop 
is required to provide an account of the “analysis of the individual cases, the 
reasons for their leaving, and the pastoral care accorded them” (Form, page 
14).
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3.13 The Salvation of Souls
It is important to remember that the main purpose of the Bishop's job -  his 
raison d'etre, is spiritual -  that is: the salvation of souls (Canons 771; 761). His 
power, the diocesan curia, including all the administrative appendage it entails, 
are subordinate to that one “spiritual purpose” (Canon 145); Arrieta (2000:64) 
iterates: “the supernatural character of the Church imposes a spiritual finality on 
the ecclesiastical organization. In the final analysis, it is the end that justifies the 
creation of ecclesiastical offices” - a “spiritual end” (Arrieta 2000:63). This 
reminder is also contained in the Bishops' own handbook, Apostolorum 
Successores (Congregation for Bishops 2004), where the Church reminds him: 
“as a general principle, the diocesan structures should always be at the service 
of the good of souls and that the administrative demands should not take 
precedence over the care of persons” (Congregation for Bishops 2004, 177). In 
the same directive, the Bishop is asked to ensure that his management “is 
smooth and efficient, avoiding all unnecessary complexity or bureaucracy, and 
always directed towards its proper supernatural end” (Congregation for Bishops 
2004, 177).
The salvation of souls is a central aspect of the bishop's pastoral ministry which 
he is unable to accomplish alone; he is dependent on his presbyte rate. Like 
their Bishop, priests too must not be allowed to forget that the salvation of souls 
is the main purpose of their vocation. Therefore, AP (Congregation for Bishops 
2004, 176) warns: “When appointing priests to these (management) positions, 
the Bishop should see to it that they exercise some other ministry involving the
117
care of souls, so as to keep alive their apostolic zeal and to avoid developing a 
damaging bureaucratic mentality through lack of direct contact with the faithful.”
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3.14 Theoretical Discussion
This thesis is not about Church theology, doctrine, or dogma; nor is it about 
organisational structures, or types of monarchies, perse. This chapter 
examines the Catholic Church's own corporate governance. In the course of our 
examination, we establish that management is a concept and practice with 
which the Catholic Church is perfectly at ease. How well it does, is all together a 
different matter. The Church is actually an advocate of good management and 
sound administration: this is evidenced in her own ecclesiastical legislation - 
Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983); for further examples, refer to 
Canons 1273 to 1289. Likewise, an assessment of the Church's management 
performance, using the managerial lens, is not without precedent; it is not a 
phenomenon which the Church is unfamiliar with.
As highlighted in our discussions above, there is a precedent set for viewing the 
Church's management performance through the managerial lens: the first 
known research on the Church's management performance was published by 
the American Institute of Management in 1956 (AIM, 1956). Therefore, in 
agreement with Church's critics, this thesis argues that it is possible to apply 
management techniques in order to evaluate or to improve management 
performance; importantly, our thesis also demonstrates that the justification for 
this examination is founded, fundamentally, on the Church's own Code of 
Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983).
However, our thesis exposes a notable absence of any performance indicator
which evaluates the main objective of the Catholic Church, and the central
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purpose of the diocesan Bishop's principal role: the salvation of souls. Given the 
importance of this objective, this thesis argues that some form of indicator and 
benchmark should be established for this key performance variable. However, it 
may be argued that whilst it is easy to apply management concepts and 
evaluation techniques to aspects of the Church which are visible, it is much 
harder to apply these to those spiritual aspects which are intangible, such as 
“the salvation of souls”. Perhaps this is one reason other researchers have not 
ventured into this area of research. Therefore, a key challenge faced by this 
thesis, for the purpose of our empirical research, is: “How does one measure 
the salvation of souls?” This question is addressed further in the next chapter 
where we attempt to develop and operationalize our conceptual framework.
One criticism of the extant research on Church corporate governance is that the 
focus is usually on the 'secular' side of management, with no evidence of any 
consideration for, or probing at, the spiritual aspect of ecclesiastical 
performance. For example, Duncan et a/'s (1999) research on church corporate 
governance analysed the internal financial controls of 1200 churches. Bison et 
a/’s (2007) research on churches focused on the usual mechanisms of 
corporate governance of accountability, for instance independent boards of 
directors, documented policies and procedures, and financial management 
practices. West and Zech (2006) also focus their efforts primarily on internal 
financial controls in the US Catholic Church. Though their research is on the 
Catholic Church, West and Zech (2006) make no reference to, nor do they 
attempt to suggest a contextual corporate governance framework, which would 
have provided a meaningful background to their research.
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It is notable that agency theory is the theoretical framework commonly used in 
Church corporate governance research. One example is Zech (2001). In an 
earlier paper, Zech (2001:327) seeks to apply agency theory to the “agent- 
principal” relationship within “churches and their clergy.” Zech (2001) states that 
it is difficult to observe and measure the performance of the clergy in order to 
ensure that compensation is commensurate with their achievement. 
Consequently, he “contends” that a “sensible solution” is to recognise 
exceptional performance by rewarding high achievers with “larger, more 
prestigious congregations.” What Zech (2001) and others like him do not seem 
to recognise is that the Catholic Church is a spiritual entity whose raison d’être 
is: the salvation of souls (Lynskey 1952; Arrieta 2000; Roman Catholic Church 
1983).
Zech (2001) does not appear to recognise that if it were a company, the 
Catholic Church's “principal” would be God. Zech (2001) does not acknowledge 
that the primary aim of entering the employ of the Catholic Church as a Priest 
should be “to serve God” for the eternal salvation of souls. Entering the 
priesthood entails considerable self-sacrifice on the part of the Priest, and his 
renunciation of all material and worldly possessions. The Priest’s self-sacrifice 
is further embodied in the solemn vows he undertakes just before he is 
ordained priest, those of: Chastity, Obedience, and Poverty (Kevane 1987). 
Therefore, for a priest to seek material reward, such as the prestige and wealth 
that comes with a bigger parish, is to decry all that the priesthood professes, 
and what the Catholic Church exists for.
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In applying agency theory to the Catholic Church and her managers -  the 
clergy, Zech (2001) does not appear to realise the reason why young men 
make sacrifices to enter the priesthood. Nevertheless, from a management 
perspective, it is important to determine the relevant measures which indicate 
‘successful performance’. In the Catholic Church, key performance indicators 
expected of priests are specifically provided for in the Code of Canon Law 
(Roman Catholic Church 1983). However, Zech (2001:330) suggests that the 
“most effective form of backloaded compensation available to churches is the 
promise of eternal life.” Again, Zech (2001:330) may not realise that priests do 
not regard “eternal life” as a form of “compensation” for which they qualify upon 
retirement; it is a reward which they can only hope to achieve a/fer death.
We established that agency theory is the dominant theoretical framework of 
corporate governance, in chapter 2. This framework is typically applicable to 
listed companies with shareholders who generally possess voting rights; they 
are therefore able to exercise shareholder democracy on the resolutions held at 
board or annual general meetings. In such cases, good practice such as board 
process, mechanisms of accountability, transparency, and disclosure, and 
compliance are part of the corporate governance landscape. However, it is 
difficult to argue that agency theory applies to a religious institution such as the 
Catholic Church; this is because the Church is monarchical, hierarchical, and 
has no shareholders. If a shareholder could be identified, it could arguably be 
God; his clergy - the hierarchy, will be his 'managers', personally responsible for 
achieving the company's mission and objectives -  primarily the salvation of
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souls.
Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) provides the basis upon which the 
Church's organisational structure arises. Against the background of criticisms 
such as the Church being “monarchical”, “radically hierarchical”, and therefore 
“dysfunctional”, Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) explains how and 
why the Church is this way, namely: the hierarchy of order, and the order of 
jurisdiction. Critiques argue that the “solution” to the Church's problem is the 
introduction of “democracy” and the reformation of its organisational structure. 
They also argue that the laity should be permitted a greater role in the 
governance of the Church. However, the insights gleaned from our examination 
of Church legislation lead us to concluded that this reform would be difficult, if 
not, impossible, without modifying the existing Code of Canon Law (Roman 
Catholic Church 1983). For example, Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 
1983) makes clear that only those who are ordained have the power to govern 
the Church (Canon 129 §1). This limits the direct involvement of the laity, and 
the scope for democracy.
To agitate for change also implies the need, in the first instance, for a 
fundamental review, or challenge, of existing Church doctrine and theology. 
Though not impossible, the likelihood of this occurring is unlikely. Nevertheless, 
this thesis argues that the concept of good corporate governance should, and 
could, be incorporated into the Bishop's diocesan curia, despite the Church's 
existing monarchical, hierarchical structure; we contend that the introduction of 
corporate governance is possible without changing Canon Law (Roman
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Catholic Church 1983); this is made possible where corporate governance is 
applied within the context of the diocesan bishop's own pastoral ministry.
The Church's corporate governance framework, in the form of the bishop's 
diocesan curia, is similar to a company's board of directors. Canon Law (Roman 
Catholic Church 1983) states that the Bishop has ultimate control over whom he 
appoints; he also has exclusive decision-making authority, and the power to 
convoke, legislate, and adjudicate. All these are in contradiction to what we 
regard as 'good practice' in the corporate governance adopted by business. For 
example, the Combined Code (2008) states that the roles of the chairman and 
CEO should be separate and not be held by the same person, in order to curb 
the concentration and the abuse of power; good practice also suggests that the 
majority of board directors should be independent so that objectivity and 
criticality are ensured at the strategic level; finally, there are also various types 
of audits and different committees whose activities and findings are subject to 
scrutiny and disclosure in order to ensure compliance, accountability, and 
transparency.
It is tempting to conclude that the Church's corporate governance is similar in 
character to the 'comply or explain' approach of the Combined Code (2008), 
rather than the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, it should be noted that whilst the 
bishop has unfettered powers of discretions -  for example, he is able to adapt 
aspects of his diocesan curia to his local requirements -  Canon Law (Roman 
Catholic Church 1983) is silent about ecclesiastical mechanisms of corporate 
governance and it fails to prescribe any board-related processes that require
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the Bishop to demonstrate accountability, transparency and disclosure. 
However, it is notable that under Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983), 
the diocesan Bishop is personally responsible for the eternal salvation of all 
those in his diocese. The concept of personal responsibility is not contained in 
the Combined Code; however, the Bishop's personal responsibility is 
reminiscent of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, where a company's 
officers are personally liable for ensuring sound internal financial controls and 
procedures.
The Quinquennial Report is the only evidence of accountability required of the 
diocesan Bishop, albeit one that is accessible only by the Vatican. As explained 
above, the Report is the Bishop's private document; it is not published nor is it in 
the public domain. The Form for the Quinquennial Report is therefore a very 
significant discovery and highly relevant to this thesis. The Form provides us 
with considerable information about what is contained in the Bishop's 
Quinquennial Report. We know now that statistical data plays a very important 
part in the reporting requirements. It is therefore unreasonable to argue that we 
are debarred from using statistics to measure ecclesiastical performance; this is 
because Rome applies to her Bishops, performance indicators which are not 
dissimilar to those used in companies. Submitted every five years, it is doubtful 
what useful purpose this Report serves and whether this type of accountability 
is at all effective. Doubts about this form of corporate governance are further 
heightened in view of the fact that there is no disclosure and therefore no 
transparency. The Report is not accessible because there is no requirement, 
under Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983), to publish it.
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The Form (page 25) informs us that the Bishop is required to highlight the key 
issues and challenges which he experiences in his role as the top executive of 
his diocese. The Form cautions the Bishop to “not only describe any difficulties 
which might have arisen, but also their underlying causes, and those means 
which have been employed [...] to resolve them, when presenting information 
concerning the actual pastoral situation of the diocese.” In the final chapter of 
the Form, the Bishop is to disclose -  in a manner similar to company CEOs -  
whether he has a pastoral plan, what are the key priorities, and the “proposed 
means to attain them.” The study of a series of Quinquennial Reports could 
provide insights into the Bishop's management and creative problem-solving 
skills. A longitudinal study of these archival documents would enable a 
researcher to construct a set of performance indicators and benchmarks based 
on what is already used by their Lordships.
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3.15 Conclusion
It can be argued effectively that the Church has a corporate governance 
framework of its own, known as the diocesan curia. Provided by Canon Law 
(Roman Catholic Church 1983), the diocesan curia can be likened to that of a 
company's board of directors: it comprises "those institutions and persons which 
assist the bishop in the governance of the whole diocese, especially in guiding 
pastoral action, in caring for the administration of the diocese, and in exercising 
judicial power" (Canon 469). Our examination of Canon Law (Roman Catholic 
Church 1983) reveals that the Church's corporate governance has significant 
differences when compared to our understanding of good corporate practice 
because, amongst other things, it is silent about ecclesiastical mechanisms of 
corporate governance; it also does not prescribe any board-related processes 
that require the Bishop to demonstrate accountability, transparency and 
disclosure. The concept of personal, individual accountability demanded of the 
Bishop is something worthy of further consideration, and notably absent in 
secular corporate governance. In the Church, the 'chairmanship' and the 'chief 
executive officer' functions are unified within the office of the Bishop; this 
'duality' goes against conventional corporate governance wisdom and practice. 
This may convey the impression that the Church's corporate governance model 
is potentially flawed.
The Quinquennial Report appears to be the only evidence of accountability
required officially of the diocesan Bishop which is prescribed by Canon Law
(Roman Catholic Church 1983). Though it is not possible to gain access to this
document, the Form for the Quinquennial Report provides significant
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information about what is required in the Bishop's five-yearly report. The Form 
proves that the Bishop's performance can be, and is, evaluated. Canon Law 
(Roman Catholic Church 1983) provides a sufficiently detailed description of the 
Bishop's duties tailored to the threefold office of Christ (Arrieta 2000:208), 
namely: teaching (Canon 386), sanctifying (Canon 387), and governing (Canon 
391). It is proposed that by cross-referencing the Bishop's job description with 
the relevant section of the Form, it is possible to develop a corporate 
governance framework which is appropriate to the ecclesiastical mission of the 
Catholic Church.
Given that the main objective of the Catholic Church, and the central purpose of 
the diocesan Bishop's principal role is the salvation of souls, our thesis 
highlights a notable absence of any performance indicator which evaluates this 
aspect of the Bishop's accountability. This thesis argues that some form of 
evaluation criteria should be established for this key performance variable. A 
key question which our empirical research seeks to answer is: “How do you 
measure the salvation of souls?” This question is addressed further in the next 
chapter where we attempt to develop and operationalize our conceptual 
framework.
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CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPMENT OF AN ECCLESIASTICAL 
MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS
4.1 Introduction
Our discussion in the previous chapter finds that the Bishop's corporate 
governance, in the form of his diocesan curia, is not optimal due to the absence 
of mechanisms which are generally necessary to check against the abuse of 
authority and power; in the case of the diocesan Bishop, his authority and 
power is exclusive. Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) could be 
considered defective, because it is silent on critical aspects of corporate 
governance such as board processes; it is also silent on aspects of episcopal 
accountability, transparency, and disclosure (AID). Despite these limitations, 
we argue that the principles of corporate governance are applicable to the 
Bishop's management of his diocese; however, in order to develop a corporate 
governance framework which is relevant, these principles must, and can, be 
situated within the context of the Bishop's pastoral ministry. This chapter seeks 
to synthesise the salient points of our literature review. By doing so, an 
ecclesiastical model of corporate governance is developed which addresses the 
issues raised in the previous chapters. The constructs within the model facilitate 
the formulation of the research questions.
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4.2 Towards the Development of an Ecclesiastical 
Model of Corporate Governance
We established that corporate governance is a board level responsibility which 
is critical to good management (Haspeslagh 2010; Udueni 1999); the principles 
of good corporate governance are mechanisms, compliance and performance; 
the characteristics of good corporate governance are accountability, 
transparency, and disclosure (ATD). In chapter 3 we confirmed that the Church 
has a corporate governance framework, albeit imperfect because it is silent on 
the provisions such as board processes and the absence of any mechanisms to 
ensure ATD. There are also no performance indicators which measure the 
diocesan bishop's primary objective. The following sections attempt the 
development of a corporate governance model which incorporates the 
principles of good corporate governance and seeks to overcome the limitations 
identified above.
4.2.1 Ecclesiastical Mechanisms of Corporate Governance
Corporate governance mechanisms are used by various stakeholders in order 
to determine whether or not progress is made or whether objectives are 
achieved (Bryman & Bell 2007). These wide ranging measures include: the way 
a board is structured (Abdullah 2007), the degree of independence of board 
directors (Setia-Atmaja 2009), the way a board of directors operate (Wan & Ong 
2005), the total return on shareholder value (Shabbir 2007), a company's 
market position (Eldomiaty 1998), and the quality of information a company 
discloses (Abdellatif 2009). We established that the diocesan bishop's
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corporate governance framework is his diocesan curia (Roman Catholic Church 
1983). The curia comprises "those institutions and persons which assist the 
bishop in the governance of the whole diocese, especially in guiding pastoral 
action, in caring for the administration of the diocese, and in exercising judicial 
power" (Canon 469).
We contend that the curia, institutions and persons contained therein, are the 
Church's equivalents of corporate governance mechanisms. However, Canon 
Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) is silent about whom the Bishop is 
accountable to, and about what constitutes matters of accountability and 
disclosure. Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) is also silent about 
matters relating to board processes and what constitute good curia practice. 
Therefore, our first research question (RQ1) seeks to examine how effectively 
Bishops use the existing ecclesiastical mechanisms of corporate governance in 
the management of their diocese?
Our research question focuses on these two institutions, in particular: the 
Council of Priests (RQ1a) and College of Consultors (RQ1b); this is because of 
the senatorial role of the Council and the consensual function of the College of 
Consultors; both comprise the Bishop's presbytery who are critical to the 
successful achievement of his tria-munera (Congregation for Bishops 2004; 
Pope John Paul II 2003, Arrieta 2000; Roman Catholic Church 1983). Canon 
495 mandates the establishment of the Council of Priests which is likened to “a 
senate of the Bishop and which assists the Bishop in the governance of the 
diocese.” A number of priests from the Council of Priests are chosen by the
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Bishop to serve on the College of Consultors (Canon 502 §1).
Though the College of Consultors' role is vague, the Bishop is required to 
consult the College before he appoints the Finance Officer (Canon 494); 
likewise, though the Bishop has the sole prerogative of removing the Finance 
Officer, he is minded to do so only after he has “heard the College of Consultors 
and the Finance Council.” Using the Form for the Quinquennial Report as our 
guide, we propose to analyse this question by using the indicators contained 
within, for instance: frequency of meetings, nature of discussions, decisions 
relating to the Bishop's tria-munera of teaching, sanctifying, and governance. As 
we are unable to gain access to the Bishop's Quinquennial Reports, we propose 
to answer this question by interviewing the Bishops and members of his clergy.
4.2.2 Ecclesiastical Compliance of Corporate Governance
In business, compliance is evidenced via a number of mechanisms: annual 
financial reporting, audit committees, shareholder annual general meetings (Fla, 
2001), meetings with analysts and institutional shareholders, and issuance of 
quarterly reports (Abraham 2008). We established in Chapter 2 that compliance 
is associated with rules, regulations (Abdullah 2007:4) and codes of good 
practice which are designed to achieve company objectives (Demirag et al 
2000:348; Heracleous 2001; Albereda 2008; Aguilera 2005; London Stock 
Exchange 2004; Walker 2009). Once again, as noted in Chapter 3, Canon Law 
(1983) is silent on such matters and it does not make any provisions which the 
Bishop is compelled to comply. However, we know that the Bishop is personally 
accountable for the management of his diocese in terms of his tria-munera. Our
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second research question therefore (RQ2) seeks to examine how Bishops 
effectively comply with the rules and regulations of their tria-munera. Bishops 
are “teachers of doctrine, priests of sacred worship, and ministers of 
governance.” (Canon 375, §1).
In the area of teaching, the Bishop's is obliged to “propose and explain to the 
faithful the truths of the faith which are to be believed and applied to morals” 
(Canon 386). We ask: “How compliant is the Bishop with his responsibility to 
teach?” (RQ 2a). Within the area of sanctifying, the Bishop is obliged to ensure 
that “abuses do not creep into ecclesiastical discipline, especially regarding the 
ministry of the word, the celebration of the sacraments and sacramentals, the 
worship of God and the veneration of the saints ” (Canon 392 §2). We ask: 
“How compliant is the Bishop with his responsibility to sanctify?” (RQ 2b). In 
terms of governance, the Bishop is obliged to ensure that “priests correctly fulfil 
the obligations proper to their state, and make available to them the means and 
institutions which they need to foster spiritual and intellectual life.” (Canon 384). 
Accordingly, the question posed is: “How compliant is the Bishop with his 
responsibility to sanctify?” (RQ 2c). As access to the Quinquennial Reports are 
not possible, we propose to answer these research questions by interviewing 
the Bishops and their clergy.
4.2.3 Ecclesiastical Performance
“Performance” usually relates to the financial results generated by the firm, as 
manifested in performance indicators such as profitability, market value, return 
on assets (ROA), and return on capital employed (ROCE), (Abdullah 2007;
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Bauwhede & Willekens 2008; Shabbir 2007; Florackis 2007; Abraham 2008). 
However, we established that the primary objective of the Catholic Church and 
the diocesan Bishop's raison d'etre is the eternal salvation of souls. Our final 
research question (RQ3) proposes to examine the diocesan Bishop's 
performance in terms of the number of souls saved. Though it is difficult to 
quantify the number of souls saved, we argue that this measure could be 
approximated by the reception of the sacraments. We therefore propose to use 
the reception of the sacraments as proxy for this performance indicator.
It can be argued that the efficacy of the Bishop's ministry is evidenced by the 
laity's adherence to the tenets of their Catholic faith; adherence is manifested by 
the laity's reception of the sacraments which are “necessary for salvation” 
(Canon 489). This argument is underscored by the Form for the Quinquennial 
Report which requires the Bishop to provide detailed statistical data - and to 
construct in-depth evaluations -  regarding the delivery and reception of the 
sacraments. Our research question (RQ3) therefore seeks to measure the 
Bishop's performance in terms of the statistical data given on the sacraments, 
namely: Baptisms, Penance, Mass attendance (Holy Communion),
Confirmation, Marriage, Holy Orders, Extreme Unction, and Catholic population. 
Arguably, an upward trend would suggest compliance, whereas a downward 
trend would suggest otherwise.
To justify our use of proxies, we refer to the works of various corporate 
governance researchers cited earlier in previous chapters; for example, proxies 
are used extensively by Abdullah (2007); Abraham (2008); Florackis (2007);
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Eldomiaty (1998); McColgan (2004); O'Sullivan (2000); Sinha (1998) and 
Shabbir (1998). The widespread use of proxies is explained by the fact that 
corporate governance is a high level, board activity; in the board room, many of 
the issues discussed are of a sensitive nature. The deliberations and decisions 
made at board level could influence competitor response and share price 
movements. Leblanc and Schwartz (2007) examine the difficulty experienced by 
corporate governance researchers in gaining access to the boardrooms;
Leblanc and Schwartz (2007:843) regard this form of research as “the blackbox 
of board process.” Pettigrew (1992:165) expresses the same sentiment in his 
study on top board directors: “Access difficulties have been and remain a 
source of constraint on studies of elites” such as board directors and senior 
executives.
We observe too that when proxies are used, reliance is placed almost solely on 
published information which serves as the primary source of data. Stiles 
(1998:15) explains that one of the reason for resorting to published information 
is because: “secondary data on companies is relatively easily attainable, a 
positive boon in an area where access problems are acute.” Abraham's 
(2008:10) thesis on corporate governance disclosure provides several clear 
examples of how proxies are used; for example, he uses the: “Total book value 
of assets, total market value of the firm, total revenue,” as “common proxies [...] 
to test for the size effect.” Abraham's (2008:10) also uses the “extent of 
disclosure” as a proxy “for the quality of disclosure”; the “average market value” 
is used by Abraham (2008:10) as “proxy for company size.”
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Eldomiaty's (1998:196) thesis on corporate governance uses content analysis of 
advertisements produced by banks in order to adopt proxies which are then 
used to measure a bank's identity; for example: the “Bank's reputation for 
clients is taken as a proxy for the first driver of identity: their List of clients. 
Information about the banks' Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is taken as a proxy 
for the second driver of identity: Reputation for innovation and change. 
Information about banks' age and geographic spread is taken as a proxy of the 
third driver of identity: Network of partners or competitors. Information about 
banks' profits, size and country of origin is taken as a proxy of the fourth driver 
of identity: External intermediaries.”
Florackis (2007:12) uses asset turnover ratio as the “inverse proxy” for agency 
costs when examining managerial entrenchment; and “managerial ownership” 
of shares is used as a proxy for “managerial incentives”. Florackis (2007:47) 
illustrates the point made earlier by Abraham (2008) above, by also using “total 
assets as a proxy for size.” The number of subsidiary companies owned by a 
parent company is used by O'Sullivan (2000:130) as proxy for “complexity.” 
Adbellatifs (2009) thesis sought to investigate which financial ratios would be 
robust proxies for information asymmetry and whether it would be possible to 
predict information asymmetry by codifying a construct for corporate 
governance. Abdellatif (2009) found that a firm's long term debt, spread ratio, 
and volatility were good proxy measures for asymmetric information. Amongst 
other things, Adbellatif (2009:129) also found that: “the higher the quality of 
corporate governance the lower the degree of asymmetric information.” The 
ecclesiastical model of corporate governance may be summarised, thus:
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Table 4.2.3: Theoretical Framework and Research Questions. Source: 
present author
Mechanisms (ATD) Compliance Performance
RQ1 RQ2 RQ3
4 4 4
Board Level - 
Diocesan Curia 
For example: principle 
office of decision­
making; efficacy of 
Council of Priests 
College of Consultors
Bishop's tria-munera of 
Teaching 
Sanctifying 
Governance
Bishop's pastoral ministry 
in terms of the 
sacraments, mass 
attendance and 
population of the laity
4 4 4
Measures Measures Measures
Frequency of 
Meetings
Nature of Discussions 
Decisions relating to 
tria-munera -  
teaching, sanctifying, 
and governance
Compliance as per 
Canon Law (Roman 
Catholic Church 1983) 
and Form for the 
Quinquennial Report
Statistical data on the 
reception of the 
sacraments and mass 
attendance and Catholic 
population
4
Source of research 
data
4
Source of research 
data
4
Source of statistical 
data
Interviews with clergy Interviews with clergy Published data
With respect to research question (RQ1), we 'hypothesise' that the Bishop has 
adequate corporate governance mechanisms in place at his diocesan curia; this 
would be evidenced by his reliance on - and the involvement of - the Council of 
Priests and the College of Consultors; this would be further evidenced by 
frequency of meetings, nature of discussions and the substantive decisions 
made in relation to the Bishop's tria munera. In RQ2, we 'hypothesise' that the 
inextricable relationship between the Bishop and his diocesan Priests entails a
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close, positive working relationship which is a prerequisite for the successful 
performance of the Bishop’s ministry (CEO/Chairman and his board members). 
This "close, positive" relationship is evidenced by the shared perceptions held 
by the Bishop and his Priest regarding the management performance issues 
related to the Bishop's tria munera: views should be broadly similar in 
perception. For RQ3, we 'hypothesise' that there is an overall increase in the 
reception of the sacraments and the Catholic population.
These 'hypotheses', though not tested by hypothetico-deductive methods of 
statistical analysis, are hypotheses in their own right. Given our interpretive 
approach, data is analysed within the context of the theoretical framework which 
we have established. We seek to test our propositions and explain our empirical 
findings by analysing our interviews (cases) in detail, thus explaining the 
phenomenon (corporate governance at diocesan level) under scrutiny. This is a 
form of analytic induction, (Johnson 2004:165), where the primary purpose is to 
test and explain (Yin 2003), and not to produce theory inductively (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967). “Having identified some 'phenomenon and generated some 
hypothesis,” Silverman (2006:295) gives us the permission to “take a small 
body of data (a 'case') and examine it.” Silverman (2006:295) declares that: “no 
hypothesis testing can or should be theory free. Necessarily, then, analytic 
induction depends upon both a model of how social life works and a set of 
concepts specific to that model.”
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4.3 Conclusion
Our proposed ecclesiastical model of corporate governance locates the 
concepts of mechanisms, compliance and performance within the context of the 
diocesan Bishop's curia and his tria munera; the characteristics of 
accountability, transparency and disclosure are also framed within the context 
of the Bishop's personal responsibility for the management of his diocese. The 
model avoids the politically sensitive option of challenging the Church's 
theological beliefs and doctrine, for example, on matters concerning the 
Church's monarchical organizational structure and the unbridled power of the 
diocesan Bishops. By working within the current shortcomings inherent in the 
Church's own Code of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983), the model 
actually improves episcopal efficiency by effectively ordering the Church's own 
mechanisms, compliance and performance to the Bishop's primary objective of 
his pastoral ministry: the salvation of souls.
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH PILOT AND RESEARCH 
ISSUES
5.1 Introduction
This chapter highlights the key research issues which arise from the difficulties 
and practical constraints experienced during the pilot phase of our research.
Our pilot involved several iterative discussions with a small number of the clergy 
who were appreciative of our research objectives; this served as preparation for 
our main research (Yin 2009:67). The challenges and issues highlighted in this 
chapter help provide an understanding of the methods which we eventually 
adopted for our research (Easterby-Smith et a /1991:33). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the predominant research method of corporate governance is 
quantitative and statistical (Brennan & Solomon 2008). Likewise, this thesis was 
originally predisposed to, and favoured, the adoption of the quantitative 
approach. However, because of the practical constraints experienced -  access 
to data, “time and resources” (Bryman & Bell 2007:79), it was necessary to 
adopt a qualitative approach.
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5.2 Archival Data - The Quinquennial Report
The original intention was to answer our research questions by using the 
diocesan Bishop's Quinquennial Report (Report) as the primary source of 
archival data; we would have applied a methodology which was similar to 
Bercovitch (2004); in his research on international mediation, Bercovitch 
(2004:415) provides a description of how he designs and implements his 
method of systematic archival analysis. In our view, a series of three or four 
Reports, from a single diocese, representing 15 to 20 years normally, would 
provide our research sufficient longitudinal data from which emerging trends 
could be derived, and performance matrices formulated. The availability of data 
from several other dioceses would enable us to make our research cross- 
sectional, thereby providing further insights to our research questions. However, 
the Bishop's Report is a private document and is not publicly available. We also 
know from Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) that the Bishop is not 
compelled to publish his Report. A Bishop is therefore within his right not to 
provide the researcher access to the Reports.
We discussed our topic with members of the clergy (critical friends) who were 
sympathetic to our research objectives; they were consulted for feedback, about 
how the hierarchy would respond to our research efforts, and for advice about 
the best way to proceed with our data capture. These discussions and 
feedback, similar to the advance preparation advocated by Saunders et al, 
(2009:175) further informed our eventual approach. The discussions also 
helped us to frame the questions which we eventually adopted for our semi­
structured interviews. Neuendorf, (2002:50) asserts that the iterative process of
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the preparatory discussions has the effect of improving the “internal validity” of 
conceptual constructs.
The insights which we gained from our critical friends gave us a better 
understanding of a wide range of issues faced, for example: how the research 
would be perceived by the hierarchy, the question of access (or the lack of) to 
data, and how the questions should be phrased. The discussions served to 
confirm that the Quinquennial Report was really a private document and that the 
Bishop was under no obligation to release it. Our critical friends reinforced our 
view that Bishops were extremely powerful and, in their own experience, really 
not accountable to anyone. We were warned that the hierarchy are not in the 
habit of discussing topics such as 'corporate governance'; they felt that 
discussing this topic especially at a time when the Catholic Church was in the 
midst of several much publicised scandals, was bad timing.
We succeeded in interviewing one diocesan bishop. Though we discussed the 
nature of the Report in general, he did not offer us access to his Reports. This 
Bishop did not return the researcher's calls for follow-up meetings and for 
access to other officials within his curia. Auxiliary bishops whom we were 
fortunate to interview also chose not to make available the Reports; being 
auxiliary bishops, they had no authority to volunteer access to their Bishop's 
document. It was an auxiliary Bishop who kindly gave us a copy of the most 
useful Form for the Quinquennial Report. The Form provides considerable 
information into what the Bishop is required to disclose in his Quinquennial 
Report.
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5.3 Questionnaires and Selection and Stratification of 
Sample
We considered the use of self-administered questionnaires as a data collection 
method since this method is commonly used in corporate governance research. 
Questionnaires are also used by Elson et al (2007), West and Zech (2006), and 
Duncan et al (1999) in their research on Church corporate governance. The 
completed returns which we received would have been analysed statistically. 
However, we discovered that the mainland UK Catholic Church is comprised of 
22 dioceses in England and Wales (Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales 
2010), and 8 in Scotland (Burns 2010), giving a total of 30 entities and 
therefore, a total of thirty Diocesan Bishops. The clergy numbers 3000, 
approximately (Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales 2010; Burns 2010).
Given the large number of the clergy, the other challenge we faced was how to 
stratify the population in a meaningful way. There were many factors which 
weighed heavily in our consideration, for example: whether to limit the 
questionnaire to parish priests only, or to extend it to all priests; should the 
Priests be members of the College of Consultors and/or members of the 
Presbyteral Council; how was their membership to be accurately determined; to 
sample all 30 dioceses or to be selective; if selective, what was the selection 
criteria for selecting the dioceses; to limit the questionnaire to the 30 diocesan 
Bishops only would produce, if they all responded, a questionable statistical 
sample size. We also considered whether the self-administered questionnaire 
should be delivered by mail or electronically via the web; if it was to be via the 
web, we were not sure whether most of the clergy would be familiar with this
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methodology or ready access to this technology.
In designing the questionnaire, especially of great help were a Bishop 
(BA080409), a religious Priest, and two diocesan Priests. The exploratory 
discussion with the Bishop was held in person and recorded; the meeting with 
the religious Priest was not taped because he did not wish to; the two other 
priests responded via phone/email. At the same time, regular monthly meetings 
were held between the researcher and his supervisors, to discuss the findings 
and insights gained. The first draft of questions which the researcher designed 
included a detailed list of the responsibilities of Bishop and Priests which was 
distilled from the Form and cross-referenced with the Code of Canon Law 
(Roman Catholic Church 1983). The draft was sent to our critical friends.
It must be acknowledged, however, that not all the clergy whom we spoke to 
were friendly or sympathetic. An example of a response, from Priest (P120509), 
on being shown the list of performance indicators was: “No one assesses the 
performance of the Bishop -  not even Rome; your PhD is doomed to failure. I 
am sorry, I can't help you further”; it was the shortest exploratory meeting. Over 
time, we decided that the list of performance indicators should be omitted. This 
decision was made for two reasons: it would not be easy for a respondent to 
produce the evidence which is necessary to prove 'compliance'; nor would it be 
easy for any member of the clergy to demonstrate 'performance' when they 
have never been required to. It was felt that asking such questions might be 
potentially embarrassing and might convey the impression that we were 
insensitive or antagonistic; the Church's hierarchy was subject to considerable
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adverse publicity at the time.
We were informed by our critical friends that Priests were already inundated 
with excessive administrative paperwork and by what many regarded as 
superfluous form-filling exercises. The consensus view was that another 
questionnaire on a sensitive subject such as 'corporate governance1 or 'church 
management, would most probably be ignored. The response rate would 
therefore be low. We (researcher and supervisors) also considered the amount 
of time which would be required for administering the questionnaire and the 
question of funding the costs of the whole exercise. The researcher was 
informed that there would be no funding to help defray the costs. We finally 
concluded that the questionnaire would not be appropriate and decided instead 
to opt for a more modest sample size, using the snowballing technique and 
semi-structured interviews as the principal method of data collection.
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5.4 Statistical Data
We proposed in chapter 4 to use statistical data on the sacraments as proxy for 
the Bishop's performance. The use of proxies is common in corporate 
governance research
(Abdullah 2007; Abraham 2008; Florackis 2007; Eldomiaty 1998; McColgan 
2004; O'Sullivan 2000; Sinha 1998; Shabbir 1998; Demirag ef a/2000). Our 
search for statistical data leads us to conclude that the Catholic Church does 
not produce any meaningful information which relates specifically to the 
Bishops' performance. Public documents, such as the Church's annual financial 
accounts, are published because the Church is compelled by civil law to do so -  
for example, by the Charities Commission.
The accounts contain only financial information and are minimal in content 
when compared to the annual accounts of listed companies; the annual 
accounts of listed companies contain breakdowns of the financial information 
and details of long term strategy and operational issues. It is therefore 
reasonable to conclude that Church does not publish quarterly performance 
data the way that listed companies do, lef alone provide a central repository for 
its dissemination. This leads us to wonder whether the episcopate ever evaluate 
their performance, individually or collectively; if Bishops evaluate their 
performance, it may be reasonable to ask how this is achieved as there does 
not appear to be any evidence to suggest that this is done.
The source commonly mentioned for statistical data is the Catholic Directory,
published annually. The publisher of the Catholic Directory is officially appointed
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by the Catholic Church; the official source of information contained in the 
Catholic Directory is the Church's hierarchy. Despite the exclusive relationship 
between Church and publisher, one criticism of the Catholic Directory is that 
information is available for only three of the seven sacraments, namely: 
baptisms, marriage and priestly vocations (Holy Orders); it is noted however, 
that figures for the Catholic population and Mass attendance are included. 
Nevertheless, it is notable that the information contained in the Catholic 
Directory is based on data that is about two years old. Given the information 
age that we and the Church now find ourselves in, it seems reasonable to 
expect that ecclesiastical information could be produced in a more timely and 
transparent manner.
Grindell (2007) criticises the reliability of the information contained in Catholic 
Directory. For instance, Grindell (2001:27) regards the Catholic population 
figures listed “as unsatisfactory”, preferring to use the Sunday “Mass 
attendance figures” instead; this is because the figures are merely estimates 
given by parish priests and the aggregated figure published annually is prefaced 
by a cautionary statement which warns that: “the resultant figures 
underestimate the Catholic population and should not be regarded as a reliable 
guide to the size of the total Catholic community which is thought to be 
approximately 12% of the national population.”
The Catholic Directory does not provide any meaningful explanatory notes 
about how, for example, these estimates are arrived at; it also fails to provide 
any explanation about the origin of the 12 percent, and how data is generally
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captured and processed. In another instance, our examination of the 1958 
Directory reveals that the Catholic population is 3,343,000; however, in the 
1959 Directory, the figure for 1958 is restated as 3,433,000, a significant 
increase of nearly a hundred thousand in just one year. However, no 
explanation is given. It may be assumed that the difference is due either to data 
entry error or retrospective correction. The Catholic Directory is available for the 
years 1958 to 2010, except for 1971 and 1972. No reasons are easily discerned 
for the omission of the two years.
In the course of our search for data, we discovered Spencer's (2007) “Digest of 
Statistics of the Catholic Community of England and Wales, 1958-2005” (the 
'Digest'). Most notably, Spencer's (2007) Digest contains figures for six 
sacraments, namely: Baptism, Confessions, 1st Holy Communion, Confirmation, 
Marriage, and Holy Orders (Priests) - albeit some are incomplete because of 
the original lack of availability. Though the Catholic Directory does not include 
the number of deaths, this statistic is contained in Spencer's (2007) Digest; 
however, as explained in his notes, the figures do not necessarily include the 
reception of the sacrament Extreme Unction because the clergy were asked to 
also include those “who did not receive the Last Sacraments” (Spencer, 
2007:24).
Spencer (2007:4) derives and cross-references his data from “five principal 
sources”, namely: (a) the CEC/CBC which, according to Spencer “is the 
sequence of four detailed sources, beginning with the Newman Demographic 
Survey (for five years 1958 to 1962), the Catholic Education Council (for the
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years 1963 to 1991, except 1981 where the national summary has been lost), 
the Catholic Education Service (for the two years 1997 and 1998), and the 
Catholic Bishops' Conference (for the years 1999 to 2005)”; (b) diocesan 
directories -  a “collection of diocesan directories and yearbooks published for 
the years 1959 to 2007”; (c) the “national Catholic Directory (published for all 
years except 1971 and 1972)”; (d) the Annuario Pontificio; and (e) Diocesan 
Trust accounts.”
In an interview with the researcher (Saturday February 5th, 2011), Spencer 
(2007) discloses that he was the first director of the Newman Demographic 
Survey and provides his personal experience of the organization. Spencer 
(2007), a retired lecturer and statistician by profession, provides a detailed 
account of the methodology he uses in his Digest. Given the extensive sources 
used and the detailed explanatory notes annotated, Spencer's (2007) Digest 
may be regarded as more reliable, transparent and far more comprehensive 
than the Church's Catholic Directory. It is for these reasons that we propose to 
use the figures from Spencer's (2007) Digest, instead of the Catholic Directory 
which Spencer (2010:4) describes as “crude” and “varying in quality from poor 
to dreadful.” A historical and critical account of the English hierarchy's 
management of Church statistics is provided in Spencer's (2007) Digest, and in 
Spencer (2008; 2010).
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5.5 Conclusion
This chapter provides an account of the challenges faced during the piloting 
phase of our research design. It was originally our intention to use a positivist, 
quantitative research method to answer our research questions; unfortunately, 
because of the practical constraints experienced, it was necessary to use an 
alternative methodology. Being forced to use an alternative research approach 
our preferred methodology is not a phenomenon unknown in the research 
community; Easterby-Smith et a /(1991), describing the works of Pugh (1983, 
1988) and Hofstede (1980), provide two good examples which illustrate how 
even well-renowned researchers deviate from their preferred methodology 
during the course of their own research.
A self-described positivist, Pugh's research in organisational behaviour and 
structure utilizes “a highly structured schedule in order to gather data” from a 
sample of 46 manufacturing organisations in England, with 132 indicators 
which characterise “the structure and context of each organisation” (Easterby- 
Smith et al, 1991:27). However, because of the complex behavioural aspects of 
the phenomena being investigated and the large amount of the data involved, 
Pugh actually “found it necessary to conduct more detailed case studies of 
individual organisations in the later stages of his research in order to give a 
fuller understanding of what was taking place inside” (Easterby-Smith et al, 
1991:28).
Hofstede's research into culture and behaviour was based on data gleaned from 
116,000 completed questionnaires, collated over a period of 5 years, from 1967.
A self-declared positivist, Hofstede's research methodology is described as 
“totally quantitative” and the data “analysis was conducted purely by computer” 
(Easterby-Smith etal, 1991:28). However, as his research evolved, Hofstede 
found it necessary to engage in “considerable post hoc analysis” of the data 
which he had amassed; this 'post hoc analysis' included further reading, 
discussing his work with other colleagues, and making use of qualitative 
research methods in order to interpret his findings; Easterby-Smith et al, 
(1991:29) aver that “based on his account of the research process (Hofstede 
1980), much of his work simply does not fit the positivist paradigm.” The next 
chapter provides an account of our research methodology.
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
6.1 Introduction
Given the research issues highlighted and discussed in the previous chapter, 
we propose to use a qualitative-interpretive research approach which involves 
the use of semi-structured interviews as the primary method of data capture and 
thematic content analysis as the method for analysing data. It is opportune for 
us to examine Timms' (2001) research into the English Catholic Church's 
management at the diocesan and parish levels; this is because Timms' (2001) 
research method appears similar to ours; by examining Timms' (2001) research, 
we will highlight those issues that we must recognize and address in our own 
research methodology.
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6.2 Broadening the Frontier of Corporate Governance 
Research: the Qualitative, Interpretive Approach
In previous chapters, we noted that the dominant research method in corporate 
governance is positivist and quantitative. The positivist approach focuses on the 
technical aspects of the methodology used, for example the “hypothetico- 
deductive” and statistical techniques of analysis (Stiles 1998:50). It needs to be 
made clear, however, that this approach and method have their limitations: a 
positivist approach assumes that individuals are all the same; consequently, it is 
then possible to fit their fixed and limited range of responses neatly into a 
standardised range of questions; in the study of social beings, positivists believe 
that it is also possible to 'control' for other variables.
We also acknowledged the “conflicting empirical evidence” of corporate 
governance research (Piesse 2005:33); For every research conclusion which 
argues for a particular outcome, it is possible to find another which argues 
against. Despite these contradictory findings, Gilles and Morra (1997:4) argue 
that “most experienced directors are certain that there is a relationship between 
board structures, compositions, operations and results.” Giles and Morra 
(1997:4) ask “whether a general statistical approach, particularly regression 
analysis, to studying corporate governance is appropriate. If it isn't, is there a 
better approach?”
From our literature review, we conclude that corporate governance is a highly 
complex subject; this is made more so because of the multiple social 
interactions of human beings, which in turn is moderated by human behaviour
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and personal values (Walker 2009; Pettigrew & McNulty 1998; Roberts etal 
2005). Indeed, complexity is one of the factors which researchers appear to 
ignore in their studies on corporate governance (Filatotchev 2005); Heracleous 
(2001:166) warns that ignoring the “complexity” milieu of organisations affects 
the face validity of the corporate governance research. To improve face validity, 
Heracleous (2001) proposes the adoption of qualitative research methods such 
as direct observation and interviews; the reason is because these data 
collection methods are better able to take into account factors of complexity 
which influence corporate governance outcomes, for example: human 
behaviour and the dynamic environmental conditions within which an 
organisation finds itself.
A qualitative approach is used because Church corporate governance research 
is not yet a mature discipline (Elson et al 2007:124). In other aspects of 
corporate governance research such as the composition of board directors and 
board process the literature is generally more developed in terms of 
epistemology, depth and breadth (Udeni 1999; Sullivan & Diacon 1999; 
Florackis 2007; Spira & Bender, 2004; Tipuric et a /2009; Stiles 1998:59). In 
Church corporate governance where published research findings appear 
minimal, our research objective has to be one where the acquisition of 
knowledge is the initial prime objective (Kvale 2009:106). Such an objective 
would benefit from a research method which allows a degree of flexibility. The 
flexible nature of qualitative research allows us to adapt research techniques 
and procedures to the requirements of the research settings and the constraints 
experienced by the research process as it progresses (Cassell & Symon
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1993:4; Kvale 2009:11).
A qualitative, interpretive approach allows human factors to be considered. Our 
decision to adopt this approach is best summarised by Zaman (2002) who 
criticises the prevalence of the deductive, positivist, quantitative approach, 
prominent in corporate governance research; acknowledging that “extant” 
corporate governance research is “mainly based on a positive epistemology”, 
Zaman (2002:65) states : “This objectivist view of the social world as a concrete 
structure leads to the adoption of quantitative research methods, characterised 
[...] by the use of sophisticated statistical analysis. Such an approach however 
represents an attempt to freeze the social world [...] into structured immobility 
and to reduce the role of human beings (after all [audit committees] are not a 
mere variable or proxy, they are comprised of human beings who interact with 
others) to elements subject to the influence of a more or less deterministic set of 
forces.”
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6.3 Interpretivism: A Critique
The qualitative, interpretive approach is not without its weaknesses. In their 
empirical investigation into the role of qualitative research in management and 
PhD studies, Cassell et al (2006) find, amongst other things, that qualitative 
research “is itself a problematic term” because “it is open to multiple 
interpretations” (Cassell et a /2006:295). One weakness of the qualitative 
approach is subjectivity. The way we perceive reality affects the way we phrase 
the research questions and it influences our choice of research methods. Crane 
(1999:238) states: “Not only is the researcher making implicit assumptions 
about what is important about the chosen field of inquiry, but they are also 
making a decision as to the way in which the reality of that phenomenon is to be 
interpreted.” Ontology is an aspect of philosophy which is concerned with the 
researcher's own way of thinking and perceiving reality (Williams & May 1996; 
Jones & ten Bos 2007). From an ontological view, our response to a question or 
a situation is very much a product of our experience which in turn, is influenced 
by our respective philosophical dispositions. Likewise, the way we 
conceptualise a problem and the way we infer from the results of our analysis is 
influenced by this experience. Williams and May (1996:10) refer to this personal 
experience as our “frames of reference.”
Consequently, there is the danger that the researcher may knowingly, or
unintentionally, impose his frame of reference on the whole research design
and methodology (Bryman & Bell 2007). In research, 'interpretivism' is an
ontological approach which is concerned with collecting and interpreting data
from the researcher's viewpoint, but situating this “perception” within the context
156
of the respondent's own frame of reference (Stiles 1998:53). Mindful of this, 
researchers who are 'emotionalists' seek to incorporate the 'individual 
subjectivity' of their respondents into their research approach by seeking to 
access this experience through the eyes and mind of the individual respondent. 
Like the emotionalist, our aim is to allow and encourage respondents to explore 
their views or feelings which accompany the answers; therefore, when posing 
our questions, we must ensure that the questions are naturally phrased so that 
the responses do not unduly distort the 'validity' of the answers given 
(Silverman 2006).
In our research approach, we place emphasis on (1) viewing reality, the world, 
and truth through the eyes of subjects; (2) demonstrating a clear understanding 
of the context within which the subject resides; (3) being mindful of the 
contextual settings; (4) avoiding circumscription -  that is: we must be careful 
not to impose our own frame of reference on the way we design our research 
and on the way we approach our subjects; and (5) collating answers and 
insights so they are derived exclusively “from the data that are collected.” 
(Bryman & Bell 2006: 421).
Crane (1999:238), an advocate of interpretivism, asserts that in their search for 
answers to their questions, researchers seek to discover the 'truth' - 'reality'. 
However, how this 'truth' is arrived at “depends upon the researcher's own 
conception of this reality which is to be described and analysed, i.e.: their 
ontological assumptions.” Crane (1999) reasons that because the “...'truth' of 
any given research study is [...] inextricably bound up in...” the research
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methods used, it would be more appropriate to say that researchers "... engage 
a subject of study by interacting with it through means of a particular frame of 
reference, and what is observed and discovered in the object (i.e., its 
objectivity) is as much a product of this interaction and the protocol and 
technique through which it is operationalized as it is of the object itself.” 
Silverman (2006:281) cautions about the use of the word “truth”, preferring 
“reality” instead: “Truth' is an exceptionally tricky term which can land us in a 
philosophical minefield. However, this does not mean that everything depends 
upon someone's opinion.” When we evaluate an assertion - “truth” for want of a 
better term, Silverman (2006:281) suggests that the evaluation be made in 
terms of how “credible” that assertion is.
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6.4 Critical Evauation of Timms' (2001) Research: Key 
Methodological Issues
Our chosen research method is not without precedent: it is similar to Timms' 
(2001) empirical study into English Catholic Church management at the 
diocesan and parish level. The data produced by Timms (2001) is also used by 
Hornsby-Smith (2001) in the latter's study on Church management at the parish 
level. Timms' (2001:9) attempted to determine how Catholics “characterised 
their locus of work and worship in terms of socio-economic factors”, also “the 
model or models of Church in actual operation, the availability of vision and any 
sense of mission.” Timms (2001:9) describes how “researchers” held 
“conversations” at the parish and diocese levels with those who agreed to be 
interviewed. It is notable that the researchers did not “administer a pre­
formulated questionnaire”; instead these “interviews” were in the form of 
“conversations around particular topics judged to be relevant to issues of 
authority and governance” (Timms, 2001:9).
Timms (2001:152) sought the “perception”, “views” and opinions of interviewees 
about aspects of decision making within the Church, amongst other things. The 
respondents included six Bishops and “twelve parish clergy.” Whilst Timms 
(2001:10) acknowledges that the sample of those interviewed cannot be 
regarded as sufficiently “random” or “representative”, he argues that the results 
of the study should not be regarded as “another poll of simply reactive opinion.” 
One possible justification given is because the “"results” were based on “so 
many carefully conducted conversations with informed respondents.” Interviews 
were conducted “on the understanding that dioceses and parishes were not to
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be individually identified.” Where it was necessary to refer to them, these were 
referred to “prosaically as Dioceses A -  F” (Timms 2001:11).
Hornsby-Smith (2001:133) examines Timms' (2001) data and notes that four of 
the dioceses were in England and the other two in Scotland. Two parishes in 
each of the six dioceses provided “around 350 active parishioners” who were 
interviewed usually “for over one hour.”. Hornsby-Smith (2001:64) regards the 
interviews as “guided conversations” and is also careful to make clear “no 
claims are made that the parishes are statistically representative of all the 
parishes in Scotland and England.” However, the impression gained is that the 
sample of 350 interviewees probably makes the study sufficiently representative 
of the Catholic population: “it is clear that between them they cover a very wide 
variety of circumstances and experiences” (Hornsby-Smith 2001:133). This 
impression is further reinforced elsewhere when Hornsby-Smith (2001:64) 
states that though the “dioceses were not randomly selected in a statistical 
sense, they were chosen to embrace the full variability of British Catholicism.” It 
is noted that “all six Bishops and over 100 senior clergy” were interviewed 
(Hornsby-Smith 2001:64).
The approach demonstrated by Timms (2001) and Hornsby-Smith (2001) 
appears to be highly subjective -  to positivists, at least. Positivists would pose 
the following questions regarding Timms' (2001) research methodology: given 
the number of researchers, what efforts were made to ensure inter-researcher 
reliability?; in the case of the “conversations” which were “judged to be 
relevant”, what assumptions informed the 'judgement', and what was the criteria
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used to determine 'relevance'?; in securing the perceptions and the views of 
the interviewees, what precautions were taken to ensure that the interviewers 
did not impose their ontological frame of reference on the respondents?; in the 
absence of an interview protocol, what care, procedures or guidelines did the 
interviewers use to elicit responses?; with regards to population 'sampling', how 
important is 'generalisation' if the sample chosen was not sufficiently random or 
representative?; is it possible to confer 'credibility' on the research findings just 
because they were based on 'so many carefully conducted conversations'?; 
how was the data analysed and what efforts were made to ensure that the 
'reporters' who wrote the reports had a common notion of what constituted 
knowledge?
Our analysis of Timms' (2001) and Hornsby-Smith's (2001) study above 
highlights a number of research issues of which we must be mindful in our own 
research methodology; these issues include the danger of subjectivity in 
aspects such as: the interview method and how our questions are phrased; 
sampling; data saturation; reliability and validity in both data coding and 
analysis, and the question of generalizability. We seek to address these points 
in the following sections, below.
161
6.5 Semi-structured Interviews & Research Questions
As enunciated earlier, the semi structured interview is our principle data 
collection method. Easterby-Smith et a /(1991:71) regard interviews as “the 
most fundamental of all qualitative methods” Other data collection methods 
within the qualitative repertoire include: “critical incident technique, protocol 
analysis, group interviews and cognitive mapping.” In adopting the interview 
method, we seek to “understand themes of the lived world from the subjects’ 
own perspectives” (Kvale 2010:10). Since our research questions are focused 
specifically within the narrow field of Church corporate governance, we choose 
to avoid an interview format which is rigidly standardised; we are sensitive to 
the danger that by doing so, we may knowingly -  or unintentionally -  impose 
our frame of reference on our interviewees’ responses, by the way we structure 
our questions.
Different forms of “biases” are discussed by Easterby-Smith et al (1999:79), and 
Silverman (2006). However, the semi-structured interview is versatile because it 
is possible to design and to phrase questions which allow respondents to 
answer in a way they feel comfortable. The respondents are also able to begin 
the answer in any way they feel appropriate. This produces a rich source of 
data. Likewise, it is also possible for the interviewer to ask follow-up questions 
as the responses merit. Interviews therefore provide an appreciable degree of 
flexibility.
The semi-structured approach is considered appropriate also because our
interviewees have busy schedules, with considerable time constrains; this
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approach enables us to adapt our questions according to the time available. 
Bryman and Bell (2007:477) state: “in semi-structured interviews the interviewer 
does follow a script to a certain extent”; in addition, the interviewer is not bound 
to “slavishly follow a schedule, as is done in quantitative research interviewing.” 
Though regarded as an “intrusive process”, interviews are also deemed 
appropriate in situations where the subject matter is “complex and dynamic” 
(Saunders et al 2009:324). Accordingly, our use of semi-structured, qualitative 
interviews is appropriate because we seek to explore and probe the issues 
under examination; the issues which we seek to discuss are relatively complex 
and relate to the clergy's attitudes and opinions (Saunders et a /2009).
From the exploratory discussions held during the pilot phase of our search for 
data, we discovered that "corporate governance" (our epistemology) was a 
concept which the clergy was not familiar with; it was therefore necessary to 
phrase our questions at a level the interviewee could understand. The response 
from interviewee (BA080409) serves to illustrate; when asked, at the end, what 
he felt about the interview, he replied: “Fine, I think it was more of a 
conversation; it was straight questions and answers; because you followed your 
questions with degrees of information which, not dictated my answers but which 
allowed me to see more clearly what you were trying to ask.”
We then realised that it was useful to incorporate prompts which could be used 
to help contextualise the questions asked. This explains why prompts are 
contained in our interview protocol; where necessary, these could be used to 
help translate our questions into the context of the respondents own "social
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constructs", thus helping them to describe their view of reality through their own 
perception. The lessons learnt in our initial findings led us to modify our 
phraseology; for example, it was decided that a more neutral approach would 
be to begin the questions by asking respondents for their ‘impressions’ and 
‘perceptions.’ By phrasing the questions in such a way, respondents were given 
the flexibility to answer our opening questions in a manner which they felt 
comfortable.
A copy of our interview schedule is attached in Appendix 2. In an approach 
similar to Stiles (1998:59), the questions in the schedule were designed to allow 
the members of the clergy sufficient opportunities to “reveal their perceptions” of 
the issues raised. The same questions were to be asked of the bishop or his 
presbyterate. The open -  but focused, questions ask the respondent for his own 
perception of the key issues faced, in terms of mechanisms (RQ1) and the 
Bishop's tria-munera (RQ2). Given that both diocesan Bishop and his Priests 
are vicariously and intimately linked in the episcopal ministry of the former, it is 
reasonable to hypothesise that both share the same perceptions -  broadly, and 
the same concerns, to a large extent (Coriden et a /1985:327; Canon 384). As 
explained in the previous chapter, performance (RQ3) is examined separately, 
primarily through the use of statistical data.
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6.6 Sampling
In terms of sampling, one of the main criticisms of qualitative research is the 
use of small sample sizes and the lack of transparency in terms of how the 
sample is selected and how the sample population is stratified. The sample size 
used in our research is indeed small (see section 6.7: Data Saturation, below). 
However, in qualitative research, a small sample size does not invalidate or 
devalue the findings of our research (Yin 2003). Indeed, in qualitative research, 
it is acceptable -  and common, for researchers to utilize sample sizes which are 
small, compared to the large sizes commonly found in quantitative research 
(Miles & Huberman 1994); also, sampling techniques in qualitative research 
“tend to be purposive, rather than random” (Miles & Huberman 1994:27). This 
is because in qualitative research, “the initial definition of the universe is more 
limited [...] and partly because social processes have a logic and a coherence 
that random sampling can reduce to un interpretable sawdust” (Miles & 
Huberman 1994:27). The overview given by Miles and Huberman (1994) above, 
helps provide justification for the small sample size used in our research. 
However, we must be careful to address the question of data saturation (see 
section 6.7, below).
Our sampling strategy is indeed “purposive” (Silverman 2006:306); this is
because the people in our sample are specifically the clergy, and not the entire
population of the English Catholic Church. Our sampling method may also be
described as “convenience” sampling (Kolbe & Burnett 1991:248), or
'opportunistic' in the manner similar to that of Stiles (1998); Saunders et al
(2009); Easterby-Smith efa/(1991); and Bryman and Bell (2006:497); this is
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because we employ the snowballing sampling technique (Marshall 1984; 
Pettigrew & McNulty 1985) where we ask our respondents to suggest other 
members of the clergy who may be willing to be interviewed by the researcher.
Finally, transparency is further achieved when we disclose the criteria used to 
stratify our sample of the clergy. Many of the considerations experienced have 
already been related in the previous chapter, where we recounted our original 
idea of using questionnaires. It needs to be said that we originally thought of 
restricting the episcopal part of the interviews to diocesan Bishops themselves 
(rather than include auxiliary bishops) because the former are exclusively 
responsible for the management of their respective dioceses. However, the 
limited success in accessing (Kvale 2009:262) diocesan Bishops led us to 
widen our interviews to auxiliary Bishops as well, given that auxiliary Bishops 
are assistants to their diocesan Bishop and therefore should experience the 
same issues, even though auxiliaries do not have the same authority. 
Eventually, invitations were sent individually to all 29 diocesan Bishops, via 
email, to their Lordships directly, or to their secretaries; the invitation explained 
the purpose of the research and invited their Lordships to be interviewed via 
telephone. None resulted. With regards to the Priests, it was eventually decided 
that the qualifying criteria for inclusion in our sample would be any serving 
member of a Bishop's presbyterate who is willing to be interviewed.
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6.7 Data Saturation
Given the small sample size, it is necessary to ask how many interviews are 
sufficient in order to achieve data saturation. In our attempts to answer this 
question, we are guided by Bryman and Bell (2007) and Guest ef a/ (2006). The 
number of interviews judged to be “sufficient” is determined by how quickly 
“saturation” is achieved; 'saturation' may be achieved at an early stage of the 
data collection exercise (Bryman & Bell 2007:499) if the research design is 
guided by a high degree of focus and direction. During our pilot, the formulation 
of our research questions and the development of the interview protocol was 
very much informed and guided by the discussions and formative feedback 
which we received from members of the clergy, our critical friends. The 
discussions and feedback helped provide our interview questions with a degree 
of focus and direction.
Guest et al (2006:65) sought to determine the number of interviews which would 
be required “to get a reliable sense of thematic exhaustion and variability in” 
their “data set.” Guest et al (2006) contend that in field research it would be 
useful to gauge the number of interviews which would be required of a research 
initiative because the numbers projected may have practical implications on the 
amount of resources required. Guest et al (2006) were also keen to clarify that 
the degree of saturation achieved is dependent on how “fine-grain” a researcher 
would require the metathemes to be, given the data set. The more “overarching” 
(less fine-grained) the quicker saturation is achieved.
Nevertheless, Guest et al (2006:65) declare that “theoretical saturation” is
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reached when “no additional data are being found whereby the (researcher) can 
develop properties of the category. As he sees similar instances over and over 
again, the researcher becomes empirically confident that a category is 
saturated [...] when one category is saturated, nothing remains but to go on to 
new groups for data on other categories, and attempt to saturate these 
categories also.” This point is further clarified by Bryman and Bell (2006:499): 
“The chief virtue of theoretical sampling is that the emphasis is upon using 
theoretical reflection on data as the guide to whether or not more data are 
needed. It therefore places a premium on theorizing rather than on the 
statistical adequacy of a sample, which may be a limited guide to sample 
selection in many instances.”
Guest et al (2006:60) opine that there is a “poor job of operationalizing the 
concept of saturation.” They found that there were no “generalizable 
recommendations” “regarding nonprobablistic sample sizes.” They reviewed 24 
research methods books and seven databases. Though saturation is critical to 
the integrity of qualitative research, the authors note that “there are no 
published guidelines or tests of adequacy for estimating the sample size 
required to reach saturation.” They disclose that only seven sources provide 
guidelines for actual sample sizes; the numbers mentioned include: 36, 15, 36,
5 and 25; between six and eight or 12 to 20. However, Guest et al (2006:61) 
note: “None of these works present evidence for their recommendations.”
In their empirical research, Guest ef a/ (2006:62) adopted a nonprobabilistic, 
purposive sampling approach, using semi-structured, open-ended interviews.
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Their interviews included 30 subjects in Nigeria and the same number in 
Ghana. Transcripts were used as the unit of analysis; the expression of themes 
was the data items found in the content of the transcripts. Guest et al (2006:74) 
“posit that data saturation had for the most part occurred by the time we had 
analysed twelve interviews.” Importantly, the authors state that “our experiment 
suggests that a sample of six interviews may have been sufficient to enable 
development of meaningful themes and useful interpretations.”
Guest et al (2006) assert that a smaller sample of participants is acceptable if 
the population is relatively “homogeneous”, with “fairly narrow objectives”
(Guest et al, 2006:75). We argue that our sample of the clergy, comprising 
Bishops and Priests, is fairly narrow and homogeneous; in addition, the 
research questions have “fairly narrow objectives” as they are focused on 
specific aspects of corporate governance. Accordingly, we were able to develop 
“meaningful themes and useful interpretations” (Guest et al 2006:74) and to 
achieve data saturation from interviews with three Bishops and 11 priests. One 
Bishop was interviewed on two occasions as were some of the priests. Though 
a fourth Bishop from diocese B was also interviewed, his is not included in our 
analysis because the interview was deemed irrelevant. In line with the 
consensus theory of Romney, Batchelder and Weller (1986:326), the 
researcher's supervisors (“experts” in research methods and supervision) were 
in agreement that the answers/themes generated from the number of interviews 
were sufficiently adequate for the purpose of developing themes and 
interpretations.
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The table below summarises the number of Bishops and clergy interviewed, 
including their diocese of origin:
Table 6.7: F 
present au1
’riests and Bishops interviewed & Dioceses. Source: 
thor
Diocese A B C D E F
Bishop 1 1 1
Priest 2 3 3 2 1
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6.8 Content Analysis: Reliability and Validity
Content analysis involves the coding and analysis of data. Various definitions of 
content analysis are provided by Kassarjian (1997:8). Definitions are also 
provided by Neuendorf (2002:10). It is noted that there is no single approach to 
- or procedure for, coding data and for the analysis of data (Bryman & Bell 
2007:595; Saunder ef a /2009:490). Kolbe and Burnett (1991:243) refer to 
content analysis as “an observational research method that is used to 
systematically evaluate the symbolic content of all forms of recorded 
communications.”
A criticism of content analysis is the apparent lack of objectivity and the 
predisposition towards subjectivity and biases on the part of the researcher. 
Subjectivity and biases diminish the reliability and validity of the data coding and 
analysis process, thus rendering the research findings doubtful and possibly 
useless. Kolbe and Burnett (1991:244) acknowledge that content analysis is 
“quite susceptible to the effects of researcher biases, which, in turn, can affect 
decisions made in the collection, analysis, and interpretation of data.”
Kassarjian (1997:9-10), however, uses the term “systematization” to highlight
two additional indicators of objectivity, namely: (1) ensuring that data is not
'selectively' chosen to influence the results of the empirical research; and (2):
the analysis of the content should be subject to -  and guided by -  a formal
research design which is underpinned by some form of theory, hypotheses,
conceptual framework and/or research questions. The second part of
Kassarjian's “systematization” is similar to the recommendation made by Kolbe
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and Burnett (1991:245) that “precise operational definitions and detailed rules 
and procedures for coding” are necessary in order to ensure objectivity.
Neuendorf (2002:50) suggests that a “typical” content analysis research 
adheres to a systematic format which includes: categorisation, sampling, 
training and pilot reliability, coding, and reporting. Likewise, Kolbe and Burnett 
(1991:245) argue that the objectivity of the categorisation and coding process 
can be improved by the disclosure of the factors involved in the coding 
methodology, which include: rules and procedures for coding, training of those 
who judge, pretesting in order to ensure “reliability of the coding process” and 
judge independence. With these considerations in mind, the following section 
seeks to disclose the efforts made to ensure reliability and validity in the 
categorisation, sampling, the coding and analysis of our data, and the interjudge 
reliability index.
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6.9 Categorization of Data and Data Analysis
Kassarjian (1997) and Kolbe and Burnett (1991:248) argue that reliability and 
validity in coding analysis is assured if “interjudge reliability” is determined. 
Interjudge reliability is influenced by procedural issues and “is often perceived 
as the standard measure of research quality. High levels of disagreement 
among judges suggest weaknesses in research methods, including the 
possibility of poor operational definitions, categories and judge training.” It is 
therefore essential to disclose the interjudge reliability index; this index is the 
coefficient of agreements between the judges. Likewise, Krippendorff 
(2004:414) argues: “agreement is what we measure; reliability is what we wish 
to infer from it.”
Almost all our interviews were recorded. All were transcribed. In our experience, 
one hour of interviews approximated 10 hours of transcription. We used NVivo, 
a computer aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) to assist in the 
development of our categories and to code our data (Yin, 2009:128). NVivo was 
selected following the review of the software by Lewin and Silver (2009a) and 
taking advantage of the recommendations made by Saunders et al (2009) and 
Bryman and Bell (2007) that CAQDAS is a useful skill for researchers to 
acquire. Some of the key features of NVivo, highlighted by Lewins and Silver, 
(2009b), include: “sophisticated content analysis functions”, “thematic qualitative 
coding functions” and the range of other tools that facilitate coding, linking, 
querying, and mapping. A personal and insightful account of using NVivo in 
qualitative research and its implications for acquiring this skill is provided by 
Johnston (2004).
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To facilitate our categorising exercise, we reviewed our interview protocol and 
our conceptual framework. From these, we devised three first level conceptual 
codes, namely: Mechanisms' (to correspond with RQ1), 'Compliance' (to 
correspond with RQ2), and 'Performance' (to correspond with RQ3): these 1st 
level codes were stored in the 'Tree Nodes' subdirectory of NViVo (version 9). 
Most of the second and third level codes used were constructs derived from our 
theoretical framework. These were linked to the respective 1st level codes to 
form a ‘hierarchy’ (also referred to as 'child nodes' by NVivo).
We read through the transcript of the first exploratory interview which was held 
with a Bishop. This was initially a paper-based exercise to test and to familiarise 
ourselves with the intricacies involved in using the categories to code the data. 
There were instances when it seemed possible to assign two codes to the same 
unit of data. This was deemed acceptable. The same process was applied to a 
transcript of an interview held with a Priest. The purpose of this exercise was to 
ensure training and pilot reliability, in the way described by Neuendorf 
(2002:51), above.
In the first test interview transcript, we were able to apply fourteen codes in 
total, at first, second and third levels. Our second transcript generated an 
additional 3 more categories. These categories, not raised in the first interview, 
were: “Vatican 2” and the “National Council of Priests.” As these terms were not 
actually featured in the main body of our literature review, we decided to 
capture these 'in vivo' as 'free nodes'. Another 'in vivo' code common to both
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transcripts were references to the Papal Nuncio. An explanation was given for 
each of the categories (all nodes); also included were simple instructions as to 
how these categories were to be applied when coding. The explanations and 
instructions were contained in the 'Description' box of each of all the 'Node 
Properties.' In the interest of transparency, a list of the categories, including 
description and instructions, was printed and given to the supervisors for their 
evaluation and comments.
We were mindful not to impose our own perception (bias) when analysing our 
data (Guest et a /2006; Easterby-Smith et al 1991; Glaser and Strauss 1967); 
we already had a credible theoretical framework within which to categorise, 
code and analyse our data. The Research Questions which form the basis of 
the interview protocol, are categories (themes) in their own right. We formulated 
our initial codes from these first level themes (Bryman & Bell 2007). These are 
similar to the “open coding” process of Strauss and Corbin (1998). As data 
collection and analysis is a reiterative process, similar to Kvale's (2010:109) 
“hermeneutical circle”, “in vivo” codes, though few, were also adopted from the 
interviews as they arose. To enhance transparency, when reporting our findings 
in the next chapter, we seek -  where possible - to quote sentences rather than 
individual/solitary words in order to convey the full context within which 
interpretation can better be understood.
The following procedure had to be followed in order to be able to compute the 
inter-rater reliability index: research assistant X, with no recent experience of 
research methodology and computer aided coding was asked to be the other
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judge. A copy of the conceptual codes was given to X; much time was spent 
explaining the significance of the codes; the explanations and directions (rules) 
which were annotated in the “Description” box of each of the codes (“nodes”). A 
list of the conceptual codes was printed, including the explanations and rules 
contained in the descriptions; the list was frequently referred to and it proved 
very useful as an 'aide mémoire'. It took considerable time to induct X in the 
conceptual framework and the objectives of the research questions (RQs). More 
time was also spent teaching X how to code using NVivo and how to use the 
features such as 'coding strips.' X was also given the opportunity to study some 
of the researcher's coded transcripts in order to test and to gain familiarity with 
the whole exercise. Finally, a new project (subdirectory) was created in NVivo 
where we imported all the researcher's transcripts, minus codings, so that X 
could begin to code.
To conduct the “interjudge reliability index” it was necessary to create a third 
project in which we merged both our codings. We were able to use NVivo's 
Coding Comparison facility to determine our “interjudge reliability index”, 
referred to as the 'inter-rater reliability' index by NVivo. The statistical method 
used by NVivo to calculate reliability is Cohen's Kappa coefficient, where values 
below 0.40 are regarded as “poor agreement”; values which fall between 0.40 -  
0.75 are regarded as “fair to good agreement”; NVivo deems as “excellent 
agreement” values that are over 0.75. The researcher and X met on many 
occasions to discuss the reliability results of each transcript; this “iterative” 
process was useful because it helped both parties clarify the meaning of each 
code and to agree the criteria when each code should be applied (Miles &
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Huberman 1994:29).
There appears to be no standard way of reporting inter-rater reliability index 
(Jones 1981; Schmitt 1983; Patrick & Moore 1985). We contacted a NVivo 
representative for advice about ways of presenting our inter-rater reliability 
index. We understood that it is better to be more informative about our index by 
disclosing the range, rather than to provide a single figure derived from an 
average of the ranges from all the research questions. Accordingly, the inter­
rater index for RQ1 ranged from 0.5976 to 1 ; the index ranged from 0.6253 to 1 
for RQ2; for RQ3, the range was from 0.611 to 1. It is observed that the lowest 
values for all three ranges indicate that there is a commendable level of 
agreement between the coders.
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6.10 Generalizability
Positivists are usually concerned with whether qualitative empirical findings, 
generated by a relatively small sample, are “generalizable” (Kvale, 2009:261). 
For those interested in generalizability, Kvale, (2009:261) instructs that the 
correct question is “not whether interview findings can be generalized globally, 
but whether the knowledge produced in a specific interview situation may be 
transferred to other relevant situations.” Kvale (2009:262) calls this form of 
generalization “analytical” where “a reasoned judgement about the extent to 
which the findings of one study can be used as a guide to what might occur in 
another situation.” According to Kvale (2009:263), this form of generalization 
involves the researcher -  who “in addition to rich specific descriptions [...] offers 
arguments about the generality of his or her findings”; and the reader “who, on 
the basis of detailed contextual descriptions of an interview study, judges 
whether the findings may be generalized to a new situation.”
It is argued that our research questions and the constructs upon which they are
based are derived from our conceptual framework; our conceptual framework,
in turn, is founded on the positive characteristics of corporate governance
theory. Consequently, the data which we capture via interviews enables us to
generalize “on the basis of a match to the underlying theory, not to a larger
universe (Miles and Huberman, 1994:29). Linking -  or generalizing, the results
of our analysis to our conceptual framework is similar to the “analytic
generalization” advocated by Yin (2009:38) where our conceptual framework “is
used as a template with which to compare the empirical results” of our findings.
This view is shared by Miles and Huberman (1994:28) who assert that “the most
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useful generalizations from qualitative studies are analytic, not sample-to- 
population.”
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6.11 Conclusion
A criticism of qualitative, interpretive research is subjectivity. One of the 
methods used to ensure objectivity is the full disclosure of the “research 
procedure”; Silverman (2006:282) argues that reliability is achieved by 
describing in detail “our research strategy and data analysis methods [...] in the 
research report” and “by paying attention to ‘theoretical transparency’ through 
making explicit the theoretical stance from which the interpretation takes place 
and showing how this produces particular interpretations and excludes others.” 
In this chapter, we have sought to be transparent by describing the measures 
taken to ensure objectivity. We began by explaining the reasons for using a 
qualitative-interpretive approach, while noting the limitations inherent in the 
quantitative approach preferred by positivists.
We reviewed the empirical research conducted by Timms (2001) and Hornsby-
Smith (2001). The review indicates that our research approach is not without
precedent; it also enables us to highlight those areas in qualitative-interpretative
research which are prone to subjectivity. A brief discussion on interpretivism
affords us the opportunity to acknowledge how research philosophy permeates
the research design; it also reinforced the need to ensure objectivity.
Justifications were also given for our decision to use semi-structured interviews
as the principle data collection method; the interview questions were based on
the constructs of our conceptual framework and guided by feedback given by
our critical friends; the knowledge gained from the preparatory discussions with
our critical friends is analogous to the “thematizing” stage expounded by Kvale
(2009:105); thematizing helps provides focus and direction in our efforts to
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acquire data.
Sampling was another research issued discussed. It is acceptable and common 
for qualitative researchers to utilize sample sizes which are small, compared to 
the large sizes commonly found in quantitative research (Miles and Huberman, 
1994); a small sample does not invalidate or diminish the significance of our 
findings. Given the difficulty in accessing data, our sampling method is 
decidedly purposive, chosen for convenience, and snow-balling in nature. We 
developed “meaningful themes and useful interpretations” (Guest et al,
2006:74) and achieved data saturation from interviews with three Bishops and 
11 priests. One Bishop was interviewed on two occasions as were some of the 
priests.
Content analysis is the process by which codes are developed and applied to 
the interview transcripts. To further ensure reliability and validity, a detailed 
description was given of how we developed the various categories of data for 
coding and analysis . Use was made of a CADQAS programme called NVivo to 
develop the categories and to code the transcripts. A description was also given 
of the measures undertaken to ensure inter-rater reliability. This involved an 
assistant who coded the transcripts. It was a labour-intensive process which 
required the researcher and the assistant to meet regularly in order to ensure a 
reasonable level of consensus. We disclosed the inter-rater reliability index; 
instead of presenting a single figure as representative of our coding efforts, we 
chose instead to report the range for the three main constructs. The indices 
ranged from 0.5976 to 1 overall.
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The question of generalizability was also addressed. In qualitative research, 
“the most useful generalizations from qualitative studies are analytic, not 
“sample-to-population” (Miles & Huberman 1994:28). Our findings are 
analytically generalized (Yin 2009). This is because our research questions and 
the constructs upon which they are based are derived from our conceptual 
framework; our conceptual framework, in turn, is founded on the positive 
characteristics of corporate governance theory. Indeed, Marshall and Rossman 
(1999) would argue that our findings have broader theoretical significance 
because the findings are based on the conceptual framework which is 
underpinned by existing theory, rather than by the number of interviews 
achieved. Our research findings are presented in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH FINDINGS
7.1 Introduction
Before proceeding it is helpful to be reminded of the research questions (RQs). 
RQ1 seeks to examine how effectively Bishops use existing ecclesiastical 
mechanisms of corporate governance in the management of their diocese 
(RQ1a). Our research question focuses on two institutions of the diocesan 
curia, in particular: the Council of Priests and College of Consultors (RQ1b). 
Accordingly, we ask our respondents the following questions: What is your 
perception of the diocesan curia? How well does it operate? (RQ1a); The other 
seeks to determine which offices of the diocesan curia play the most critical role 
in the Bishop's pastoral management of his diocese, for example: the 
Presbyteral Council and the College of Consultors (RQ1b).
RQ2 concerns the Bishop's compliance with his tria-munera, namely: teaching, 
sanctifying and governing. In the area of teaching, the Bishop is obliged to 
“propose and explain to the faithful the truths of the faith which are to be 
believed and applied to morals” (Canon 386); therefore, we ask our 
respondents: What are the key issues/indicators in the area of teaching? 
(RQ2a). In the area of sanctifying, the Bishop is to obliged to ensure that 
“abuses do not creep into ecclesiastical discipline, especially regarding the 
ministry of the word, the celebration of the sacraments and sacramentals, the 
worship of God and the veneration of the saints” (Canon 392 §2); accordingly, 
we ask: What are the key issues/indicators in the area of sanctifying? (RQ 2b).
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In terms of governance, the Bishop is obliged to ensure that “priests correctly 
fulfil the obligations proper to their state, and make available to them the means 
and institutions which they need to foster spiritual and intellectual life.” (Canon 
384); therefore, the question posed is: What are the key issues/indicators in the 
area of governing? (Q2c). Our findings are presented in the following sections, 
below; ++further discussions regarding the implications of the themes are also 
presented in the next chapter.
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7.2 Ecclesiastical Mechanisms of Corporate 
Governance (RQ1a)
We find that: (1) the Bishop's council is the office commonly used to exercise 
episcopal authority; (2) though an essential part of Church corporate 
governance, the Council of Priests and the College of Consultors are not 
fulfilling their designated role, adequately; (3) the increasing tension between 
Canon Law and Civil law poses a threat to the Bishop's power and the Church's 
authority; and (4) the election process of Bishops merits further investigation. 
Further elaborations regarding our findings are provided in the following 
sections.
7.2.1 The Bishop's Council
Our findings indicate that the principle office of decision-making and the locus of 
control within the diocesan curia is the Bishop's 'council'. It is not, as expected 
in our literature review, the Presbyteral Council -  also known as the Council of 
Priests. We noted in our review that Canon 495 mandates the establishment of 
a Presbyteral Council which represents the Bishop's “presbyterium”; it is likened 
to “a senate of the Bishop which assists the Bishop in the governance of the 
diocese.” It is notable that the Bishop's council, however, is not a mandatory 
office, but optional: under Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983), the 
Bishop may, if he “has judged it expedient”, establish an episcopal council 
(Canon 473 §4). This Bishop's council may take various forms and size and is a 
reflection of the flexible nature of the Code of Canon Law (Roman Catholic 
Church 1983).
185
The centrality of the Bishop's 'council' to all decision-making was made evident 
by the Bishops and Priests we consulted. Bishop (BA080409) disclosed that the 
Bishop's council is the corporate governance office which is most commonly 
found; the membership comprises the diocesan Bishop himself, the auxiliary 
Bishops, and several others, all of whom “report our administrative or pastoral 
responsibilities every [frequency of meetings]; that is how “we keep us all in 
touch with one another.” There is no standard way Bishops organize and 
structure their councils; even the membership and frequency of meetings 
varies.
Another Bishop (B100510) confirms that the structure of the Bishop's curia 
“varies from one diocese to another.” There is nothing “laid down” about these 
matters, he said, explaining: “If you take a diocese like -  for example, Arundel 
and Brighton, that has one Bishop, whereas we meet in the [ordinary's] Council 
once very couple of weeks, we take a regular review of issues happening in 
different parishes, clergy health and welfare, and various other things like that, 
various major decisions and so on; in a diocese with one Bishop, he will then 
have a Bishop's Council in which he is the only Bishop, but he will have -  
almost certainly, the Chancellor cum Vicar-General, a number of people 
probably from the College of Consultors, maybe two or three, various people 
from the diocese.”
The views expressed by both Bishops (BA080409 and B100510) above, were 
also echoed by this Priest (PB170510), who explained: "... in the case of [name
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of diocese],we have [number of] auxiliary Bishops and one [ordinary]. I know 
that they meet fortnightly, I believe, in what they call [the ordinary's] Council. 
And they tend to make most of the decisions pertaining to the diocese, between 
the [number] of them, also the Vicar-General -  so there's about [number of] 
people.”
Though the Bishop's council may be a common feature and is central to his 
governance, it is by no means the norm. There are others who, like Bishop 
(260509) avoid the use of an “episcopal council”; Bishop (260509) prefers to 
use those offices which are actually mandated in the Code -  namely: the 
College of Consultors and the Council of Priests. Bishop (260509) states: “I 
don't have a Bishop's Council. I have the Consultors. I do not have an episcopal 
council; I do have [number of persons] that I talk things through -  the Vicar- 
General and I really [...] sometimes. And the Finance Council is the trustees.”
The wide variety and choice of structures available to the Bishops give 
credence to our assertion that the Code of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 
1983) is similar in character to that of the Combined Code (Financial Reporting 
Council ,2008), in that it is 'principles-led', as opposed to the highly prescriptive 
'rules-based' type of corporate governance. The Combined Code exemplifies 
the principles-based approach which is characteristic of the way that corporate 
governance is practised in the UK and in Europe. We discern that Bishops are 
allowed considerable latitude as to how they choose to structure and manage 
their respective councils, according to their local circumstances. It is noted that 
in structuring their curia, Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) allows
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Bishops to “develop context-specific solutions” (Balgobin 2008) which are 
appropriate to their diocese, for example: geographical size and circumstances. 
This latitude extends to the frequency of -  and the manner in which -  meetings 
are conducted; in one case, it was “once every couple of weeks...” (B100510); 
in another diocese, the “Council meets every week” (BA290410).
7.2.2 Role of the Council of Priests and the College of Consultors (RQ1 b)
The Council of Priests (the “Presbyteral Council”) is the “institutional 
manifestation of the communion between the bishop and the priests who 
collaborate with him”, (Arrieta 2000:236). Though it exercises only a 
consultative role, the members “by their advice could effectively help the bishop 
in the management of the diocese.” As highlighted in our literature review, this 
Council, mandated by Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) is likened to 
“a senate of the Bishop which assists the Bishop in the governance of the 
diocese...” (Canon 495). Likewise, the College of Consultors is a consultative 
body, whose views are not binding on the Bishop except in those circumstances 
which Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) prescribes (Arrieta 
2000:241).
Given their 'senatorial' and advisory roles, it is reasonable to expect these 
offices to be held in high regard by the presbyterate. Our findings indicate 
otherwise. The Council of Priests and the College of Consultors appear to be 
negatively regarded by the presbyterate, generally. The Priests whom we spoke 
to appeared to be highly sceptical about the effectiveness and the relevance of 
these two offices. The Priests are doubtful about the purpose of the Council and
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the College; they are critical of the way the meetings are conducted. As with the 
diocesan curia, the structure of the Council of Priests and the College vary 
between dioceses. From our conversation with Bishop (B100510), we form the 
impression that the College of Consultors is a “smaller body”, of “a higher level”, 
whilst the Council is “a slightly less formal thing”, and “in a sense takes the 
temperature of the views of a wider number of clergy.”
Bishop (B100510) disclosed that, in his diocese, the College of Consultors 
meets “just a few times each year”; the College is consulted by the Bishop 
“about long term policy” and “diocesan finances.” In his diocese, this body is 
chaired by “the Financial Secretary.” The Bishop revealed that he had been 
experimenting with ways of organizing his Council so that it can be more 
effective. In the past, he discloses, the meetings were formal affairs, conducted 
in the morning, and ended with lunch: “it would all be a bit of 'minutes and 
matters arising' -  sort of formal.” Recently, he tried to extend the meeting to the 
early afternoon, with much less formality, in order to engender a “more open 
discussion about certain issues that affect us.”
Priest (P120510) informed us that, in his experience, the Council of Priests and 
the College met “three times a year. “Whether that is adequate is another 
question”, he said. Fie was of the opinion that it was “unusual for the Council to 
meet more than three times a year. In some dioceses, the Council may meet 
“twice a year, because of the logistics of getting people together.” But the 
Consultors would meet more often: “it all depends on the level of business.”
This view is contrasted with that of Priest (300410) who said that in his
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experience, the Consultors “only meet three times a year. No, it is not frequent 
enough.”
Priest (P220410) shared his experienced of being a member of the Council of 
Priests; the Council was very large because there were many “ex-officio” 
members. It was a large “talking shop” which did not discuss anything 
substantive, he said; the Bishop did not set the agenda and discussed “trivial” 
matters; there was “no leadership” or a sense of real purpose. Many did not 
want to be members but were 'volunteered'. Compared to the College of 
Consultors, the Council was akin to a conduit used for the reception and 
dissemination of information and updates, to be transmitted to the parishes.
The College of Consultors was a smaller but influential body, Priest (P220410) 
said; however, members were more interested in temporal concerns -  how 
money was spent. The same negative sentiment is expressed elsewhere by 
Priest (P300410): “When we do meet, we just sit around the table and he [the 
Bishop] says, “well, I've - there is no agenda, except what he's got, then if you 
want to chip in something, and the minutes are taken by one of the priests and 
we get the minutes. But, it is a farce. It's an absolute farce. It is usually held in 
the [time of day] for an hour, after the Council of Priests. By that time we are 
fed-up with the meetings anyway because we had a meeting in the [time of day] 
and now with another one in the [time of day] and we want to get away soon as 
we can. It is almost a non-event.” Priest (P300410) expressed great 
dissatisfaction at the way the Council of Priests was treated by the Bishop. The 
Council was ineffectual and no longer relevant, he said. The Council had “no
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teeth”; he likened this office to that of the National Conference of Priests which 
he said was “dead, gone.” The National Conference of Priests had gained such 
a reputation for being a useless body that it was “abolished [...] because they 
could not get representatives to go there and not only that, the Bishops were 
not listening anyway.”
This negative view of the Council of Priests was iterated by another Priest 
(PA070510). He informed us that he was invited to be on the Council of Priests; 
however, he wanted to find out what membership entailed before he made the 
decision to accept. Priest (PA0705010) was informed by one Council member: 
“Well, we meet [number of times] a year, and have a good lunch.” Priest 
(PA070510) was disenchanted: “I am standing down from getting into these 
positions, because they are just talk shops. I can think of nothing that the 
Council of Priests, for all that time, energy and effort, nothing that's ever made 
the slightest difference to my life, because it doesn't make any difference.”
The clergy's perception of the Council of Priests and the College of Consultors 
appear to be less than 'senatorial' and more derisory rather than 'advisory.' 
When asked whether his Bishop referred to the Presbyteral Council and the 
College of Consultors regularly enough, this Priest (PB170510) replied: 
“Probably not, I would say. I would say probably not as much..." The negative 
view held by the presbyterate of the Presbyteral Council and the College of 
Consultors may be surmised from the statement made by Priest (PB170510): “I 
think the College of Consultors is a relatively formal body. And the extent to 
which it is involved in the day to day management is questionable.” The
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comments expressed above convey the impression that, in the management of 
their diocesan affairs, Bishops may not be making full use of the capabilities 
which the College and the Council have.
7.2.3 Church Law and Civil Law
As noted earlier, much of the Church legislation is enshrined in Canon Law 
(Roman Catholic Church 1983). Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) 
gives Bishops considerable latitude and discretion and makes them the 
exclusive heads of their dioceses. However, there appears to be a 'force' which 
is capable of 'superseding' the Bishop's own extraordinary powers of discretion. 
This force appears to be capable of 'moderating' the Bishop's monarchical 
independence; it is also able to 'compel' the Bishop to comply with - and to 
provide evidence of ATD (accountability, transparency and disclosure) beyond 
that which is minimally required of their Lordships. This force is civil law. Civil 
law includes a raft of legislative acts and statutory bodies charged with 
regulating and policing; examples are wide-ranging and extend to the regulation 
of charities, employment, education, and Health & Safety, amongst others.
The distinction between Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) and civil 
law -  and the intrusive power of the latter, is made by this Bishop (BA080409), 
who acknowledges: “the [name of diocese] is a registered trust, therefore we 
are accountable according to the laws of this country, for everything to do with 
charities. We are accountable to the government for all matters pertaining to 
tax. In the secular sense, we have to be fully accountable.” Bishop (B260509) 
too made the distinction between civil law and Canon Law; the latter guides
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“ecclesiastical governance.” He said, “One immediately has got two different 
agencies at work.” He explained by way of an example: “if you talk about 
property in a parish, in Church law, it belongs to a parish; in civil law, it belongs 
to the diocesan trust. So if you are talking about corporate governance, that's 
how I look at it, and therefore, as a Bishop, it is my responsibility to ensure that 
everything is done according to the law of the Church and according to the law 
of the land.”
The potential conflict between Civil law and Canon law, is illustrated in the 
example given by this Priest (P120510) who explains: “in canon law, each 
parish is a separate legal entity. But from the point of view of civil law it is simply 
regarded as a branch of the overall charitable trust...” Under Canon Law 
(Roman Catholic Church 1983), the parish priest is allowed to sell any land 
which has been left to a parish; the Parish Priest has the right to authorize that 
sale without reference to any other authority. However, in civil law, the decision 
to sell the parish property comes under the purview of the registered charity, 
that is, the diocese. “So,” Priest (P120510) asks, “if someone leaves a house to 
a parish, the sale is left to the diocesan trust, they intend it to be for the benefit 
of the parish, but who gets to say how the money is used? Is it the Parish Priest 
or the Finance Board?”
The 'conflict' between canon law and civil law also manifests itself in 
fundamental issues of social morality. Bishop (BA290410) acknowledged that 
such conflicts are a reality. He cited the example of abortion and euthanasia: in 
civil law it is “perfectly legal for a woman to have an abortion” and the same
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“with the other end, assisted dying.” However, the opposing stance, held by the 
Church, is enshrined in Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983); for 
example, Canon 1398 states: “A person who procures a completed abortion 
incurs a latae sententiae excommunication.” Education was another example 
provided by Bishop (BA290410) to illustrate the intrusive nature of civil law; 
Bishop (BA290410) referred to the “sex education bill” (Sex and Relationships 
Education Bill, 2010) which requires schools to provide sex and relationships 
education to pupils as young as 13 years old. Bishop (BA290410) 
acknowledged: “Sometimes, it is not a very happy relationship.” The Bishops 
were, he said, still trying to 'work things out' with the government. The concern 
conveyed is that, through legislation, the State is able to supersede or to 
undermine the Church's moral position and authority.
As has been established in previous chapters, the diocesan Bishop has 
exclusive control over all aspects of corporate governance within his diocese. 
His decision-making authority is personal, absolute and unfettered: all the 
officers of the diocesan curia are appointed by him; the diocesan officers are 
consultative and do not possess any voting rights. However, in charity law lies 
another example where civil law intrudes upon, and conflicts with ecclesiastical 
governance. Referring to the Charities Act (2006), this Priest (P120510) asked: 
“How does the Board of trustees relate to the finance board? Who are the 
trustees?” Priest (P120510) then explained, “In this diocese, the two bodies [the 
Bishop's Finance Council and the diocese's board of trustees] are more or less 
coterminous in that the trustees are members of the finance board, and vice- 
versa. But there is a difference because the finance board is a consultative
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body to the Bishop. Consequently the Bishop is not a member of it and does not 
have a vote. Whereas he is a trustee. As a trustee he does have a vote. You 
could conceivably have a situation where there is a tie vote.” Consequently, it 
would be possible to have a situation where the Bishop “has not obtained the 
consent of the finance board but can use his vote to win the acceptance of the 
trustees.”
Employment law is another growing area of conflict. Priest (P120510) disclosed 
that in recent years, there have been a growing number of court cases which 
have sought to challenge the employment status of the clergy: Are the clergy 
“employees” or “office holders?”, he asked. Priest (120510) held that under 
canon law, the clergy are “not employees of the Bishop, but office holders” and 
that this has, hitherto, always been the State's legal position. However, of late, 
“the civil courts seem to be moving towards a position where they are going to 
be regarded as employees of -  presumably - the charitable trust.” He agreed 
that in a broad sense the clergy “have employee status because they have a 
contract to provide services.” Nevertheless, even though the clergy have always 
been regarded as office-holders, this tradition is increasingly challenged in the 
law courts.
If the clergy are legally regarded as employees, that change in status could 
have “all sorts of implications in terms of the ability of the Bishop to make 
appointments and move people” (P120510). There would be far-reaching 
ramifications -  for example: liability claims, EC directives, and issues of 
taxation. Thus far, the income received by the clergy is regarded as
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“remuneration” or “financial support”, rather than “salary”; this is based on the 
current understanding that the Priest is supported so that he is available to 
perform services for the Church. Priests are not paid particularly for any specific 
tasks which they perform. This Priest (090410) explained that he, like other 
members of the clergy, were living in “survival mode”; the clergy are taxed as 
self employed and like his fellow Priests, he had to file his own tax returns.
Priest (090410) disclosed details of his income: £65 a week for housekeeping; 
£5 a day for mass intentions; Christmas and Easter collection; his lodgings are 
taxed as 'benefit in kind'; he also receives “stole fees” -  that is: donations for 
conducting baptisms, marriages, funerals, and stipends for mass intentions.
7.2.4 The Election of Bishops
The election of the diocesan Bishop is especially pertinent to our research 
because it relates directly to the person of the Bishop himself; as a leader, the 
Bishop's ontology and axiology influences the vision, shape and direction of his 
diocese. The selection of a Bishop and the traits which are characteristics of a 
holy and effective incumbent are therefore fundamental issues of strategic 
importance. Priest (P300410) disclosed that during a Consultors meeting, his 
Bishop, due for retirement, was asked: “what say the clergy and the laity of this 
diocese” would “have in the appointment of the new Bishop?” The Bishop 
replied that the appointment process would be overseen by the Apostolic 
Nuncio. The Nuncio would engage in a consultation process where he would be 
guided by the Bishop's views. The Bishop also assured the Consultors that they 
could trust him to ensure that “it was done properly”, stating: “you can have my 
word for it.”
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This Priest (P300410) informed the Bishop that the selection process mentioned 
by his Lordship was inadequate, for the following reasons: “Number one: we 
don't know what the consultation process is; secondly, the whole process is 
self-perpetuating. The third: it lacks transparency.” In the minutes that followed 
this meeting, Priest (P300410) discovered that the two terms which he had 
used: “self-perpetuating” and “lack of transparency” were omitted. Priest 
(P300410) challenged the secretary about it, but the secretary “laughed at me, 
and I know damn well [...] the Bishop didn't want that in the minutes. Now, this 
is how he controls things, because that would reflect upon what he had said.” 
Priest (P300310) recounts a discussion which he had with the previous 
Apostolic Nuncio, where he (Priest 300410) suggested possible names for an 
episcopal vacancy. Of one name, the Nuncio replied: “He wasn't on my list.” 
Priest (300410) deduced from this discussion that the Nuncio's list was very 
much influenced by existing Bishops; he asked: “Where does he get that list 
from? Does he get it from the Bishops? So the Bishops are actually giving him, 
feeding him, the information about the priests. And he then will give the Bishops 
the sort of Bishop that they want.” Hence the reason why he feels that the 
selection process is “self-perpetuating” and that it “lacked transparency”.
This feeling of distrust - and the lack of confidence - in the selection of the 
Bishop is expressed by this Priest (PA070510): “a lot of us feel that it’s the 
same people who keep re-arranging the jobs amongst themselves. It is the 
same twist of people, most of them were at seminary together, so it’s an old boy 
network. Re-electing within itself. And if you look, there is sort often priests who
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hold most of the jobs within the diocese. New blood doesn't come in.” Priest 
(PA070510) is of the view that the existing core of Bishops share similar traits 
and that their accession to the episcopal office follows a career pattern which is 
best described as “typical.” He named a Bishop, commenting on his Lordship's 
career: “[Name] has just been made [ordinary] of [place]. He had worked as 
[positions] in a parish. I don't think he has even ever been a parish priest. When 
administrator he began teaching at one of the seminaries, then became 
seminary rector, and that is always a fast track to episcopacy. You become a 
seminary rector first. So what you are used to doing is having that authority role, 
first, as a belief - and it is exactly the same with the man he replaces, [name] 
who was seminary rector; OK, fast track through a small diocese in 
Northampton -  bishop for a year in the diocese? - and then becomes 
Archbishop.”
Priest (PA070510) provides further insights: “And I think if you were to look at 
the Bishops and ask what pastoral experience [they have], you'd be surprised. 
Their pastoral experience as Bishops fine; and then they do this reshuffling of 
Bishops. They have a hierarchy episcopacy -  diocesan, you can expect a good 
Bishop to be taken out and turned into an Archbishop. [Name] got the job as 
[ordinary] of [place] because he was [name of activity]. The question wasn't “Are 
you good at your job?” The question was, “It would look like a good thing?” And 
it might be worth looking at the Bishops' backgrounds. Kevin MacDonald 
worked on the ecumenical commission in Rome for umpteen years, became a 
seminary rector for two years [...], Bishop of Northampton for 1 year, 
Archbishop.”
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The general impression conveyed is that the current cohort of Bishops share 
similar characteristics and their mind-set is “much of a likeness” (PB220310). 
This impression is shared by Priest (PB220310). He feels that the Bishops “are 
a closed-shop.” They effectively, “choose their own.” The Papal Nuncio “is a 
career diplomat” who “does not know the priests, “ he said. The Nuncio is 
therefore dependent “on the recommendation of the bishops for appointment of 
bishops; so bishops choose their own kind who will not rock the boat.” Priest 
(PC240510) accused the Bishops of being “useless.” He declared that those 
who want to become Bishops are not to have certain views; their collective 
culture and mind-set is predisposed to “not rock the boat”; consequently, those 
who become Bishops share the same values and outlook as those already in 
the episcopacy.
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7.3 Key Issues in the area of Teaching: Principal 
Findings (RQ2a)
Key concerns expressed include (1) the decline in Catholic marriages and the 
failure on the part of the hierarchy to promote marriage-related practicalities 
such as natural family planning (NFP), and (2) quality of catechesis.
7.3.1 Marriage
For Catholics, marriage is associated with morals because of Church's 
teachings on issues such as the purpose of the conjugal act and the sanctity of 
life. With regards to matrimony, there appears to be an absence of any 
concerted effort by the hierarchy to promote the sacrament of marriage; this 
issue was highlighted by the following clergy (B260509, PC020510, P300410, 
P200410). Priest (P290410) said: "I don't hear the argument for the sanctity of 
marriage proactively put forward." In his view, the Church should promote - and 
provide information about - natural family planning (NFP), but it did not. Since 
NFP was not available on the NHS, there “should be a whole network setup.” 
He felt that the Bishops had failed to use the many opportunities which their 
leadership positions afforded them, to preach about the importance of the 
sacrament of marriage and about NFP; the Bishops should deliver to society “a 
counterblast proclaiming the importance of marriage.” He also criticized the 
Bishops' pastoral letters on this subject, describing them as “very bland ones...”
The clergy, Priest (P290410) said, were conscious that “the salvation of souls is 
our prime mission.” However, in reality, the importance of this mission was
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usually overlooked. One possible reason for this failure, he suggested, could 
be due to the clergy being inundated by the “weight of paperwork and other 
concerns.” Priorities become mixed-up: “Certainly when you look at some of the 
Church's national agencies, they seem more concerned with switching off lights 
than the salvation of souls.” He argued that there was no clarity in what the 
leadership of the Church stood for, and that there was an absence of sound 
catechesis. “Again, we are not clear enough in what we teach. And so young 
people have no clear reason for why they need to practice their faith -  it is just 
seen as a nice thing. And we don't encourage the pursuit of holiness, especially 
going to confession.”
Finally, Priest (290410) felt that the Bishops “should be more proactive about 
proclaiming for the good of the whole of society.” He felt that they were 
“reacting” rather than “proclaiming”, stating: “It always seems to be as a reaction 
to some new thing from the government that we react against, to see if we think 
it is wrong ...” He criticizes the Bishops for their collective failure to present a 
robust challenge to government's initiatives, citing as an example, the recent 
legislation which forced adoption agencies to allow gay couples to foster 
children. Describing the Church's response as a “fiasco”, this priest disclosed: 
“only one diocese challenged in the courts that legislation and they have 
succeeded in getting it overturned. Meanwhile in other dioceses, adoption 
agencies have closed or abandoned their Catholic allegiance. I think we gave 
that up without enough of a fight.”
This Priest (P300410) explained that there “used to be [number of] marriages a
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year...” in his parish. “Now there are about [much less].” About two-thirds of the 
parents who brought their children to him for baptism were either married in a 
registry office or not married at all. He laments: “That to me is a pastoral 
problem.” “The problem goes further back,” he said. He doubts very much that 
“many of the parents today are committed. We've lost two generations. And 
there is no way that we can make that up.” He is convinced that many “people 
do not know the faith.” Catholics “go away and get married in the registry office 
and they do not know that the Catholic Church says that you've got to get 
married before a Catholic priest and two witnesses.” He stated that many 
Catholics were simply ignorant about their faith.
Priest (PC020510) stated that there is a problem of “lapsation”. In his view, it is 
“common knowledge that lapsation of [Catholic] teenagers is very high.” He 
regards this lapsation as “a haemorrhage which should be a concern.” He 
wonders how much of the problem was down to the failure of the clergy to teach 
the laity their faith: “Christian marriage for example, is an obvious one because 
it is the next sacrament they are going to receive. How much do they know 
about the Catholic faith?” The views expressed above were underscored by 
this Bishop (B260509), who admitted that: “there hasn't been such emphasis on 
missionary vocations, and I think we're now realizing that you've got to really 
[strengthen] the vocation of marriage. And the vocation of commitment. And we 
have not, at the moment, got any kind of agency for the promotion of marriage. 
Although nationally, there is now funding available.”
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7.3.2 Catechesis
Another theme running through the priestly interviews was that of poor 
catechesis (instruction in the Catholic faith). Priest (PA070510) felt that his 
Bishop failed to make use of the opportunities available to preach the faith and 
to catechise: “the [ordinary] has got every opportunity to talk to us about the 
love of God and our love of creation, and instead we're being told what we 
should do is not leave our television on standby and put in a (?) light bulb. Well, 
a missed opportunity, isn't it?” Echoing the comments expressed by his 
confrère in section 7.3.1, Priest (PA070510) was critical of his Bishop's pastoral 
letters, complaining that they were always repetitive: “I always cross out every 
other paragraph, it makes no difference. Because he says it, and says it again.” 
He asked: “Where is that teaching authority coming forward?”
Lapsation was another theme restated by this priest (PB170510): “There's been 
a colossal amount of rejection of very important aspects of the Catholic faith by 
many, many Catholics.” Even priests, he felt, had rejected the faith. Priest 
(PB170510) cited, as an example, the case of Sunday mass observance: “In 
most parishes, there would be quite a lot of people who would have no regard 
for the fact that they should be at Mass every Sunday, and wouldn't think 
anything of missing Mass for two, three Sundays, and going back a fourth 
Sunday and receiving communion -  say, straight away, without any thought of 
having committed any sin at all.”
The “greatest decline”, Priest (PB1705010) went on, has been in the “spiritual 
life and the teaching of the faith...” He regards the catechetical programmes
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taught in the Catholic schools as meaningless, arguing that they were “not 
Catholic at all.” Schools were forced to use this material because they were 
mandated by the Bishop: “the people who work in the Bishop's school education 
offices, [...] say that, “this has been ratified and approved by our Bishop.” 
Therefore, “we don't have a leg to stand on if we disagree with the content of it. 
Because they just say that the Bishop said this is okay.” He disclosed that he 
and many of his colleagues had voiced their concerns, but to no avail: “Many of 
the priests that I know, who had been to that -  they call it Priests Council -  
they've found that -  they've raised issues but concern is not really duly taken...”
Priest (PB170510) was critical of the Bishops' lack of leadership, citing as an 
example, “the whole issue of our adoption agencies with the new law, in the UK. 
Under civil law, an adoption agency could not discriminate against homosexual 
couples who wanted to adopt. “We had a Catholic children's society -  they were 
our adoption agency. To get around it, so that the word “Catholic” wasn't there, 
they changed the Catholic Children’s Society to the Cabrini Children Society, St 
Frances Cabrini was the founder. So now, they are still funded by the parishes 
in the diocese, and now they can -  and they do -  adopt out children to 
homosexual couples.” He disclosed that many of his colleagues were 
“annoyed” with the Bishops' lack of leadership in this matter; he said that the 
clergy felt useless and impotent because this matter was “brought up at the 
Council of Priests but the [ordinary] really took no notice of it at all.”
Priest (PB170510) wants the Bishops to demonstrate clearer leadership “with 
regards to us being able to pass on the Catholic faith to others; stronger
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leadership in relationship to things that pertain to essentially, our Catholic faith.” 
He cited some examples: “Like -  Catechism, doctrine that is taught at 
seminaries, parish level, Catholic schools, the syllabus and systems are used in 
Catholic schools He complained that “many priests ... disagree with a lot of 
the policies that come from the diocese” regarding the Religious Education 
syllabus mandated by the Bishop for Catholic schools: In terms of doctrinal 
content, the syllabus “don't really have much say.” Priest (PB170510) states he 
and his fellow clergy have expressed their concern regarding religious 
education; however, he and many of his colleagues feel that their Bishop is not 
really listening to them.
Abortion and euthanasia are key issues, Priest (PB170510) continued; “sex 
education in schools” was “a big one”; sex education has been forced on 
Catholic schools by the government. Priest (PB170510) declares: “We as 
priests would like the Bishop to be more firmer and more clearer in statements 
of official Catholic teachings. And we find we never get that. We never get 
clear statements about what Catholics are to believe from our local Bishops, we 
never get clear statements about faithfulness to magisterium, faithfulness to the 
Pope, that's never there; there's always a great silence, to put it bluntly.” He 
claimed that priests have, for many years, “complained to Bishops and the 
diocesan curia, or the dicasteries that oversee catechesis in schools, about the 
lack of doctrine that the syllabi have...”; but nothing has been done.
The lack of a doctrinally sound catechesis programme is a serious “disconnect" 
highlighted by Priest (PC020510): “But there is a larger disconnect, in terms of
205
Catholic education and catechesis.” Priest (PC020510) is convinced that 
Bishops “have been persuaded in the last 50 years to leave it to the 'experts' but 
the [ordinary] is equally responsible for Catholic education, catechesis of his 
diocese, as well as for the formation of priests and everything else. The buck 
stops there. But it’s a buck that's been delegated.”
206
7.4 Key Issues in the Area of Sanctification: Principal 
Findings (RQ2b)
Liturgy is defined by the Oxford English dictionary as “a form or formulary 
according to which public religious worship, especially Christian worship, is 
conducted”. In the Catholic Church the rubrics and words of the liturgy are 
codified in liturgical books - missals. Liturgical deviations and the absence of the 
promotion of the sacrament of confession are two of the key issues raised by 
our respondents. Further insights are provided in the section which follows.
7.4.1 Liturgy
Of the Bishops interviewed, only one (BA290410) mentioned that “good liturgy” 
was essential. It was not clear whether he felt that there was a problem in this 
area of his ministry. The Bishop said: “Some places have extremely good 
liturgy. Some places are lacklustre. And that is a shame because I don't think it 
takes a great deal to create the beauty of liturgy, but it is very easy to lose it 
through the distraction, the business.” Bishop (BA290410) did not volunteer 
any examples to illustrate what he meant by “good” and “lacklustre.” He did not 
indicate what he or any of his brother Bishops are doing to address those 
instances where the liturgy is 'lacklustre'.
An example of “bad” liturgy was given by Priest (P220410); he said that the 
Bishop himself, at the Cathedral level, did not provide a good model of how the 
liturgy should be celebrated. He alleged that at the ordination of one bishop, 
there was “African dancing,” something not in the rubrics of the liturgy. The
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quality of the celebration of the liturgy in his diocese was “lamentable”. He 
accused the Bishops of failing in their duties and that they (the Bishops) 
displayed a “lack of oversight” over the parishes, with “minimal input.” He 
mentioned that he has not known the Bishop to affect any correction of liturgical 
abuses. Priest (P220410) maintained, that his Bishop does not really care about 
what happens at parish level and that he (Bishop) will “not interfere” in parish 
affairs.
Speaking of his own Bishop, one Priest (PA070510) felt that “the attitude in the 
diocese is actually there are no real abuses in the liturgy.” He disclosed that his 
Bishop was willing to accept any liturgy deviation, so long as it was not Latin; 
his Bishop was also totally against the Extraordinary Rite -  the Missale 
Romanum 1962, a form of the Mass which is celebrated in Latin. Priest 
(PA070510) said: “The only abuse they (the Bishops) think is Latin. If you have 
been making up your own Eucharistie Prayer, not wearing a chasuble, 
celebrating on a coffee table, you wouldn't get rapped for it. If you started 
saying Mass in the Extraordinary Rite, “Oh no! Not that!” The [ordinary] hates 
it.”
There is a lack of consistency, alleges Priest (PB170510), in how the Mass is 
celebrated; he says that the clergy are allowed “to do their own thing[...] 
especially in regard to the liturgy.” There are parishes where the liturgy is 
“followed very correctly, and done in a very beautiful way,” and in other 
parishes, “the rubrics” are “completely disregarded.” Priests improvise and add 
“their own character into the liturgy,” Priest (PB170510) complained that this
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deviation has never been regarded as an issue by the Bishops: “I have been to 
so many parishes where there has been certainly, definitely liturgical abuses in 
many ways, and it is all accepted and never addressed at all by any Bishop as 
far as I know.” He felt that this is generally the situation in the Catholic Church, 
“in England and Wales, and probably in Europe. Lack of leadership, I would 
say.”
Priest (P290410) asserts that the Bishops need to celebrate the Mass with 
dignity, and that “the Bishops need to follow Pope Benedict's lead ...” The 
Catholic heritage -  music, for example, could be used to enhance the dignity of 
the liturgy: “one has to look at the music being prepared for the beatification of 
John Henry Newman -  (it) doesn't really reflect the richness of the Church's 
musical heritage.” He agrees that the Gregorian chant “would be one area 
where encouragement could be given.”
Priest (P120510) said that when Catholics think of “worship”, they usually 
confine their understanding of this term to the celebration of the “Mass”. 
However, he observed that “all of the sacraments are expressions of worship” 
but that “people don't always see it like that.” He attributes this ignorance to the 
lack of “formation”. Even the sacrament of penance (confession), he said, is 
“after all an act of prayer, an act of worship, as well as the forgiveness of sins, 
the end result.” In his view, Catholics are not aware that there “is that whole 
area of the proper understanding of the worship dimension of all sacraments.”
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7.4.2 The Sacrament of Confession
In the Sacrament of Confession forgiveness of sins committed after baptism is 
granted through the priest's absolution to those who with true sorrow confess 
their sins and promise to satisfy for the same. “Without being strictly necessary, 
confession of everyday faults (venial sins) is nevertheless strongly 
recommended by the Church. Indeed the regular confession of our venial sins 
helps us form our conscience, fight against evil tendencies, let’s ourselves be 
healed by Christ and progress in the life of the Spirit. By receiving more 
frequently through this sacrament the gift of the father's mercy, we are spurred 
to be merciful as he is merciful” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2000; 366).
Priest (290410) felt that the sacrament of confession was not sufficiently 
promoted and therefore underutilised: “we are not clear enough in what we 
teach. And so young people have no clear reason for why they need to practice 
their faith -  it is just seen as a nice thing. The liturgy is often dull and 
uninspiring. And we don't encourage the pursuit of holiness, especially going to 
confession. Priest (P090410) disclosed that many of the children in his church 
had very little idea about their Catholic faith; he gave the example of the 
children of travellers who were better prepared for Confession than those at the 
local Catholic school; the traveller children had been catechised by a nun.
Priest (070510) admitted that “no one goes to confession in my parish.” 
Likewise, Priest (P170510) stated: “In most of the parishes in [name of diocese] 
there are no records of people going to confession. All we know for sure is that 
it's decreased substantially.” Priest (P120510) revealed that the figures for the
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sacrament of confession used to be kept “about 40 years ago.” He suggested 
that a possible reason for the lack of any data “is that there isn't a national 
statistical office for the Catholic Church. They used to be kept by the 
Catholic Education Council. They stopped doing it about 15 -20  years ago. 
Don't know why, maybe their funds were cut. They used to coordinate the 
statistical returns and produced them nationally. Now it is up to each diocese to 
keep its own.”
Bishop (BA290410) was of the opinion that the sacrament of confession should 
be frequented less, rather than more, as strongly recommended by the Church: 
“My own understanding of the sacrament would suggest that actually this is 
something which you do less regularly...” He felt that frequenting the sacrament 
“every week becomes a rather automatic and perhaps -  for me anyway -  it will 
be a rather superficial celebration of the sacrament.”
Another Bishop (260509) acknowledged the significant reduction in the 
reception of the sacrament; however, he did not know the cause for the 
decrease: “I think that we are already exercised about encouraging people to 
use the sacrament of reconciliation [...]; the number of people who use the 
sacrament is relatively small. I'm trying to understand why. It's quite difficult 
really. I think there is an issue of the sense of sin, and an understanding of sin, 
an understanding of the need to confess sin, and understanding of the need for 
grace, to live faithfully to God.”
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7.5 Key issues in the area of Governance: Principal 
Findings (RQ2c)
There seems to be a 'disconnect' in how the bishop and his presbyterate 
perceive and relate to each other; their expectations of the other also appears 
to be askew. Consequently, the relationship between the Bishop and his 
Priests is perceived to be less than ideal.
7.5.1 Bishop's Management Style and his Relationship with his 
Presbyterate
Bishops appear to view their presbyterate as independent operators. Bishop 
(B100510) revealed that his Priests are “given a large degree of freedom” as to 
how they choose to manage their parishes and their own work. This seems to 
mirror the Bishop's own situation, where he has considerable powers of 
discretion over his own diocese. Bishop (B100510) disclosed that it is for this 
same reason that when a Priest experiences a 'problem', the Bishop does not 
expect to be involved, or to 'interfere'. The Bishop revealed that he would 
intervene only in extreme cases, and then, only if the Priest had violated 
“something fundamental in Canon Law, or civil law.”
The Bishop (B100510) was of the view that his involvement was limited: "... 
there is a very limited extent to which I can say: you must do this. So, in terms 
of governance, it's quite a complex picture, really.” He went on to recount a 
situation where another Bishop had the ability to remove from a parish, a
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particular Priest who had been serving there for the last forty years. However, 
this particular Bishop did not do so because this old Priest was “a very strong 
character and somehow it never happened.” The lack of action demonstrates 
either a lack of leadership on the part of the Bishop or the desire not to 'rock the 
boat.'
The impression gained is one where the presbyterate have little direction from, 
or control by, the Bishops. An area where lack of managerial control appears 
evident is in the provision of continuing professional development (CPD) - for 
example "formation week", for Priests; the Bishop mentioned that though this 
was mainly for the benefit of the clergy, it was doubtful whether they availed 
themselves of this. Attendance at these events was not mandatory; he 
admitted: "Attendance to that was never very good." This view was reinforced 
by another ordinary (B290410): “Last year we ran a series of seminars for 
priests. One of the topics was [title of topic]”. The Bishop acknowledged that not 
many of the priests attended this formation week.
It appears that Priests are managed by exception: that is, only when a problem 
arises. The situation was explained by this Bishop (B100510) who said that: "A 
Bishop may not see that much of a priest, and an individual priest may not see 
a Bishop for a while, only on public occasions.” However, he continued, if the 
Bishop is aware that a priest is experiencing problems, he would then meet his 
priest on a regular basis. This view is similar to that expressed by another 
ordinary (B260509). This Bishop disclosed that when he was first appointed to 
the diocese; he was mindful of his clergy and made it a point to see "them all
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individually." "Now, if they wish to see me, they have a direct line to me, email 
as well." The care of his clergy is also delegated to his "Deans, and through the 
Vicar-General." The Bishop's (B260509) perception of his clergy is that they are 
“essentially private individuals.” He explained that it is possible for him to ask 
his clergy to “go on retreat,” to “have a spiritual director,” and to “celebrate 
mass”; however, he admits that it is “difficult” for him to enforce these requests. 
Bishop (B260509) chooses instead to “assume they are doing” what is expected 
of them.
When asked whether there should be some form of performance appraisal of 
his clergy, this ordinary (BA080409) replied that he was already engaged in 
appraising his clergy, but that the appraisals were not documented. Though he 
acknowledged that there were “certain strengths in” documenting this process, 
he was very cautious about how this would be introduced: “I can see some 
priests saying “This is none of your business”.” This Bishop seemed very 
reluctant to “lose the goodwill” of his clergy, and was wary of “repercussions”; 
the Bishop was willing to be tolerant even if this meant that “there will be a few 
priests who would persist” in being disobedient to their Bishop. He asked: “To 
what lengths do you go on a particular issue if by enforcing that one, you lose 
the goodwill for any other number of things that the priest is doing?” This 
Bishop's (BA080409) management style may be summed up by his apparent 
reluctance to confront or to enforce: “Confrontation, drawing battle lines, is very 
often not the way ahead.” Underpinning the Bishop's (BA080409) relationship 
with the clergy is his desire not to “overdo” discipline; the danger of over 
“reinforcing” is that: “we strangle initiative on the part of individual priests and
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you could start treating them like children.”
In the preceding paragraphs, Priest (PC020510) accuses the Bishops of failing 
in their obligation to teach the Catholic faith; it appears that the Bishops may be 
ignorant of this failing because they have relinquished their teaching 
responsibility for “Catholic education, catechesis” and the “formation of priests” 
to so-called 'experts' (Priest, PC020510). Attendance at such formation for 
priests appears poorly attended; the lack of interest by the clergy in attending 
such priestly formation classes is explained by Priest (P021209). He confirmed 
that the clergy are usually reluctant to attend priestly formation classes 
organized by the Bishop. Priest (P021209) revealed that this resistance is 
usually displayed by “orthodox” priests who are reluctant to attend or to be 
involved in those classes because they know that those who are responsible for 
delivering this formation are themselves “not orthodox.”
The Bishop's relationship with his presbyterate is given further prominence by 
Priest (P070110). He described his relationship - and that of his fellow clergy -  
with the Bishop as “fragile”; this Priest (P070110) suffered a ‘mental breakdown’ 
as a result of an inappropriate posting which he blames on his Bishop: the 
Bishop had been advised not to proceed with the posting of Priest (P070110) 
but had decided against the advice. This led to the Priest (P070110) being 
placed in situations which were difficult for him to face and to adjust to, thus 
leading to his ‘mental breakdown’. Another Priest (P090410) was of the opinion 
that members of the hierarchy are a problem. He said that the Bishops are 
arrogant, did not communicate with their Priests, and that they have a problem
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of not listening to their clergy. He accused his own Bishop of not knowing his 
presbyters sufficiently well. He said Bishops were unlikely to induct their priests 
before assigning them to their respective parishes of work; also, the Bishops 
were not likely to “tell the truth” because Priests will “not like what they hear.” 
Telling the truth would lead to confrontation, which can be damaging because 
the presbyterate will retaliate by withholding their cooperation and goodwill; they 
will also “bad-mouth” and then leave the ministry.
Given the recent -  and continuing scandals -  experienced by the Church, one 
Priest (P051210) wondered whether a more interventionist style of management 
by the Bishops would have been more appropriate. He admitted that there were 
Bishops who were comparatively “hands-on”; however, from his experience, 
Priest (P051210) feels that: “Bishops would, by and large, leave it to the clergy 
to get on with it. And they will intervene when things were going too far out of 
line.” Parish Priests hold considerable power over the implementation of policies 
at grassroots level and are critical to the success of the parish. “Often the 
difficulty is putting into practice at parish level, the policies that are there,” he 
said. “The strength and weakness of the whole systems (rest) very much with 
the Parish Priest.” He admitted that: “On the whole, there is a danger that the 
Parish Priests run their own kingdom.” He also said that “priests tend to cherish 
their autonomy. But at the price of an overall sense of pastoral purpose within 
the diocese.”
The illustration given by Priest (P300410) serves to explain the seemingly 
'laissez-faire' style of management and the sometimes fractured relationship
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between the Bishop and his presbyterate: “You could get a heck of a lot worse 
Bishop than my Bishop, because for the most part, he leaves us to paddle our 
own canoe. What I do in [name of parish], I do in [name of parish]. He doesn't 
interfere with my management style, which is a good thing.” This priest referred 
to Rome's role in the Bishop's performance, explaining that the oversight which 
Rome displays over her Bishops may be regarded as one of 'vigilance' rather 
than 'management'. This paradigm cascades downwards: the Bishop is the 
proper pastor of his diocese and the Parish Priest is regarded as the proper 
pastor of his parish. Consequently, the Bishop's role over his clergy's ministry is 
one of'vigilance'rather than'management.'
The apparent perception gap between the Bishop and his clergy is further 
characterized by the views given by Priest (220410). He said that he does not 
see enough of his Bishop and that his Bishop lacks “visibility”; consequently, 
there is a “lack of high profile” on the part of his boss. This sentiment seems to 
suggest that Priest (220410) prefers a Bishop who is more 'hands-on', and 
possibly, more assertive or interventionist. This Priest was of the view that 
Bishops generally display a “lack of oversight” over the parishes in their 
diocese; the Bishops manage with “minimal input.” Priest (220410) revealed 
that he has not known his Bishop to make any correction of abuses though 
these occur; at the parish level, his Bishop does not really care and the latter 
“will not interfere”. Worse still, he claims, the Bishop does not know his priests 
well. Priest (P220410) provided an example: the Bishop posted a Priest to a 
new parish but without providing the Priest with an induction, briefings, or 
overviews. The Bishop did inform or forewarn the incumbent Priest about the
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challenges which would be issuing from the parish. Priest (P220410) lamented 
the absence of any 'steer' and a “lack of support” from the Bishop. Priest 
(P220410) suggests that the basic problem with the Bishops is their “aversion to 
talk about spiritual aspects of the faith” - doctrine, dogma and morals. The 
Bishop “does not want to talk about this.” This is because if the Bishop does, he 
would “open a can of worms”; the Bishop would encounter disagreements and 
dissensions about the faith from priests and laity. Priest (P220410) was of the 
view that if the Bishop himself is not clear about these aspects of the faith, it 
affects the way he performs his ministry.
Another Priest (P290410) said that the clergy's role had changed in terms of its 
focus and emphasis; priests are now generally regarded more as “social 
worker(s) and all the rest of it.” He admitted that though the administrative 
aspect of the priest's function was very important, he felt that the clergy has lost 
sight of its primary role: “the one thing that is central is the celebration of the 
sacraments.” He voiced the need to rediscover this aspect of the clergy's raison 
d'etre and to return to the "... traditional model of priesthood.” He suggested the 
reason for the sad state of the Priesthood could be attributed to the formative 
stage of a priest's training whilst in the seminary: “you need to go back to 
looking at formation.” He asserted that very “little time is spent teaching the 
priest how to say Mass.” Consequently, seminarians graduate “with very little 
liturgical formation. Given that this is the principle task of the priest -  that seems 
very strange.” Priest (P290410) believes that Bishops should be more closely 
involved in the priestly formation of their presbyterate, recalling that at the time 
of the Council of Trent, the training model was for the seminary to be located
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“next to the Bishop's house.”
It appears reasonable to ask whether the Bishops' apparent reluctance to 
'interfere' in his Priests' affairs makes the Bishop seem remote and out of touch. 
This Priest (P300410) is grateful that his Bishop had never pressurized him:
“We have days of recollection, study days, [...] but I could sit here for ever and 
a day. No one puts any pressure on me at all. I never had a sabbatical, could 
have had two or three, but nobody has put any pressure on me to do so.” 
However, he regretted that the Bishop did not take a more directive approach 
towards his continuing professional development (CPD), admitting: “I would 
value the Bishop ringing me up and saying, 'Look, I have got a course you want 
to go on, and it is on Scripture, or Canon Law, or on something like that.' I would 
value that. Go take yourself off for a month, a week, whatever.”
Priest (P300410) feels that the lack of contact with his Bishop and the 
corresponding absence of direction may explain the sense of alienation felt by 
some priests and their lack of 'self-esteem'. “What is lacking in the diocese is 
the building up of self-esteem; priests feel -  look as though they are -  
depressed.” Priest (P300410) feels that there is a lack of leadership and 
management by his Bishop: “There doesn't seem to be any kind of scheme of 
things -  vocations have dropped, mass attendances have dropped, people feel 
they are terribly discouraged ...” “If I were a [ordinary], I would want to do 
something about this” (Priest, 300410).
The low esteem amongst the clergy is also felt by Priest (PA070510), who
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explains: “I think the problem with [the munera of] teaching is a lot of the priests 
feel very relegated down the scale.” He stated that Priests feel a sense of “dis- 
empowerment.” This is because none of his colleagues feel that they have any 
influence. “And none of us feel that our voice is heard, and none of us feel that if 
we stand up and said something, we wouldn't get in trouble.” So, in addition to 
their inability to exercise some form of meaningful influence, there is also an 
element of fear. Priest (PA070510) feels that the situation is hypocritical: “We 
keep on being told about social justice, social justice, social justice. But I don't 
feel that there is a feeling of social justice amongst the priests, at the lower 
level.”
Priest (PA070510) feels that clergy and the laity have switched roles, and that 
this state of affairs is unnatural and distorted. The laity have increasingly 
undertaken more of a lead in the liturgical and pastoral aspects of the Church, 
steadily usurping elements of the priestly role -  e.g: the use of extra-ordinary 
ministers especially during mass when there is no compelling need, visiting the 
sick, and giving out Holy Communion. Conversely, priests have been reduced 
to the role of “social workers”, “health and safety managers”, and “red-tape 
administrators”. This led Priest (PA070510) to reflect on his decision to become 
a Priest: “If you 'clericalize' the laity, and 'laicise' the clergy, what is the 
attraction? Why give up family, your life, job, live in this ridiculous structure, if 
you can do most of it either as a permanent deacon with a family, with a job, 
with income, in charge of your own pension, in charge of where you choose to 
live, not being moved around on a whim of (snaps his fingers), and all the rest 
of it. Why bother to be a priest?” He feels that the clergy have lost their priestly
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identity, stating: “Priestly identity is at a real low,” and that this is affecting “the 
morale of the clergy.”
Priest's (PA070510) experience best illustrates the estrangement between the 
Bishop and his presbyterate: “This is my first parish. I am still waiting though, for 
somebody to phone me up and say, “Is everything alright, [his name], anything I 
can do to help?” Priest (PA070510) disclosed that he had not “been in any way 
mentored as a priest in a parish”, and that no one from the ordinary's office has 
ever been in contact with him to determine how well he is performing: “The 
Dean hasn't done it, local priests haven't done it. The [ordinary] hasn't done it, 
the Vicar-General hasn't done it. The personnel group hasn't done it. The 
Consultors haven't done it. There's nothing in the diocese that is actually 
checking: is it alright?” He said that there is “this gulf between the Bishop and 
his priests”. Priest (PA070510) claimed that his Bishop did not (want to) know 
what his priests were doing. Asked if this problem is unique to his diocese,
Priest (PA070510) replied that this situation is common elsewhere. He felt that 
Bishops consciously chose not to become sufficiently well acquainted with their 
priests because they (the Bishops) would discover that there is a huge amount 
of pastoral work which they will be obliged to extend to their priests. He 
remarked that it was “far easier to feed - and be loving to - a pet dog than to be 
kind to your fellow religious.”
Given the lack of direction, Priest (PA070510) expressed the view that priests 
do not know how to spend their time; they ‘while away their time' doing 
administrative work, writing emails, and feeling good at having done some
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'work'; Even the Bishops themselves, Priest (PA070510) said, do not know how 
to spend their time; instead of ministering to their priests, and exercising their 
tri-munera they, like the priests for whom they are responsible, choose to focus 
their time on administrative work, which is the “easier option”, on activities such 
as: “changing light bulbs, health and safety, and estate management”. Priest 
(PA070510) provides another example from his own experience: “I was asked, 
“OK, would you be alright to become parish priest of [name of location]?” And I 
said, “I obviously need to think about it. “Well,” he [the ordinary] said, “you're not 
allowed to discuss it with anybody, and you mustn't go into the parish.” “And I 
thought, on reflection: how do you make a decision based on nothing? If you 
were going to move to a job, a different job, you go, you have an interview with 
the job, you have a look round the place, you would like to meet the people.”
This Priest (PA070510) disclosed that he had to resign his faculties because of 
ill-health. The final exposition he provides discloses how uncaring he felt his 
Bishop had been: “I thought, well what I'm chasing at the moment because 
you're [ordinary] not doing anything, is I'm chasing my recovery.” So if it 
requires resignation, I said, “How do I resign?” He said, “You write a letter and 
say this, that and the other.” I said, “Can you just jot down what I need to do,” so 
he actually wrote my letter of resignation for me, and it took me in total, a ten 
minute meeting, to resign from the diocese.”
In contrast, this Priest (PB170510) was of the view that his Bishop was 
"considerate to Priests". In his experience, his Bishop kept a "caring eye" on his 
clergy's temporal requirements: "living, your finances, and things like that." He
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confirmed that Bishops "do their utmost to try to support their priests. In that 
regard, that is good, really." However, he believed that the Bishops were 
'considerate' because they did not to "want to rock the boat, they (the Bishops) 
don't want to upset individual priests, maybe. That could be one of the reasons, 
or -  they are happy with the abuses taking place." He believes that there were 
many abuses in the liturgy, perpetrated by Priests; however, the Bishops were 
not intervening as they should. "Maybe they don't see anything wrong with it, 
personally." He felt that the Bishops' faith -  "or commitment to the Catholic faith 
is not strong as to warrant concern about these things." This Priest disclosed 
that there were many within the presbyterate who "want to be faithful to the 
Church's teachings and to the Pope, but they find that by being that way, in 
some way, they can be ostracised by their Bishop and also by people, other 
priests, in the diocese as well." Priests were being "ostracised" by their Bishop 
for "being too conservative, or being too right wing, or too traditional." They 
were castigated as "outcasts" for being "faithful Catholic priests,"; it is therefore 
not surprising that there was low self-esteem and low morale within the 
presbyterate. He summarized the situation by stating: "Generally amongst the 
clergy, there is a general feeling of despondency and half-hearted ness and not 
being supported much by the Bishop. I know two or three priests in my diocese 
who are seriously thinking of leaving the diocese and going to work in the US. 
And that happens often because they get so despondent."
Priest (PB170510) went on to describe his Bishop's relationship with his 
presbyterate as one that is plagued by a "lack of communications, lack of 
consultation". This situation is underpinned by a "feeling" that there is no "real
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direction in the diocese." The lack of communication is accentuated by the 
absence of any feedback from the Bishop. Priest (PB170510) related how the 
diocese was asked to participate in a fact-finding exercise. Though "everyone 
participated in that," nothing else was heard: "at the end nothing really came 
from it." His colleagues felt that the Bishop was “not really listening to them." He 
said “many priests in my diocese” felt despondent and believed that there was a 
“lack of leadership from the Bishops." Priest (PB170510) was asked to rate his 
relationship with the Bishop, on a scale of 1 to 10, ten being "very good." He 
replied: "Mine would be about three to four, personally, in my opinion. I would 
say that with some priests in the diocese it would be a lot lower than that -  
maybe two or one. They feel so despondent about so many issues. There is no 
firm leadership. I think that is the problem. And so, decisions are made and 
sometimes, they can be a bit ambiguous. You don't really know what they 
mean. That is a big thing that is missing."
Priest (PB170510) cited as an example, a problem which had become a key 
issue: the inadequate standard of catechesis used in the diocese's “parishes, 
and also in schools.” According to him, Priests had been complaining to the 
Bishops, the diocesan curia, and to the dicasteries in Rome that oversee 
catechesis in schools, about the lack of sound doctrine in the learning material 
used by the diocese to teach the Catholic faith. He complained about the 
inability of Catholic schools to pass on the Catholic faith to the children who 
attend these institutions. The Priests, he disclosed, had been voicing these 
concerns for many years, asking that decisive action be taken to address this 
deficiency; however, “as far as I can see, nothing has really been done, by the
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Bishops.” There were individual priests, he said, who were making heroic efforts 
to ensure that the catechesis given in their schools or in their parishes was 
faithful to the Church's teachings. He voiced dissatisfaction about his Bishop's 
lack of response, saying "... we don't get real support from the Bishop regarding 
that -  not public support. He may come and see you and say, “Oh, what you're 
doing is okay”, but it needs to be public so that people know where the Bishop 
stands on these issues. Which they don't really, not in my diocese.”
Another key issue raised by this Priest (PB170510) was the high attrition rate of 
the clergy. He was concerned about the “high dropout” rate of priests who had 
“left the active ministry.” He said: “I can think of myself since I was in the 
seminary, many of the people who were training with me, even in the year 
above me, or below me, so many I know have now left...” He blamed the Bishop 
for this situation, stating that the Bishop “has the care of the priests in his 
diocese. So, he has to take some responsibility for it. But I have never seen a 
Bishop admit responsibility or any sort of fault on their part.” He made the point 
that it was the Bishop who appoints the priests; if the clergy had problems, it 
was the Bishop whom they should refer to, and no one else: “we can only go to 
the Bishop, there is no other person that we can go to. He should know what 
the issues are.” The Bishop was also personally responsible “for the formation 
of priests." He concluded that a “high drop-out” rate meant that there was 
“something defective in our formation...” He questioned the Bishops'judgement 
and the recruitment-selection process which is used to select priests. He 
wondered how could it be possible that those who entered the seminary were 
not fully aware of “all the consequences of it,” or “maybe [...] there was a fault
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or flaw in the discernment process. But again, that is the responsibility of the 
Diocesan Bishop.”
From the above accounts, it appears that Bishops do not meet their 
presbyterate on a regular basis or at specified intervals. This Priest (PB220310) 
confirmed that he only saw his Bishop once a year. He also disclosed that there 
is the problem of obedience on the part of priests; they would not be willing to 
listen to the Bishop if the latter told them what to do. This situation was further 
confirmed by another Priest (PC020510), who stated that there were 
“disconnects” between what he had learned in the seminary and what the laity 
expects of Priests. He also voiced the view that there seems to be a 
'disconnect' “in the selection of priests, their training, their subsequent 
appointment, and what the laity expect of them.”
Priest (PC020510) was also doubtful about the recruitment and selection 
process of seminarians: “Do those who select priests know what is going to 
happen to them at the next stage -  probably they do, and do those in the 
seminary know what's happening -  again probably they do -  but again, there 
are disconnects there. It’s relevant because the selection of priests is in some 
ways one of the [ordinary]'s most important tasks. One which he usually 
delegates.” He was asked if priests were given continuing priestly formation, to 
which he replied: “There's nothing like that. As far as I know. Almost nothing. 
Generally speaking.”
The lack of communication -  and the apparently failure by the Bishops to listen
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to their presbyterate is a recurring theme in our analysis. This same priest felt 
that the Bishop “could listen more, perhaps.” Priest (PC020510) described the 
relationship between Bishop and his presbyterate as “informal”, explaining how 
“things are usually sorted out by discussion rather than by confrontation and the 
use of the law. But it isn't always an equal discussion, than it would be in any 
other hierarchical system, or management system either.” He also drew 
attention to the attrition rate of priests: “We have lost young priests who could 
have been saved, by a bit more proactive management, by Bishops who were 
backing their own generation, backing the senior man, in utilitarian terms, a 
disaster for the diocese.” With regards to ongoing spiritual formation, he 
recounted how it was thirteen years after he had been a Priest, “before anybody 
in management, Bishop or auxiliary Bishop asked me even whether I had a 
spiritual director.” Priest (PC020510) “was delighted to be asked, but saddened 
that it had taken so long.” He was of the opinion that the hierarchy needs “some 
kind of management training,” which would stop “them being swallowed up in an 
administrative machine, because that's what's happening.” Priest (PC020510) 
feels that the spiritual aspect of the priesthood has been neglected; the “spiritual 
side has got to be looked at as well and I don't think that anything is being done 
on either front.”
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7.6 Episcopal Performance: Key Findings (RQ3)
This section presents our analysis of the reception of the sacraments. In RQ3, 
we seek to evaluate episcopal performance. The efficacy of the Bishop's 
ministry is evidenced by the laity's adherence to the tenets of their Catholic 
faith; adherence is manifested by the laity's reception of the sacraments which 
are “necessary for salvation” (Canon 489). The frequency of the reception of the 
sacraments is used as the proxy for the laity's adherence to the tenets of their 
Catholic faith; these include the following sacraments: Baptisms, Confessions, 
1st Holy Communion, Confirmation, Marriage, Holy Orders, and Sunday Mass 
attendance as well because it is mandatory for Catholics to attend Mass every 
Sunday. For reasons already explained in Chapter 5 (Pilot Research and 
Research Issues) statistical figures for the specified sacraments are taken from 
Spencer's (2007) Digest.
We present our findings in the following sections, beginning with an overview of 
the Catholic population during the period 1958 to 2005. The figures for the 
Catholic population will help provide a basis for comparison. The elaboration of 
the statistics below is followed by further evaluation and interpretation in section 
7.8 (Discussion).
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7.6.1 Catholic Population
Table 7 6.1 Trends for the Catholic Population, 1958-2005
Source Diges 
of Eng
of Statistics of the Catholic Community 
land and Wales, 1958 -  20 05. p 19
Year Catholic % ( + or - )
Population Year on Year
1958 3489732 100
1963 4017360 15.1
1971 4092176 19
1980 4257789 4.0
1991 4255569 -0.1
2001 4189448 -1.6
2005 4197393 0.2
The Catholic population grew by 15%, from 1958 to 1963, and it peaked in 1980 
(4,257,789). Though it grew by 0.2% in 2005 (4,197,393) over 2001 
(4,189,448), the overall trend is downwards since 1980 (4,257,789). A  graphical 
presentation of the data is given below:
Table 7.6.1A Trends for the Catholic Population. 1958 -  2005
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7.6.2 Sacrament of Baptism
Table 76 -2: Trends for Baptisms, 1958 -  2005 
Source: Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community 
of England and Wales. 1958 -  2005. p 36
Year on Year
1958 100
1963 149825 16.7
1971 108825 -27.4
1980 84531 -22.3
1991 85345 1.0
2001 67526 -20.9
2005 66510 -1.5
Baptisms grew from 1958 (128,367) and peaked in 1963 (149,825). Since 1963, 
baptisms have been in steady decline, reaching a low of 66,510 in 2005; this 
represents a reduction of over 40%, compared to the peak in 1963. During the 
same period, from 1963 to 2005, the Catholic population grew by over 4.5%. 
The baptisms in 2005 (66,510) represent 1.5% of the total Catholic population 
for the same year (2005 = 4,197,393), whereas in 1963 baptisms were 3.7% of 
the Catholic population in the same year. The graphical presentation of the
trend is given below:
Table 7.6.2A: Trends for Baptisms, 1958 -  2005
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7.6.3 Sacrament of Confession
Table 7 6.3; Trends for Confessions, 1958 -  1969 
Source: Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community 
of England and Wales. 1958 -  2005, p 95
Year
1958
1963
1971
Confessions
60488
68466
57596
% ( + or - ) 
Year on Year
100
13.2
-15.9
Intermittent figures (Easter confessions) of varying years were available for 
eight dioceses, only. The diocese of Nottingham is chosen to provide an 
indication; it is the only diocese with complete figures from 1958 until 1971. It is 
observed that confessions peaked in 1963 (68,466) by 13%, from 1958
(60.488). However, it fell by over 15% in 1971 (57,596). Compared to 1958
(60.488), the figure in 1971 represents a net reduction of over 4 percent. A 
graphical presentation of the data is given below:
Table 7.6.3A:Trends fo r Confessions, 1958 -  1969
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7.6.4 Sacrament of 1st Holy Communion
Table 7 6.4: Trends for I 61 Holy Communion. 1971 -  2005 
Source Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community 
of England and Wales. 1958 -  2005. p 86
Year on Year
1958 R7Â N/A
1963 N/A N/A
1971 95664 1000
1980 68365 -285
1991 55751 -18.5
2001 60358 8 3
2005 58336 -3.4
Figures are not available for 1958 and 1963. It is notable that the figure 
increased in 2001 (60,358) by 8.3% from 1991 (55751). The reception of 1st 
Holy Communion peaked in 1971 (95,664). However, the trend has been 
decreasing ever since 1971, to a low of 58,336 in 2005; this represents a 
reduction of 39% over the period. At the same time, from 1971 (4,092,176) to 
2005 (4,197,393), the Catholic population increased by 2.5 percent. A graphical 
presentation of the data is presented below:
Table 7.8-4A: Trends for 1st Holy Communion, 1971 — 2005
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7.6.5 Sacrament of Confirmation
Table 7.6-5 Trends for Confirmations. 1958 -2005 
Source: Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community 
of England and Wales. 1958 -  2005, p 93
Year Confirmations % ( *  or - ) 
Year on Year
1958 99656 100
1963 80460 -19 3
1971 82835 3.0
1980 54803 -33.8
1991 39761 -27.4
2001 36524 -8.1
2005 35213 -3,6
Confirmations increased by 3% in 1971 (82,835) eight years since 1963 
(80,460). However, the overall trend is downward, from a peak of 99,656 in 
1958, to a low of 35,213 in 2005; this represents a fall of over 60%. During the 
same period from 1958 (3,489,732) to 2005 (4,197,393), the Catholic population 
grew by over 19%. A  graphical presentation of the data is given below:
Table 7.6.5A: Trends for Confirmations, 1958 -  2005
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7.6.6 Sacrament of Marriage
Table 7.6 6: Trends for Marriages, from 1958 -  2005 
Source Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community 
of England and Wales. 1958 -  2005. p 53
Year Marriages % ( or - ) 
Year on Year
1958 45150 100
1963 45397 0 5
1971 43827 «3.5
1980 31524 -28.1
1991 21600 «31 5
2001 12097 44.0
2005 10924 9 7
Marriages grew by less than 1 % in 1963 (45,397), over the five years from 
1958 (45,150); the overall trend is downward, from 45,397 in 1963 to 10,924 in 
2005: this represents a net decrease of over 70% since 1958. At the same time, 
the Catholic population grew by over 19% during the same period from 
3,489,732 in 1958, to 4,197,393 in 2005. A graphical presentation of the data is 
given below:
Table 7.6.6A: tsnds fo r Marriages, from 1958 -  2005
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7.6.7 Sacrament of Holy Orders (Priests)
Table 7.6 7 Trends for Holy Orders, 1958 -  2005 
Source: Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community 
of England and Wales, 1958 -  2005. p 100
Year Holy Orders 
Secular Priests
% {+  or - ) 
Year on Year
1958 4356 100
1963 4673 73
1971 N/A 0 0
1980 4469 ^ 4
1991 4024 -10.0
2001 3708 7 9
The number of diocesan Priests grew by 7.3% in 1963 (4,673) since 1958 
(4,356). However, the trend since 1963 is downward. 2005 (3,485) saw a 
reduction of over 20% in the number of diocesan Priests since 1958. The ratio 
of Priest to Catholic population in 1958 was 1:800; in 2005, the ratio was
1:1200. A graphical presentation of the data is given below:
Table 7.6.7A: Trends for Holy Orders. 1958 -  2005
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7.6.8 Sunday Mass Attendance
Table 76.8: Trends for Sunday Mass Attendance, 1958 -  200i
Source: Digest of Statistics of the Catholic Community
of Eng land and Wales, 1958 -  2005, p 84
Year Sunday Mass % ( + or - )
Attendance Year on Year
1958 N/A N/A
1963 N/A N/A
1971 1899803 100.0
1980 1644224 -13.5
1991 1298685 -210
2001 989614 -23.8
2005 942473 -48
The overall trend for Sunday Mass attendance is down, by over 50% since 1971 
(1,899,803). The figures indicate that a decreasing number of Catholics attend 
Sunday Mass, where over 78% of the Catholic population failed to fulfil their 
Sunday obligation in 2005.
Table 7 6.8A: Trends for Sunday Mass Attendance, 1958 -  2005
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7.7 Episcopal Performance -  Discussion of Key Findings
7.7.1 Introduction
Our findings, presented in the previous section, indicate that all five sacraments 
are in systemic decline; the same may be said for Sunday mass attendance.
To recap: baptisms declined by over 40%. Confessions fell by 15%. 1st Holy 
Communions peaked in 1971 (95,664) but decreased to 58,336 in 2005, a 
reduction of 39% over the same period. Confirmations fell by over 60% (1958 = 
99,656; 2005 = 35,213). The sacrament of marriage witnessed a fall of over 
70% (1958 = 45,150; 2005 = 10,924). The number of Priests fell by over 20% in 
2005 (3,485) since 1958 (4,356). Finally, figures indicate that Sunday Mass 
attendance is down by over 50% since 1971; importantly, over 78% of the 
Catholic population did not fulfil their Sunday obligation in 2005.
7.7.2 Corroboration of Episcopal Performance with Key Issues Raised in 
the Research Interviews
With these figures in mind, we reflect further on our research interviews and the 
findings to ascertain whether the key issues and the resultant episcopal 
performance corroborate. The poor episcopal performance appears to support 
the concerns which emerged from our interviews. It is notable that these 
concerns -  for example: low marriage rates, poor catechesis, questionable 
liturgy, and the high attrition rates of the clergy, were “key issues” raised by 
members of the presbyterate; it is equally notable that none of these issues 
were raised by the episcopate, nor did they feature prominently in any of the 
Bishops' responses. Nevertheless, in our interviews, this one Bishop (B260509)
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admitted that: “there hasn't been such emphasis on missionary vocations, and I 
think we're now realizing that you've got to really [strengthen] the vocation of 
marriage. And the vocation of commitment. And we have not, at the moment, 
got any kind of agency for the promotion of marriage. Although nationally, there 
is now funding available.”
It is arguably plausible to echo the concerns mentioned by the Priests whom we 
interviewed: the Bishops are not doing their jobs. To illustrate, Priest (P290410) 
said: "I don't hear the argument for the sanctity of marriage proactively put 
forward." This Priest held the view that the Bishops failed to preach about the 
importance of the sacrament of marriage; in his (P290410) opinion, Bishops 
should deliver to society “a counterblast proclaiming the importance of 
marriage.” Priest (P300410) acknowledged the growing decline in marriages, 
disclosing that about two-thirds of the parents who brought their children to him 
for baptism were either married in a registry office or not married at all; he said: 
“That to me is a pastoral problem.” “The problem goes further back,” he said: 
“We've lost two generations. And there is no way that we can make that up.”
Priest (P304010) was convinced that many Catholic did “not know the faith.” 
Catholics “go away and get married in the registry office,” he said, “and they do 
not know that the Catholic Church says that you've got to get married before a 
Catholic priest and two witnesses.” The lack of catechesis was also mentioned 
by members of the presbyterate, for example: PB170510 and PC020510. In his 
(PC020510) view, it was “common knowledge that lapsation of [Catholic] 
teenagers is very high.” He regarded this lapsation as “a haemorrhage which
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should be a concern.” Priest (PC020510) wondered whether the lack of 
catechesis could be blamed on the failure of the clergy to teach the laity their 
faith: “Christian marriage for example, is an obvious one because it is the next 
sacrament they are going to receive. How much do they know about the 
Catholic faith?” Priest (PB170510) noted that there was “a colossal amount of 
rejection of very important aspects of the Catholic faith by many, many 
Catholics.” Even priests, he felt, had rejected the faith. Using Sunday Mass 
attendance as an example, Priest (PB 170510) stated that in “most parishes, 
there would be quite a lot of people who would have no regard for the fact that 
they should be at Mass every Sunday, and wouldn't think anything of missing 
Mass for two, three Sundays, and going back a fourth Sunday and receiving 
communion -  say, straight away, without any thought of having committed any 
sin at all.”
The “greatest decline”, Priest (PB1705010) continues, has been in the “spiritual 
life and the teaching of the faith...” He felt that the catechetical programmes 
taught in the Catholic schools were meaningless and “not Catholic at all.” Priest 
(PB170510) said that schools were forced to use this material because they 
were mandated by the Bishop; he disclosed that he and many of his colleagues 
had voiced their concerns, but to no avail: “Many of the priests that I know, who 
had been to that -  they call it Priests’ Council -  they've found that -  they've 
raised issues but concern is not really duly taken...” Finally, the lack of a 
doctrinally sound catechesis programme was also highlighted by another 
member of the presbyterate - Priest (PC020510): “But there is a larger 
disconnect, in terms of Catholic education and catechesis.” He was convinced
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that during the last 50 years Bishops had “been persuaded” - rather erroneously 
-  to rely on so-called 'experts' to develop appropriate catechetical curricula; 
however, he felt this had proved to be a mistake, given the dire state of the 
Church as he perceived it, and made worse by the fact that the Bishops appear 
to have abdicated their responsibility as the principal dispensers of the faith.
Priest (PB170510) was critical of the Bishops' lack of leadership, citing as an 
example, “the whole issue of our adoption agencies with the new law, in the UK. 
He disclosed that many of his colleagues were “annoyed” with the Bishops' lack 
of leadership in this matter; the clergy felt useless and impotent because this 
matter was “brought up at the Council of Priests but the [ordinary] really took no 
notice of it at all.” Priest (PB170510) said that the presbyterate want the “Bishop 
to be more firmer and more clearer in statements of official Catholic teachings. 
And we find we never get that. We never get clear statements about what 
Catholics are to believe from our local Bishops, we never get clear statements 
about faithfulness to magisterium, faithfulness to the Pope, that's never there; 
there's always a great silence, to put it bluntly.” He claimed that priests have, 
for many years, “complained to Bishops and the diocesan curia, or the 
dicasteries that oversee catechesis in schools, about the lack of doctrine that 
the syllabi have...”; but nothing has been done.
Labelling the latest episcopal performance results as “bad news” and 
“catastrophic”, the National Secular Society (NSS) is convinced that there is 
now a “massive loss of interest in Catholicism in England and Wales” (National 
Secular Society 2013). The Latin Mass Society (LMS) shares a similar view; it
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regards the latest episcopal performance as a “catastrophe”; to the LMS, the 
figures “show unambiguously that something went seriously wrong in the 
Church in England and Wales in the 1960s and 1970s. Catholics ceased quite 
suddenly to see the value of getting married, having large families, and having 
their children baptised. Non-Catholics no longer perceived the Church as the 
ark of salvation, and ceased to seek admission. Young men no longer offered 
themselves for the priesthood in the same numbers as before.” (LMS n.d.)
It may be opportune at this juncture to ask: “when, how and why did the decline 
begin?” The statistics and line graphs suggest that the downward trend began 
during the 1960s. The comments made by Priest (P300410) above, regarding 
the growing decline in marriages, provides a possible clue. In particular, Priest 
(P300410) said that the “pastoral problem” currently experienced by the 
Catholic Church “goes further back.” Of note is his comment that: “We've lost 
two generations. And there is no way that we can make that up.” In Catholic 
tradition, one generation amounts to twenty years; two generations takes us 
back to the 1960s, when the 2nd Vatican Council, commonly known as 'Vatican 
M' was convened by Pope John XXIII in 1962, and closed by Pope Paul VI in 
1965 (Jones, 2003). Likewise, the systemic decline in the bishops' performance 
is attributed by the LMS to “the wrenching changes which were taking place in 
the Church at that time, when the Second Vatican Council was being prepared, 
discussed, and, often erroneously, applied.” (LMS n.d.)
241
7.7.3 Vatican II
An analysis of our transcripts for relevant references to “Vatican II” reveals the 
following comments made by the priests whom we interviewed. Priest 
(P090410) disclosed that when he was in the seminary, “spirituality was not 
encouraged; when I prayed, the Dean would laugh at me; when I recited the 
rosary, I was laughed at. Since Vatican II, spirituality has gone down.” In his 
discussion about “the Bishop's role in relation to priests,” Priest (170510) felt 
that “the amount of priests that leave the active ministry is very, very high, now- 
a-days. I know in the time of Vatican II there was a high drop out of a lot of 
clergy, but I can think of myself since I was in the seminary, many of the people 
who were training with me, even in the year above me, or below me, so many I 
know have now left the active ministry. There are ten, going to twenty if I count 
them all up, since I have been a priest for [so many] years. If you think about it, 
that is a high drop out of men leaving the active ministry.”
Contrasting his current experience of parish life with the changes which 
followed the close of the Council in 1965, Priest (P300410) said: “What I do find 
rather disturbing in this climate today, is where we've moved away from the 
principles of the 2nd Vatican Council.” He explained the difference between “the 
climate today” and the period which followed Vatican II, thus: “in 1970s we were 
full of the teachings of the 2nd Vatican Council. And in this diocese we were 
every progressive, with the most reactionary Bishop that ever put on shoes. I 
know this because [censored].” Though the Bishop “was the most progressive, 
he was the greatest old fuddy-duddy that ever stood on two feet.” With regards 
to the liturgy, his Bishop “came back from the 2nd Vatican Council saying, 'Over
242
my dead body will I ever say mass in English.' But I am afraid he did. He did, 
because he had to. But once he had given in, he had given in. 'If that is what the 
Church wants, then I [the Bishop] would.' But ever since then, there has been a 
greater control from the centre, from the top. And it has gone right through the 
seminaries.”
These remarks suggest that the changes introduced since Vatican II were 
seismic and affected the very foundation of the universal Church, even in 
England. From Priest's (P300410) comments -  e.g.: “we were very progressive, 
with the most reactionary Bishop”, we suspect that the changes may have 
affected the Church's eschatological traditions, including the sacred liturgy (for 
example: 'Over my dead body will I ever say mass in English.'); his comments 
are also suggestive of power struggles -  whether actual or philosophical - for 
instance: “ever since then, there has been a greater control from the centre, 
from the top.” His remarks concerning “control” and “seminaries” suggests that 
the training which priests received may have been substantially affected; this 
suggestion may also be linked to the comments made above by Priest 
(P090410), who said that when he was in seminary: “spirituality was not 
encouraged; when I prayed, the Dean would laugh at me; when I recited the 
rosary, I was laughed at. Since Vatican II, spirituality has gone down.” These 
reforms could arguably have contributed to the declining numbers of priests and 
could be coupled to the comments made by Priest (170510), above: “the 
amount of priests that leave the active ministry is very, very high, no-a-days. I 
know in the time of Vatican II there was a high drop out of a lot of clergy, but I 
can think of myself since I was in the seminary, many of the people who were
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training with me, even in the year above me, or below me, so many I know have 
now left the active ministry.”
The views expressed by this Priest (P240510) suggest that the changes 
introduced by Vatican II may have had negative consequences on the way the 
Bishops have taught the faith: “We've had a problem in England with Bishops 
who haven't understood -  the sufficient culture of education -  to understand 
how progress is made in the sacred sciences, how research works, how -  the 
importance of research for good teaching, for providing ongoing teaching at the 
third level in the sacred sciences: what you haven't had, you can't give. And you 
often can't imagine. And it’s rather made us stick in the mud, as a country. That 
is a constant tendency in this country. It may have stopped us from going wildly 
overboard with Vatican II, but we were really rather stick in the mud before 
Vatican II, now we're rather stick in the mud after Vatican II, in terms of moving 
on to where other countries are now. It does seem to be characteristic -  the two 
opposites of stick in the mud: one wouldn't allow dialogue Masses, because we 
didn't do that sort of thing in England, the other is still stuck with folk Masses in 
the seventies. There is a need, if you're going to be the same diocese for ten, 
fifteen, twenty or thirty years, you're going to suffer the problem of sameness of 
ten years: how do you revivify?”
Vatican II may also have confused the way that Bishops now perceived 
themselves: doctrinally, Bishops are individually and personally accountable for 
the way they govern their diocese; their episcopal accountability is singular and 
personal, not collectively as a separate order. However, Vatican II seems to
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have blurred this belief; Priest (P240510) explains: “the fact that the episcopacy 
seems to be defined by Vatican II as a sacred order, how does that order 
establish its own identity? Or, are we still seeing Bishops as priests with 
jurisdiction? I think that is the way some Bishops saw themselves. It's the way 
that Tridentine Church -  if I may use such a phrase -  tended to look at it, not as 
a separate order, but as a priest with jurisdiction.”
The 2nd Vatican Council appears to have created a split between two 
generations, the “older men” who embraced and implemented the changes 
introduced by the Council, and the “younger men” who attribute the current 
decline in the Church to the careless mismanagement of the previous 
generation. If the older generation is perceived as 'liberal', the general reaction 
of the younger generation has been to become more 'traditional'. This split is 
accentuated by the apparent lack of communication between the two 
generations and the suspicion which one views the other. Priest (P020510) 
explains that: “there is a huge generation gap between the older men who went 
through Vatican II, and younger men who tend to be more conservative, more 
traditional. If there is a generation gap, I think it is always the responsibility of 
the older and more experienced generation to establish the communication. No 
communication has been established. Their perception is: “why are all these 
odd, young people coming out conservative? They're not like us.” But, from the 
young’s point of view, all they see is the older generation wrecked everything. 
And did its own thing.”
When asked whether the Bishops were aware of this dichotomy, Priest
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(P020510) answered: “No, not really. They are aware of it in epistemological 
terms, they know the younger men. But then, it’s not the men coming out of the 
seminary that is the concern; it is the men going into the seminary, the men 
applying. It is not the fault of the selection system, or the training system. It 
simply is, these days, people who are prepared to devote their lives to the 
sacrifice of the priesthood, tend to have had to make hard choices, from quite 
an early age, and are therefore more likely to want structure, to want order, in a 
way that was different for the older generation.” He said that the “Bishops need 
to know this: what is the case is that we have this phenomenon that the younger 
generation are more conservative. The sixties generation of politics seems to 
have transmitted in this country, its values quite efficiently to the next 
generation. This has not happened in the Church. It is very significant that it 
hasn't, sociologically.”
Priest (P0200510) explained that: “the older generation went through Vatican II 
under a much, much, more authoritarian formation: homes were stricter, 
schools were stricter, there was military service, all of that. They just felt sat 
upon. They were a very strong generation, and so they simply threw it all aside, 
burnt it all, destroyed it. And decided to recreate things in their own image.
“Let's do what we want for a change.” What Vatican II said, and what Vatican II 
was in terms of experience in the Church, are two very different things.” Priest 
(P020510) provided an anthropological snapshot of the sociological situation at 
the time: “But once these changes took place, society changed after Vatican II, 
radically, and the number of Catholics in Europe radically reduced. You now get 
a situation -  if I remember Timothy's [Radcliffe] article correctly, where a lot of
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people who want to become priests, are from broken homes, they are not from 
good Catholic families anymore. They are usually older or they won't be 
accepted. They're used to have to make decisions in an essentially very free -  
not even a free society -  where you're expected to be sexually active -  they 
have to make certain decisions, or repent of them, in their teens and twenties 
before they think about becoming a priest. And so they tend to be in need of 
structure, to be in need of all the things like that, and all the pattern of life, they 
haven't had. And so they want these things and the older generation can't see 
why. That is a valuable analysis I think because it’s fairly value-free, and we 
should start with what's there before we decide what shouldn't be there.”
If the question were asked: “what have the Bishops done to arrest the decline in 
episcopal performance”, Priest's (P020510) answer may be summarised as:
“not much.” He says: “I don't think this question is sufficiently debated. It may be 
that the Bishops have talked about it in private, but there hasn't been a national 
debate about that. It's another disconnect. It is a generational disconnect. It 
would be good if it were looked at because in my own subject of [name of 
discipline], I see right here -  all the old manuals, and all the old spiritual books, 
that were -  in most cases -  greatly superseded, being dug out again and put on 
the internet, by the younger tradies [traditionalists] in the United States, of 
course they are internet savvy. As if nothing has changed, as if they wanted to 
cut a chunk of the Church's history out.”
Vatican II has spawned a younger generation, now characterised as 
'traditionalists'; they appear keen to disavow the 'mistakes' made by the
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previous generation. The apparent desire to move back into the past is further 
elucidated by Priest (P070510): “If you spot the new seminarians, you'll never 
see them out of the collar. They've got a new identity. Whatever it is that 
happened at Vatican II, they made a complete cut-off from the past. I don't know 
how that happened, I don't know what took place, but there became a mind-set 
in the Church which was: if you don't throw out your Latin vestments, throw out 
the Latin hymn-books, put in a wooden side-table, face the people, use English 
as much as possible, and open your presbytery doors to everybody, to all 
comers, and say, “Welcome, welcome, welcome,”, and get liberal and lax about 
things -  if you don't do that, then you are resisting the Holy Spirit. And I think 
they've got a concept of the 2nd Vatican Council which is NOT the concept of 
the 2nd Vatican Council. They took on this idea that if I say in English, facing 
the people, and I turn a blind eye, then I am fulfilling the Council. And there was 
a spirit at the time of that -  of people reading into the Council what they wanted 
to do.”
Identifying himself with the new generation, Priest (P070510) explains how he 
and his contemporaries perceived the older generation and how the new order 
was ideologically different from the old. His explanation is insightful because it 
captures the complexity, the nuances, and the angst experienced by both 
generations; it demonstrates the pervasive uncertainty which Vatican II seems 
to have introduced into the daily lives of Catholic everywhere: “Here is a load of 
people, who are the children of the council -  these newer priests, my generation 
-w e  are the children of the 2nd Vatican Council. Actually, I have read the 
documents and it says the people should know Latin. The altar should be
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positioned so that Mass could be celebrated facing the people; it never said that 
we've got [to do this] in our Churches. It never actually said that, and yet we're 
being told, by the people that is what it is.”
Priest (P070510) feels that the previous generation who implemented Vatican II 
were blameworthy: “what we've ended up with is a Church where the reception 
of the sacraments, lapsation of people, number of vocation is very evident. And 
here we are, at a stage where I always want to say: if they bother to look hard, 
these reformers of the 2nd Vatican Council -  I'm thinking about our Episcopal 
Vicar for Finance was -  in their late 60s kind of priests -  they were -  sort of -  at 
seminary at the time of the Council, so everything changed, so they went in 
expecting one thing, and came out something else, they fully embraced it, off 
they went. Of that generation, they need to look behind and spot: there are no 
vocations. People don't go to Church. They don't get married in Church. They 
don't receive the sacraments, they don't get confirmed, the kids in school aren't 
interested in religion. And yet we are paying for these Catholic Schools.
Because if you look at the facts and the figures, this 'crisis' is caused by the - 
exactly the - people who are running the Church now. They are the people who 
ran the shop at that time. And then they're surprised! And we are seeing the 
results of it! And yet these are still the people -  it's a bit like having the boss of 
UBS still working at UBS after they've lost all the money, do you see what I 
mean? They can do no wrong. It's always sunny. Even in a crisis, “oh, it’s the 
young people today, who are not listening to the word of God.” Not: we've made 
a mistake!”
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A scholarly analysis of Vatican II and its impact on the life of the Catholic 
Church in the twentieth century is given by Amerio (1996). Amerio (1996) 
concludes that Vatican II failed to achieve its original objectives and that the 
consequent outcome that Council may be regarded as “paradoxical”; this is 
because Pope John had made clear, via the Roman synod held in preparation 
for the 2nd Vatican Council, that he wanted the Church to maintain traditional 
principles “at every level of ecclesial life” (Amerio 1992:55). Although this was 
nothing new or novel in terms of accepted practice then, the Pope's synod 
“prescribed for the clergy a whole style of behavior quite distinct from that of 
laymen. That style demands ecclesiastical dress, sobriety in diet, the avoiding 
of public entertainments and a flight from profane things. The distinct character 
of the clergy's cultural formation was also reaffirmed, and the outlines were 
given of the system which the Pope solemnly sanctioned the year after in 
Veterum Sapienta. The Pope also ordered that the Catechism of the Council of 
Trent should be republished, but the order was ignored.”
With regards to the sacred liturgy, the synod “solemnly” confirmed “the use of 
Latin”; also, it stated that “all attempts at creativity on the part of the celebrant, 
which should reduce the liturgical action of the Church to the level of a simple 
exercise of private piety, are condemned.” Given current liturgical practices, it is 
interesting to note that the synod then reaffirmed the “need to baptize infants as 
soon as possible,” “a tabernacle in the traditional form and position is 
prescribed, Gregorian Chant is ordered, newly composed popular songs are 
submitted to the approval of the bishop, all appearance of worldliness is 
forbidden in churches by a general prohibition of such things as the giving of
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concerts and performances,” amongst other things (Amerio 1996:55). However, 
as the experiences of our interviewees confirm, “this massive reaffirmation of 
the traditional discipline, which the synod wanted, was contradicted and 
negated in almost every detail by the effects of the council” (Amerio 1996:56).
7.7.4 Hope
Though the outlook for the Catholic Church appears bleak, one Bishop has 
spoken lately about the need to address the challenges facing the Church today 
(McLeod 2008); the challenges referred to by the Bishop are similar to the ‘key 
issues’ featured in our research findings. Bishop O'Donoghue's vision and plan 
for action, contained in a series of documents, were “enthusiastically” received 
by “Catholics all over the U.K. and beyond”; however, McLeod (2008:1) 
continues, “there has been no support, so far, from any of Bishop O'Donoghue's 
brother bishops.” Brown (2009) reports that the Bishop retired on May 1st, 2009 
but the documents written by his Excellency “had started a national debate 
about Catholic life and had come to the attention of politicians so that he was 
called to give evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Children, Schools and Families in March 2008 which was concerned that the 
bishop was promoting a type of ‘fundamentalism’” (Brown 2009:25). During the 
hearing, Bishop O’Donoghue “was questioned aggressively by Barry 
Sheerman”, the chairman of the Select Committee (Chamberlain 2011). The 
chairman is quoted as saying “that faith education works all right as long as 
people are not that serious about their faith. But as soon as there is a more 
doctrinaire attitude questions have to be asked” (Caldwell 2008)
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7.8 Conclusion
Our first research question (RQ1) examines how Bishops utilize the existing 
ecclesiastical mechanisms of corporate governance effectively in the 
management of their diocese. As has been disclosed, the Bishop's diocesan 
curia is the primary ecclesial means of corporate governance. Under Canon 
Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) the 'episcopal council', also known as the 
'Bishop's Council' is an optional body which the Bishop may use at his own 
discretion. The Presbyteral Council and the College of Consultors, two offices 
mandated by Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983), are designed to be an 
integral part of the bishop's ministry. Our findings indicate that the Bishop's 
Council is the preferred office through which he manages his diocese. The 
College of Consultors and the Presbyteral Council appear to be ineffective and 
superfluous.
Also notable is the growing influence of civil law on ecclesiastical governance: 
legislation has the apparent ability to moderate the Bishop's authority and to 
supersede the way he manages his Church. Civil law is also a source of conflict 
in terms of its ability to impose requirements that are at odds with the Church's 
teachings on morality, for example: sex education, abortion, and euthanasia. 
Another theme which is relevant to good corporate governance is the 
appointment of Bishops. Given the critical role of his position and the absolute 
power which is invested in his office, the recruitment and selection of the Bishop 
is another important theme identified in our findings. The current recruitment 
and selection process could be construed as vague, thus suggesting a lack of 
transparency.
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With regards to the Bishop's responsibility to teach (RQ2a), the key issues 
appear to be the inadequate promotion of the sacrament of marriage; the same 
impression is expressed about teaching the faith. Both these issues relate to 
catechesis. A recurring theme expressed by the clergy is the apparent lack of 
leadership on the part of the Bishops on this matter. The key issues highlighted 
by the presbyters convey the impression that Bishops may not be aware of 
liturgical abuses which may be occurring (RQ2b). The sacrament of penance 
appears to be neglected in terms of its reception by the laity; this suggests that 
the formation of conscience may be possibly defective or absent. Whilst the 
mind of the Church is to allow the Missale Romanum 1962 to be celebrated 
freely, it is difficult to assess whether this is being achieved.
RQ(2c) examines how Bishops ensure corporate governance compliance in 
terms of their obligation to govern their diocese. Our findings suggest that the 
perceptions held by the Bishops are not necessarily similar to that of their 
presbyters: the themes expressed by the presbyters do not seem to feature at 
all in the Bishops' discourse. The Bishops do not appear to have identified any 
key issues which corroborate with those expressed by their presbyters. An 
emerging theme which merits further consideration concerns the relationship 
between the Bishop and his presbyters. This relationship appears to be distant 
and may be perceived as estranged. The expectations of the two parties appear 
to be disparate: Bishops convey the impression that they manage by exception, 
treating their priests as independent franchisees. There are priests who seem to 
appreciate being left alone, but for reasons which do not necessarily reflect well
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on their Bishops. Similarly, there are those who appear to prefer a Bishop who 
is directive, supportive and active.
Finally, our analysis of the performance figures for the third research question 
(RQ3) indicates a contraction in the reception of the sacraments. Given the 
overall long-term downward trends, it may be reasonable to assume that the 
Catholic faith is no longer central to the lives of the laity. The next chapter 
discusses these themes in greater detail.
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
RESEARCH FINDINGS
8.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses in greater detail the main themes that were identified in 
the previous chapter; it highlights the practical and theoretical implications of 
our research findings. Within the Church it appears that the Church's corporate 
governance framework is analogous to the principles-led model characterized 
by the Combined Code (2008). However, there may be ineffective use of the 
Council of Priests and the College of Consultors; we consider structural 
changes that could improve performance. We explore possible future 
challenges to the relationship between Church and civil authorities with 
implications for the present management structure and requirements for 
Accountability, Transparency and Disclosure.
Given the unique and pivotal role of Bishops we question the present processes 
for their recruitment and selection. Although there appears to be a sub-optimal 
relationship between the Bishop and his presbyters we demonstrate a 
significant amount of practical advice and guidelines already in existence to 
help them in their ministry. We discuss the implications for training and 
education in management and leadership, but note the paucity of accurate 
statistical data to gauge performance.
We discuss the similarities between the purpose of the Bishop's diocesan curia
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and that of the Combined Code. Our analysis suggests that existing corporate 
governance theories may not be effective in mitigating future scandals, with a 
need for new models that promote the virtues, emphasise good behaviour, and 
focus on individual, personal responsibility. Personal individual accountability is 
a concept practised within the Catholic Church and epitomised by the diocesan 
Bishop. We suggest that the Church could provide an ecclesiastical dimension 
to this new generation of corporate governance. Finally, we discuss how good 
corporate governance is indeed applicable and integral to Church management, 
however different it may appear.
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8.2 The Diocesan Curia: Comply or Explain
Our findings suggest that accountability, transparency and disclosure (ATD) are 
not obvious features of the diocesan curia. In chapter 3 of our literature review, 
Wuerl (2004), a bishop himself, informs a sceptical audience that the 
mechanisms of accountability and transparency in the Catholic Church already 
exist, in the form of the Bishop's diocesan curia. Wuerl (2004) is correct in his 
assertion that mechanisms already exist. However, it is not difficult to 
understand why Wuerl's (2004) sceptics are reluctant to accept his asseveration 
about accountability and transparency; their reservations may not be entirely 
groundless (Steinfels 2004:27), given our empirical findings and our 
understanding of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983). There are no 
provisions in Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) which formally require 
a Bishop to demonstrate ATD to any of his constituents (Arrieta 2000; Canon 
391; Canon 473 §4). It seems likely that other members of the episcopacy do 
not share Wuerl's (2004) concept of ATD.
Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) specifically mentions the College of
Consultors and the Presbyteral Council, implying that these are the principle
offices of the diocesan curia through which Bishops exercise their office.
However, our findings suggest that the Bishop's Council is commonly the
primary office through which they manage diocesan affairs, not the College of
Consultors or the Presbyteral Council as would be reasonably expected. Canon
Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) gives diocesan Bishops the discretion to
promulgate offices other than those provided for in Church legislation, if they
are appropriate to local ministerial requirements. The Bishop's discretionary
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powers leads us to infer that the Church's corporate governance framework is 
analogous to the principles-led model characterized by the Combined Code 
(Financial Reporting Council 2008).
Discussed in chapter 2, the Combined Code offers companies the option to 
adopt some or all of the principles specified within its provisions, according to 
the company's local or individual circumstances. Though companies are not 
forced to comply with all of the principles, they are required to explain clearly 
the reasons for their refusal to adopt those provisions which may be deemed 
relevant by their peers and by the regulatory authorities (Financial Reporting 
Council 2008:1). Though the Combined Code adroitly avoids being perceived in 
any way as being prescriptive, we noted how it frequently refers to - and relies 
extensively on, the rules and legislation of other bodies, such as the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) and the London Stock Exchange.
It can be argued that the Code of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983), 
particularly the Canons which relate to the Bishop's tria-munera and his 
diocesan curia, resembles the Combined Code in that it permits the Bishop to 
adapt the curia to his local requirements; it is also brief and comparatively 
vague. However, detailed practical advice concerning how the Bishop complies 
with his obligation to teach, sanctify and govern is contained elsewhere, for 
example: in the manual Directory for the Pastoral Ministry of Bishops (also 
known as Apostolorum Successores (Congregation for Bishops 2004)).
Detailed guidelines and instructions are also given in the Bishop's handbook: 
“The Bishop, Servant of the Gospel of Jesus Christ for the Hope of the World”,
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(also known as Pastores Gregis (Pope John Paul II 2003); these documents, 
and their significance, were discussed in chapter 3.
As with the Combined Code, Canon Law could possibly consider the inclusion 
of formal references to the Bishop's handbook (Pope John Paul II 2003) and 
manual (Congregation for Bishops 2004) as the standard by which 
ecclesiastical corporate governance may be applied and evaluated. In addition, 
it could also consider the adoption of the Directory for the Life and Ministry of 
Priests (Congregation for the Clergy 1994). This is because, as discussed in 
chapter 3, the Bishop is specifically asked in his Quinquennial Report to report 
his clergy's attitude towards the Directory for the Life and Ministry of Priests. 
This Directory is the handbook for Priests; it is addressed to all members of the 
clergy “through the Bishops,” and is meant to “be a help for every priest in 
deepening his identity and in growing in his spirituality; an encouragement in the 
ministry and permanent formation” (Congregation for the Clergy 1994:2). The 
Directory for the Life and Ministry of Priests should prove relevant and useful to 
both the Bishop and Priest as amongst other things, it discusses in great detail 
the clergy's role in the Bishop's ministry.
Ecclesiastical managers may also wish to consider the inclusion of a provision 
in Canon Law or in the Quinquennial Report, which requires the episcopate to 
either “comply or explain” their acceptance and implementation of the guidelines 
contained in the documents mentioned above. Initially, this modest initiative 
may help promote disclosure and a certain amount of transparency within the 
hierarchy; incrementally, it may be possible for stakeholders such as the clergy,
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laity, episcopal peers and critics, to compare and to evaluate what diocesan 
bishops choose to report. This could, over time, lead to a wider acceptance of 
ATD and possibly result in improved ecclesiastical performance.
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8.3 The College of Consultors and the Presbyteral 
Council
Findings indicate that the College and the Council may not be held in high 
regard by the presbyterate; both offices do not seem to possess any effective 
power and appear to be inadequately utilized by the Bishops. The lack of 
experience in engaging advisory bodies could be a possible reason for their 
apparent under-utilisation; in our literature review, Reese (2004:148), suggests 
that “Bishops who wanted to use these bodies did not quite know how. Few 
priests or Bishops had the experience or the training to work with consultative 
bodies. Either the Bishops tightly controlled the agenda and therefore 
suppressed initiative and free discussion, or they failed to provide leadership 
and the bodies floundered. Few were willing to do the homework and the 
committee work necessary to make consultative bodies work.”
The comments made by our respondents convey the impression that Bishops 
regard the two offices as possible encumbrances. However, it is reasonable to 
ask whether, in its existing form, the College and the Council contribute to the 
Bishop's effective management of his diocese? The role of the College of 
Consultors is vague; canon 502 of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) 
simply states: “to which belongs the functions determined by law.” Canon 495 
merely states that the Council of Priests is “a senate of the Bishop and which 
assists the Bishop in the governance of the diocese” (Roman Catholic Church 
1983); no further elaboration, process, or guidance is given about the roles of 
these two offices, except that they are consultative bodies and that the Bishop 
is not bound to abide by their counsel.
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Our deliberations above imply that there may be a certain amount of 
redundancy in the diocesan curia and that the offices of the College of 
Consultors and the Council of Priests could possibly be merged; for example, 
the College could be subsumed by the Council; the merger would help eliminate 
slack and serve to consolidate the consultative role of the Council of Priests.
The efficacy of the Council of Priests could be further enhanced if greater clarity 
were provided by Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) regarding the 
functions which it should undertake and the responsibilities which fall within the 
Council's purview. Additional sections and suggestions could also be added to 
Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) to explain in greater detail what is 
meant by “a senate of the Bishop and which assists the Bishop in the 
governance of the diocese” (Canon 495).
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8.4 Church Law and Civil Law: the Issue of Intrusion 
and Control
Our findings suggest that civil law is capable of taking precedence over Canon 
Law; it seems to be able to dictate how the Bishop organises the offices of his 
diocesan curia. In one of the examples given by our respondents, we were 
informed that the diocese's assets are vested in legal trusts; unlike under Canon 
Law, the Bishop is consequently required by the Charities Commission 
(Spencer 2010:3) to demonstrate accountability, transparency and disclosure 
(ATD). There is a raft of legislation with which the Bishop is required to 
demonstrate compliance, for example: the Health and Safety Act (1974) and the 
requirements of the Health & Safety Executive. In the area of employment, we 
learned that the clerical status of Priests, hitherto respected and accepted, is 
being increasingly challenged: is the Priest an employee, a self-employed 
professional, or an 'office holder'?
Through legislation, civil law is a potential source of conflict in terms of its ability 
to impose requirements that are at odds with the Church's teachings on 
morality, for example: sex education, abortion, and euthanasia. The situation is 
confirmed and summarised in the comments made by Bishop (BA290410), who 
acknowledged that such conflicts are indeed a reality when he described 
abortion and euthanasia as examples where Church and government disagree; 
another example referred to by Bishop (BA290410) was the “sex education bill” 
which requires schools to provide sex and relationships education to young 
pupils. Bishop (BA290410) even acknowledged that “it is not a very happy 
relationship.” Hence it appears that, through legislation, the State is able to
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supersede or to undermine the Church's moral position and authority.
We recall the admonishment expressed earlier by Cafardi (2004:12); he warns 
that if the Bishops refuse “to recognize accountability in the exercise of their 
authority [...] civil society will find ways to make them accountable, either in civil 
trials for damages or in criminal prosecutions.” The intrusive nature of civil law 
may be regarded as attempts by the government to make the Church more 
'accountable'. The Catholic Church in the UK may be aware of parallel attempts 
elsewhere to make the Church 'accountable'. For example, in 2009, the State of 
Connecticut attempted to make the Catholic Church 'accountable' by 
introducing ‘Bill 1098: An Act Modifying Corporate Laws Relating to Certain 
Religious Orders’, (General Assembly of the State of Connecticut 2009). The 
“Roman Catholic Church” was the only 'religious order' specifically named in the 
Bill. The Bill legislated for the introduction of a board of directors -  similar to that 
of business corporations -  which would supersede the Bishop's diocesan curia. 
The members of the board -  of which there would be no less than seven and no 
more than thirteen - would comprise members of the laity, elected by the 
congregation. Significantly, the Bishop himself would be an “ex-officio” member, 
without any voting rights. The stated purpose of the Bill was: to change “the 
corporate governance provisions applicable to the Roman Catholic Church”, in 
order to make it easier for regulators to look into any misdemeanours 
perpetrated by that institution (General Assembly of the State of Connecticut 
2009:4).
Bill 1098 acknowledged the distinction between the “administrative and
264
financial” aspects of the Bishop's obligations, and his “duty or responsibility” for 
“religious tenets and practices.” The Bill proposed that the administrative and 
financial aspects of the Bishop's management be placed under the direct control 
of the Board of Directors; matters of religious tenets and practices were to 
remain under the Bishop's jurisdiction. The Bill is reminiscent of Cafardi's 
(2004:12) warning to the Bishops that “larger civil society will find ways to make 
them accountable.” Though the Bill failed, it may be viewed as an example of 
the way that civil law could be used to enforce ATD within the Church. This 
implies the need for Church managers to evaluate whether the Church's 
communication channels and her relationship with government and society 
could be further improved. The same could possibly apply to the Church's 
relationship with “larger civil society” (Cafardi 2004:12).
Had the Bill succeeded in becoming law, the ramifications on the character and 
structure of the US Catholic Church would have been seismic, given our 
understanding of Church law. One possible outcome would have been the 
privatisation of the Bishop's ministry, changing it from that of caring for a 
diocese through a diocesan curia, to one which involved managing a religious 
organisation through a board of directors, stripped of the authority which was 
customarily his; this implies that decisions would be decided by democratically 
elected board members - the laity, who possess voting rights. Arguably, it could 
be also be possible, eventually, for those who drafted Bill 1098 to introduce 
further legislation which could 'nationalise' the whole Catholic Church in the 
USA. Though 'privatisation' and 'nationalisation' now appear remote, such a 
situation is not untenable if efforts are made continually to introduce pieces of
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legislation which serve to diminish the institutional Church.
The apparent attempts to introduce legislation which effectively supersedes 
Church teaching may be reflective of an attitude which the United Kingdom 
government holds towards the Catholic Church. For example, in a recent report 
by the Telegraph (Bingham & Ross 2012), Catholics were told that they had to 
“choose between their religion and obeying the law when their beliefs conflict 
with the will of the state." This “conflict” is suitably illustrated by the case of the 
Catholic adoption agencies, referred to by some of our respondents (P290410; 
PB170510). The UK government legislated that homosexual couples be allowed 
to adopt children from Catholic adoptions agencies; when the Church appealed 
on religious grounds, the High Court refused to grant the Church exemption, 
thus forcing the closure of all Catholic adoption agencies in England.
It is possible that a higher degree of ATD may go some way to mitigate the 
growing attempts by the state to regulate. In our literature review, the findings 
by Bauwhede and Willekens (2008) support the argument that companies 
disclose more corporate governance information in order to reduce information 
asymmetry and to reduce agency costs; disclosure is also made in order to 
improve the level of trust between the company and stakeholders. Any 
demonstrable efforts at ATD by Church managers may go some way to re­
establish the episcopate's credibility within and without the Church. However, it 
is difficult to predict whether a perceived increase of the Bishops' ATD will 
mitigate the continued rise of civil intrusion.
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8.5 The Recruitment and Selection of Bishops
Given the unique and pivotal role that Bishops exercise, the Church's 
operational effectiveness, efficiency, and the successful achievement of her 
objectives are very much dependent on the Priest who is ordained to the 
episcopacy. The existing recruitment and selection process of Bishops appears 
somewhat obscure even to the clergy themselves. Respondents who discussed 
this matter seemed unable to identify or describe the actual process by which 
candidates for the episcopacy are selected. It was mentioned that the Papal 
Nuncio had a list of candidates who were nominated by the current Bishops; 
this list was forwarded to Rome by the Nuncio. The absence of a selection 
process which is transparent could possibly render the hierarchy open to 
accusations that the Nuncio gives the existing cohort of Bishops “more of the 
same”, and that “new blood doesn't come in”; the current selection process may 
therefore be regarded by the clergy as “self-perpetuating” and one which “lacks 
transparency” (Priest P300410).
Good corporate governance suggests that the selection process of key officers
should be transparent and fully disclosed. In our literature review, Reese
(2004:149) asked: how possible would it be to “return to the ancient custom for
the selection of Bishops that was articulated by Leo I (440 -  461) who said that
no one could be a Bishop unless he was elected by the clergy, accepted by the
people, and consecrated by the Bishops of his region?”. Reese (2004:149)
asserts that the exclusive right of popes to appoint Bishops is a relatively new
development which “has no basis in church tradition.” Heft (2004:130) too asks
whether it would be possible to return to the old tradition when Bishops were
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elected locally, “without any formal intervention on the part of the pope.” Heft 
(2004:130) wants the principle of “subsidiarity” - first enunciated by Pope Pius 
XI - to be applied within the Church itself, at the diocesan level where the laity 
and the clergy will “have a say in who should be their bishop.” This ideology 
could also filter down to the parish level where the laity will have a say “in the 
appointment of their local pastor.”
The concerns expressed by our respondents suggest that there are others 
factors beyond the recruitment and selection process itself which need to be 
given consideration. These factors imply fundamental and long term 
considerations; for example, Church managers may wish to determine whether 
it is desirable to develop a pool of suitably qualified candidates for the 
episcopate; candidates should possess the leadership traits and management 
skills which enable them to develop positive relationships with their 
presbyterate. This implies an evaluation of the characteristics and personality 
traits which future episcopal leaders should possess; from a human resource 
management perspective, this evaluation could form the basis of a 'person 
specification'. A determination of the environmental factors affecting episcopal 
function, as well as consideration of the key factors in successful performance 
of their role, appears timely.
The characteristics and the leadership qualities required of a bishop are 
indicated in the Bishop's manual Apostolorum Successores ( Congregation for 
Bishops 2004) and in the Bishop's handbook Pastores Gregis (Pope John Paul 
II 2003). The documents suggest that the presbyterate and the laity desire a
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Bishop who cares “as a father and brother who loves them, listens to them, 
welcomes them, corrects them, supports them, seeks their cooperation and, as 
much as possible, is concerned for their human, spiritual, ministerial and 
financial well-being” (Pope John Paul II 2003:40); the Bishop is expected to lead 
by example and must possess “a moral authority” which is “bestowed by his life 
of holiness” (Congregation for Bishops 2004:83). Further characteristics and 
the qualities of a successful Bishop are also provided in both documents.
Church managers may consider a recruitment and selection policy which 
includes talent development, retention, and succession planning.
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8.6 The Relationship between the Bishop and His 
Presbyters in the Light of Existing Performance and 
Leadership
The apparently poor relationship between the Bishop and his presbyterate is a 
key finding because many of the issues raised by the presbyterate appear to 
arise from the fragile bond between the two parties; the relationship appears to 
be characterised by a lack of meaningful interaction or substantive dialogue 
between the two parties. In addition to the differences in how both groups 
recognise key issues, there also seems to be a perceived gap in how each 
views the other; the views expressed convey the impression that Bishops 
regard their presbyterate as independent, self-sufficient franchisees who are 
expected to operate autonomously. Bishops appear to be reluctant to interfere 
generally; this reluctance may contribute to the impression among the clergy 
that there is an absence of any direction from their episcopal leaders, the 
relationship between both parties could be conjectured as one of 'mutual 
tolerance'.
Our findings suggests that 'fear' could possibly be another feature which 
characterises the relationship between Bishop and presbyterate; this is because 
Bishops appear reluctant to adopt a more directive approach or more pro-active 
stance, for example: by exhorting their priests to be more obedient and 
encouraging them to participate in continuing formation. One possible reason 
for this could be that Bishops fear their presbyterate will take umbrage and 
thereby withhold cooperation, or that the offended presbyter may even leave the 
priesthood. Our findings convey the impression that there are priests who view
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their Bishop as ‘absentee-landlords’; they fear that any intervention or 
interference by their Bishop could possibly curtail their independence. Other 
priests appear to express doubts about the orthodoxy of their Bishops and fear 
being ostracised if they are seen to be more outspoken about the Catholic faith 
or perceived to be more orthodox than the Bishop himself.
The perceived lack of communication could possibly help explain why the key 
issues raised by Priests do not seem to feature at all in the Bishops' responses. 
Key issues raised by the presbyterate include: the reduction in the reception of 
the sacrament of marriage, the doctrinal suitability of teaching material 
sanctioned by Bishops for catechism in diocesan schools and churches, and the 
quality of catechesis taught by those appointed by the Bishop. These concerns 
could be viewed in terms of the performance figures analysed for the sacrament 
of marriage, for example; the overall trend for Catholic marriages is downwards, 
from 45,150 in 1958 to 10,924 in 2005: this represents a net decrease of over 
70% since 1958; in contrast, the Catholic population grew by over 19% during 
the same period from 3,489,732 in 1958, to 4,197,393 in 2005.
As noted in our review, catechesis is the Bishop's primary responsibility; 
catechesis involves teaching Catholics about the indispensability of the 
sacraments to their daily lives. For example, the Church teaches that on 
“Sundays and other holy days of obligation the faithful are bound to participate 
in the Mass” (Canon 1247). Without valid reasons, the failure to attend Sunday 
Mass places a Catholic in ‘a state of mortal sin’ (Roman Catholic Church 2000, 
527). According to the Catholic Church teaching, if mortal sin “is not redeemed
271
by repentance and God's forgiveness, it causes exclusion from Christ's kingdom 
and the eternal death of hell” (Roman Catholic Church 2000:456). The Church 
teaches that forgiveness is obtained through the sacrament of Confession, also 
known as “penance” or “reconciliation” (Canon 959; Roman Catholic Church 
2000:363). Our analysis for Sunday Mass attendance reveals a figure of 
1,899,803 in 1971. In 2005 - latest figures available, Sunday Mass attendance 
was 942,473. The figures imply that in 2005, over 78 percent of the Catholic 
population failed to fulfil their Sunday obligation.
Likewise, our analysis of the data for the sacrament of Confession (available 
from 1958 to 1971) indicates that the reception of this sacrament peaked in 
1963 (68,466), a rise of 13%, from 1958 (60,488); however, by 1971 it had 
fallen by over 34% to 57,596. Compared to 1958, the figure in 1971 represents 
a net reduction of over 4 percent. A similar pattern is seen with the rest of the 
other sacraments, namely: Baptism, First Holy Communion, and Confirmation; 
all figures suggest a downward trend though the Catholic population has been 
increasing over the same time period. Though Church managers may be able to 
cite other factors which will help to explain these figures, the results and the 
views expressed by the presbyterate imply that there may be some cause for 
concern.
The other issue raised by our respondents, almost all of them priests, is the 
high attrition rate of presbyters leaving their vocation; the perceived reduction 
appears to be corroborated by our analysis of the performance figures: the 
number of diocesan priests has been declining since 1958 (4,356). 2005
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(3,485) saw a reduction of over 20% in the number of diocesan priests since 
1958. The ratio of diocesan priests to Catholic population was 1:800 in 1958; in 
2005, the ratio was 1:1200. Clues for the downward trend may be found in the 
comments made by respondents; comments expressed include: feeling useless 
and demotivated; the lack of direction; feeling dis-empowered; the inordinate 
amount of administrative work experienced by the clergy; priests being made 
pseudo-social workers; the 'clericalization' of the laity and the 'laicization' of the 
clergy.
Further insights into the reducing number of priests may be gleaned from the 
doubts expressed by the respondents about what candidates for the priesthood 
are taught during their training and about the lack of continuing liturgical and 
spiritual formation. These findings imply that there may be potential problems 
associated with the recruitment and selection of candidates and possible issues 
with the discernment process during the formative years at the seminary. 
Pastores Gregis (Congregation for Bishops 2003:78) reminds us that the Bishop 
is directly responsible for the formation of his seminarians. This implies that it is 
the Bishop's responsibility to ensure the suitability of those teachers whom he 
has entrusted to train his candidates.
Bishops may wish to be more closely involved in the priestly formation of their 
presbyterate. Guidelines in Pastores Gregis (Congregation for Bishops 
2003:41) advise that the Bishop is required to visit the seminary frequently and 
develop a “genuine personal knowledge of the candidates.” Before the Bishop 
appoints a seminarian, he must make “careful inquiry”, engage in “ample
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consultation” and conduct the “necessary investigation.” This implies that it 
may be helpful to re-evaluate the current selection procedures and to 
reconsider whether existing policies are still fit for purpose; it may also be useful 
to determine whether there are mechanisms of ATD in place to ensure 
compliance. Finally, we recall the suggestion made by Priest (P290410), 
questioning whether his proposal regarding the seminary's physical location is 
indeed viable: “Bishops should be more closely involved in the priestly formation 
of their presbyterate, recalling that at the time of the Council of Trent, the 
training model was for the seminary to be located next to the Bishop's house.”
Apostolorum Successores (Pope John Paul II 2004:75) reminds the Bishop that 
his presbyterate are "the principal and irreplaceable co-workers of the order of 
Bishops," It must be remembered that the successful performance of the 
Bishop's pastoral ministry is dependent on the cooperation and the goodwill of 
his Priests. This implies that as the head of his organisation, the onus is on the 
Bishop to "take care to assist his priests in every way, so that they come to 
appreciate the sublime priestly vocation, live it with serenity and defend it with 
vigour, radiant with joy as they faithfully carry out their duties." In acknowledging 
the “special quality” of their relationship, Pastores Gregis (Pope John Paul II 
2003:40) exhorts Bishops to relate actively, and at all times, to their presbyters 
“as a father and brother who loves them, listens to them, welcomes them, 
corrects them, supports them, seeks their cooperation and, as much as 
possible, is concerned for their human, spiritual, ministerial and financial well­
being.” (Pope John Paul II 2003:123). However, the views expressed by the 
presbyterate suggest a level of dissatisfaction regarding the low level of contact
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they have with their Bishop. It also appears there are clergy members who 
prefer their Bishop to adopt a higher profile, in order to send a ‘clear signal’ to 
the clergy, laity and secular world regarding the Bishop's stand on many 
doctrinal issues.
The Bishop is to be a "father, brother and friend to his diocesan priest". 
Consequently, the Bishop is obliged to create “a climate of affection and trust 
such that his priests may respond with a convinced, pleasing and firm 
obedience” (Congregation for Bishops, 2004:75). Trust is certainly an essential 
element in any relationship. For a scholarly discussion on the concept of trust 
and its critical influence on goodwill, cooperation and efficiency, see Bachmann 
(2001); Môllering, Bachmann and Lee, (2004); Bachmann and Inkpen, (2011). 
Responses indicate that some priests fear being ostracised if they are seen to 
be more outspoken about the Catholic faith or perceived to be more orthodox 
than the Bishop himself.
The exhortations above suggest the desirability of a management style that is 
more interventionist, pro-active, demonstrative, and caring. The Bishop is meant 
to demonstrate genuine care for his priests by “accompanying them as a father 
and brother in the fundamental stages of their ministerial life, starting with their 
first steps in the pastoral ministry” (Pope John Paul II 2003:40). Given their 
leadership role Bishops are advised to lead by example (Congregation for 
Bishops 2004:31). Our findings convey the impression that the Bishop’s current 
leadership style may be perceived as ‘laissez-faire’. Sosik and Dionne 
(1997:454) describe the laissez faire style of management as the “most
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ineffective and passive"; this is “characterized by delays of action, absence and 
indifference.” This style of management rarely bodes well for organisational 
relationships and operational effectiveness (Bandiera ef a/2012). The insights 
gleaned from our findings suggest that a leadership style which is 
“transformational” (Burns 1978; Bass 1985) may be more appropriate to the 
existing situation.
Our discussions suggest that a significant amount of practical advice and 
guidelines already exists for Bishops to adopt in the course of their ministry. 
These good counsels extend to how the Bishop should relate to and perceive 
his presbyterate; they elucidate those factors which are critical to their 
Lordships' successful achievement of ‘saving souls’. Our findings imply that 
there may be merit in considering whether much more could be done by all 
members of the clergy and the episcopate to avail themselves of the advice and 
guidelines that already exist, perhaps through a greater emphasis on continuing 
priestly formation and devoting more time to reflective learning. These 
suggestions have implications for training and education, that is, continuing 
priestly formation which includes the disciplines of leadership and management.
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8.7 Ecclesiastical Research: Data Collection and 
Collation Capability
Data is an integral part of effective management, especially in term of effective 
decision-making and long term planning. However, findings suggest that the UK 
Catholic Church may not have a data collection apparatus which is 
comprehensive and accessible as befits an organisation of its size and stature. 
Spencer (2008) provides a critical review of the Church's record in acquiring 
and managing data. Spencer (2008:v) discloses that the Church has 
“impressive publications providing vast quantities of data, much of it of little 
relevance and almost all of it of questionable reliability.” This implies that it is 
arguably possible for the Church to consider the inauguration of a research 
body whose object includes the conduct of social scientific studies for effective 
decision-making and episcopal management. An example of such a research 
body is the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA), an affiliate of 
Georgetown University which is located in Washington DC, USA. Church 
managers may also wish to consider the possibility of building on the 
accomplished works of Spencer (2007).
8.8 Theoretical Implications
Our theoretical framework is based on the following suppositions: corporate 
governance is relevant and applicable to Catholic Church management 
(Chapter 1). The principles of corporate governance are the mechanisms of 
accountability, transparency and disclosure, compliance, and performance. The 
practice of good corporate governance results in positive performance (Chapter 
2). Performance does not have to be measured in purely financial terms, only. 
Within the context of a religious organisation such as the Catholic Church, 'good 
performance' can be defined in terms of the organisation's objectives, namely: 
the salvation of souls (Chapter 4).
Good performance also manifests itself in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. 
In the case of the Catholic Church, examples of efficiency and effectiveness 
could include a positive relationship which characterises the organisational 
culture, for instance: the relationship between the Bishop and his presbyterate; 
another practical example of efficiency and effectiveness would be the 
appropriate roles which are meant to be assumed by the presbyterate and the 
laity, respectively; finally, positive episcopal performance could also be framed 
in terms of the frequency of the reception of the sacraments by the laity.
Our examination of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) reveals that the
Church's corporate governance framework is different to that used and
understood by secular business organisations and regulatory authorities (see
Chapter 3). From a secular viewpoint, the Church's corporate governance
framework may appear to be 'flawed' and 'inadequate' for reasons of duality:
278
the Bishop has exclusive powers because he holds the equivalent positions of 
chief executive officer and chairman of the board. In addition, he is not 
accountable to any of his constituents. Though duality is frowned upon in the 
business world, in the Bishop's case, his position and authority arise from 
Church doctrine and ecclesiastical law; Church doctrine is a constraint accepted 
by this thesis, within which the research evolves. The outcome is an 
ecclesiastical model which has been developed within the parameters imposed 
by Church legislation, where the principles of corporate governance are 
adapted and made compatible with Catholic doctrine (Chapter 3).
Whilst one possible theoretical implication would be that corporate governance 
is applicable to a religious organisation such as the Catholic Church, it may be 
helpful to briefly reconsider the assumptions associated with a few of the 
theoretical frameworks mentioned in Chapter 2. Agency theory (AT), the 
dominant theory in corporate governance, focuses on the 'agents', also known 
as “top management of the corporation”, who manage the company on behalf of 
the owners, also known as 'principals'; one assumption states that “the agent 
will not always act in the best interest of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976:5). Eisanhart (1989:61) suggest three reasons for the agent's undesirable 
behaviour: “self-interest”, that is: the agent is prone to “managerial 
opportunism”; “moral hazard”, which “refers to lack of effort on the part of the 
agent”; and “adverse selection”, which means the “misrepresentation of ability” 
by the agent about the agent's own “skills or abilities”.
In transaction-cost economics (TCE), Williamson (1988:569) “expressly
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assumes that human agents are subject to bounded rationality and are given to 
opportunism.” Bounded rationality is defined as "intendedly rational, but only 
limitedly so” and “opportunism is self-interest seeking with guile.” As a result of 
the agent's behaviour, Williamson (1998:569) believes that the role of the 
“economic organization” is to “craft governance structures that economize on 
bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding the transactions in 
question against the hazards of opportunism.”
Both agency (AT) and transaction cost economics (TCE) theories assume that 
human beings in general, and agent-managers in particular, are defective and 
vice-ridden; their behaviour is: selfish (“self-interest”); greedy (“managerial 
opportunism”, “self-interest seeking with guile”); lazy (“lack of effort on the part 
of the agent”); liars (“misrepresentation of ability”); inconsistent, undependable, 
and unreliable ("intendedly rational, but only limitedly so”); this implies that 
managers are incapable of any self-control and devoid of any dignity. Hence the 
reason why it is necessary to “craft governance structures that economize on 
bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding the transactions in 
question against the hazards of opportunism.”
If managers are regarded as the personification of vice, it is hardly surprising 
that scandals continue unabated since the days of Enron; we have had the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for over ten years now, and all the corporate governance 
research papers that have been written since then. 'Bad' executive behaviour, 
identified by Walker (2009:19) and De Larosière (2009:6) in Chapter 1, also 
helps explains why 'good' corporate governance has been ineffective in
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preventing the recent global economic crisis. This implies that more rules, 
regulations and codes of good practice are unlikely to decrease the problems of 
bad behaviour. It is therefore notable that the current paradigm of corporate 
governance does not at all focus on the behaviour of the individual person - the 
manager. It is also notable that both theories do not seek to address these 
behavioural defects by promoting the qualities which are opposite to the vices 
mentioned by AT and TCE.
Opposing vices are qualities that include: consideration, generosity; integrity, 
diligence, consistency, dependability, reliability, moderation and honesty, 
amongst others. These qualities can be seen as derivatives of the cardinal 
virtues: justice, temperance, fortitude and wisdom (Roman Catholic Church 
2000:443). However, we find no evidence in our research to indicate that these 
human virtues and the desired behaviours are expressly encouraged, cultivated 
or promoted by governments, business and company boards; the same can be 
said of our review of legislations and codes of good practice, for instance: the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (One Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of 
America 2002) and the Combined Code (Financial Reporting Council 2008).
Our examination of corporate governance indicates that management is silent 
about what constitutes virtuous behaviour; it is also silent about the human 
virtues upon which such behaviour is founded and nurtured. This implies that 
there is a need to re-evaluate corporate governance from a more fundamental 
perspective; at the personal level of the individual. There is a need to examine 
the human virtues that manifest in good behaviour, as opposed to those vices
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inherent in the theoretical frameworks which underpin corporate governance, 
namely agency theory and transaction cost economics.
What then are 'human virtues'? The Catechism of the Catholic Church defines 
human virtues as “firm attitudes, stable dispositions, habitual perfections of 
intellect and will that govern our actions, order our passions, and guide our 
conduct according to reason and faith. They make possible ease, self-mastery, 
and joy in leading a morally good life. The virtuous man is he who freely 
practices the good.” At this juncture, it behoves us to ask: if human virtues are 
fundamental to good behaviour and to good corporate governance, why are 
they not an integral part of the corporate governance landscape?
Wieland (2005:76) argues that effective corporate governance is impossible 
“without integrating moral attitudes and requirements with behaviour.” Wieland 
(2005) reasons that it is the individual who matters in corporate governance, not 
so much the rules and regulations; this is because companies “such as 
Worldcom, Enron, and Arthur Anderson all had formally brilliant systems of 
corporate governance and compliance -  they just did not live according to 
those, especially top management” (Wieland 2005:76). For Wieland (2005:74), 
corporate governance is the question of how moral values can be translated 
into practice; the moral dimension and values must be practically integrated 
within economic transactions. Wieland (2005:75) notes that those who are 
involved in the practice of corporate governance have rarely “adopted a values 
orientation.” Wieland (2005) implies that people are generally ignorant about 
moral values.
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The absence in corporate governance of any reference to the individual's 
morality is not surprising, argues Orin (2008:146); this is because, at the basic 
level, morality is no longer taught “in any sort of systematic, formalised, or 
reliable way.” Orin (2008:146) states that in reality, “most people have 
received, or will receive, little to no formal education in ethics, but for the most 
elemental lessons of kindergarten.” Though many companies own and publish 
codes of conduct, Orin (2008:146) maintains that these Codes are inadequate 
because they “do not provide actual solutions to individual problems”; 
consequently, individual executives lack the wherewithal and are incapable of 
navigating the moral compass in a knowledgeable manner.
Similarly, Keen (2006) is of the view that in many companies, management’s 
understanding of moral virtues is very basic; executives would not be able to 
explain eloquently the relevance of justice and prudence to their company’s 
ethos. According to Keen (2006:9) company executives regard “moral guidance 
as unnecessary, even insulting.” Nevertheless, Keen (2006) argues that the 
virtues are inseparable to good corporate governance; for example: the virtue of 
justice “embodies the guiding principle determining regard and concern for 
others and is contingent on personal integrity, the subset of justice that properly 
directs deliberation and choice.” Justice “is closely linked to honesty, the 
operative virtue that gives reason for trust.” It is the virtue of prudence which 
gives executives "... the capacity to create vision and direction, encourage 
participation and inform the management of risk” (Keen, 2006:9).
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However, Keen (2006:10) argues that executives will be able to acquire the 
virtues “only by training and habituation; a process of discovery.” If executives 
are ignorant about virtues and about what constitutes virtuous behaviour, 
companies should provide these individuals with the requisite training in such 
matters. Keen (2006:10) maintains that the cost of such training and practice is 
worth the investment if this causes society to trust such a “virtuous” company. 
Keen (2010:10) argues for “an informed understanding of the role and function 
of the virtues as corporate resources.” Corporate Governance will become 
effective only when it contains “virtuous conduct” which the executive has 
“internalized” and nurtured into a habit (Keen 2006:10).
Likewise, Bainbridge (2003:6) espouses a corporate governance model which is 
grounded “in the tradition of virtue ethics.” Bainbridge (2003:6) maintains that 
virtue ethics “trains us to a moral life emphasizing the habitual private exercise 
of truthfulness, courage, justice, mercy, and the other virtues.” Bainbridge 
(2003:5) suggests another reason why the current brand of corporate 
governance is devoid of virtues: “As faith has eroded among our corporate 
elites, [...] the capitalists of our day lost this essential moral foundation and, 
with it, the instinct for honor that virtue inculcates.” Bainbridge (2003:5) criticizes 
principle-based ethics as being inadequate and equally flawed: “Principle ethics 
pose a double threat to ordered liberty: principle ethics displace not just private 
ordering of economic relationships, but also personal virtue”; Bainbridge argues 
this is because these “individuals are not allowed to define for themselves what 
constitutes trustworthy or honourable behaviour, but instead must comply” with 
guidelines made by those who are themselves not “virtuous” (Bainbridge
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2003:5).
The criticisms made above about the absence of “virtue ethics” (Bainbridge 
2003:5) in existing theoretical frameworks imply the need to re-evaluate some 
fundamental aspects of life which may be associated with the agent-manager in 
particular, and society in general. Is it the school's responsibility to inculcate and 
nurture good behaviour in the individual (Wieland 2005)? Should virtue ethics 
be part of the curriculum (Orin 2008)? Are companies obliged to train their 
executives in the virtues (Keen 2006)? Finally, it also needs be asked whether 
the society in which the agent-manager lives and works values the moral virtues 
(Bainbridge 2003; Macintyre 1985; Moore 2008). These are important 
philosophical considerations which fall outside the ambit of this thesis.
Our findings and discussions imply that there is the need for a new generation 
of corporate governance which focuses positively on the virtues and promotes 
good behaviour; these new-generation models of corporate governance should 
also focus on the personal responsibility of the individual. The implication 
resonates clearly with Brennan and Solomon (2010:897) who argue that 
corporate governance theoretical frameworks and board-based mechanisms of 
accountability should now evolve to include those which make the individual the 
object of accountability. Corporate governance models which promote virtuous 
behaviour should also find accord with Walker (2009:19) and De Larosière 
(2009:6): both blame the bad behaviour of company board members for the 
scandals which led to the recent global economic crisis. Our knowledge of 
ecclesiastical corporate governance indicates that personal individual
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accountability is a concept which is practiced within the Catholic Church and it 
is epitomised by the diocesan Bishop; as evidenced by Church law and the 
various ecclesiastical documents reviewed, the Church's concept of personal 
individual accountability is founded on the virtues which the Bishop is expected 
to practice and display in his behaviour towards the clergy and the laity. This 
implies that the Church could provide an ecclesiastical dimension to this new 
generation of corporate governance.
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8.9 Conclusion
This section concludes our discussions on the practical and theoretical 
implications of our findings and discussions. The Bishop's diocesan curia 
appears similar in several ways to the Combined Code (Financial Reporting 
Council 2008). Our findings suggest that certain aspects of the curia may be 
superfluous to requirements and that clarity would be helpful to episcopal 
management. Accordingly, Church managers may wish to consider how parts of 
the Combined Code could be adapted to augment the Church's model of 
corporate governance whilst still maintaining the Church's doctrinal authenticity. 
The existing relationship between Church and civil authorities suggest that 
Church managers may wish to consider whether the Church is communicating 
effectively with the government and the wider society in general. A 
communication strategy may be helpful. The recruitment and selection of 
Bishops connote long term and wide-ranging human resource implications in 
areas such as education, training, talent management and succession planning. 
The existence of a data collection agency may be helpful to Church managers 
in their decision-making and long term planning.
The Bishop's relationship with his presbyterate is a significant part of our 
findings; a positive relationship is critical to the successful achievement of the 
Bishop's pastoral ministry. Much is dependent on the goodwill and cooperation 
of his management team -  the presbyterate. The symbiotic relationship 
between the Bishop and his presbyters has been discussed in chapter 3. It may 
be argued that in any organisation, a less than optimal relationship could
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possibly have a negative effect on motivation and retention. It may therefore be 
opportune to review the amount of administrative work undertaken by the 
clergy. The delegation of administrative matters to qualified members of the laity 
may be desirable; their talent and disposition may seem more appropriate for 
administrative tasks. This change will allow the presbyters to achieve what they 
have been ordained to do. Bishops may themselves be similarly overburdened 
by administrative matters; an equivalent review may help improve long term 
efficiency and goodwill (Bandiera et a /2012).
It may be timely at this juncture to state that our thesis is cognizant of the 
importance of causal direction, as discussed in Chapter 2. Using the same 
justifications as Holm and Scholer (2010:33), we propose that causality is not 
the main focus of our thesis. This proposal is not unique and is consistent with 
“other studies" (Brown & Caylor 2004:32). We acknowledge the limitations 
imposed by endogeneity and the importance of causal inference (Udueni 
1994:70; Vafeas & Theodorou 1998:404; Tosi 2008:163). Though causality has 
not been established, this does not lessen the importance of good corporate 
governance or the relevance of our findings (Gilles & Morra 1997:4; Brown & 
Caylor 2004:32; Haspeslagh 2010:375; Donaldson & Davis 1991:59; Balgobin 
2008:11). Our findings confirm that good corporate governance is indeed 
applicable and integral to Church management. In public companies, corporate 
governance is a high-level management activity and the responsibility of board 
directors who are at the summit of the organisational pyramid (Udueni 1999:64); 
the same may be applied to the Catholic Bishops; stakeholders expect good 
corporate governance of the Church, especially since it is an advocate of good
288
management and stewardship; these stakeholders include the laity, the clergy, 
critics and regulatory authorities, amongst others.
Finally, our review of literature reveals an absence of any reference to the 
Church's own corporate governance framework - the diocesan curia, even by 
researchers of Church corporate governance (West & Zech 2006; Zech 2001; 
Timms 2001; AIM 1956). This implies that church critics and corporate 
governance scholars may not be aware that the Church has a corporate 
governance structure of its own, however different it may appear to be. It is 
conceivable that this widespread ignorance and the perceived absence of any 
concrete evidence of ecclesiastical ATD, contributes to the view held by critics 
that there is no “corporate governance” or “accountability” in the Catholic 
Church (Post 2003; Leadership Roundtable 2004; Oakey & Russett 2004; Gluck 
2003; Gluck 2004; Martin 2006; West & Zech, 2006; Elson et a /2007; Barth 
2010; Enofe & Amaria, 2011). It is hoped that this research helps correct the 
misperception.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS
9.1 Introduction
Our research problem was summarized in chapter 1 by this overarching 
question: What is the corporate governance model of the Catholic Church and 
how can it be appropriately applied to the Catholic Church in general, and to the 
Church in England, in particular? The objective of our research was to answer 
the following questions: Does the Church have a corporate governance 
framework of its own? How would it be described and how does it compare with 
the models of corporate governance commonly found in the secular world of 
business? How is it used to demonstrate compliance and how does it measure 
ecclesiastical performance? What, if any, empirical research has actually been 
undertaken on corporate governance in the Catholic Church?
Our findings indicate that the Catholic Church has a corporate governance 
framework of its own, though this fact may not be widely known, for reasons 
discussed in the previous chapter. The Church's corporate governance is 
different from that used by business and regulatory authorities; this may help 
explain why the Bishop's diocesan curia appears to be limited or 'defective' in 
the eyes of the secular world. Our ecclesiastical model of corporate governance 
addresses these perceived limitations and 'defects' by adapting those aspects 
of good practice, where appropriate, to the constraints imposed by the Church's 
own legislation; this is achieved without challenging Church teaching and being 
mindful of episcopal authority.
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9.2 Contribution of the Research
This research contributes to the theory and practice of corporate governance in 
several ways. First, it applies the theory and discipline of corporate governance 
to a global religious organisation: the Catholic Church. Thus far, the traditional 
realm of corporate governance research has been the boardrooms of 
commercial organisations and on the functional aspects of management, such 
as financial management (West & Zech 2006). Unlike previous church 
management research (AIM 1954; Timms 2001; Hornsby-Smith 2001; Zech 
2001), this research focuses specifically on the corporate governance aspect of 
Church management. Importantly, this research conceptualises 
corporate governance within the context of Catholic Church, in terms of the 
diocesan Bishop's personal accountability. Within this ecclesiastical model, the 
mechanisms of corporate governance and compliance are conceived in terms 
of the Church's own laws and doctrine, as embodied in the Code of Canon Law 
(Roman Catholic Church 1983).
Second, this research proves that it is possible to view the institutional Church 
through the managerial lens and that management principles are indeed 
relevant to the Catholic Church. The research also proves that corporate 
governance is necessary to good Church management. As demonstrated in 
previous chapters, the evaluation of Catholic Church organisation and 
performance - through the managerial lens is nothing new, for example: Timms 
(2001), Hornsby-Smith, (2001), Post (2003), West and Zech (2001), and Gluck 
(2003). For ecclesiastical evidence, this research refers to the source
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documents within the Catholic Church itself, namely: the Code of Canon Law 
(Roman Catholic Church 1983) and to the Form for the Quinquennial Report. 
The Code of Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) states that her 
administrators are “bound to fulfil their function with the diligence of a good 
householder” (Canon 1284, section 1).
The discovery of the Quinquennial Report, a significant finding, provides further 
evidence that the principles of management are applicable to the Church; the 
Report proves that accountability is required of the diocesan Bishop, albeit 
'upwardly', to the Vatican. The Form for the Quinquennial Report, another 
significant finding, provides considerable information about what is contained in 
the Bishop's Quinquennial Report. Findings confirm that statistical data is 
indeed an important part of the reporting requirements. Statistical indicators can 
therefore be used to measure ecclesiastical performance - since Rome applies 
these to her Bishops. The Form discloses that a Bishop is required to highlight 
the key issues and challenges which he faces in his capacity as the top 
executive of his diocese. According to the Form, Bishops are required to “not 
only describe any difficulties which might have arisen, but also their underlying 
causes and those means which have been employed [...] to resolve them, when 
presenting information concerning the actual pastoral situation of the diocese.”
In his Report the Bishop, in a manner similar to the CEOs of public companies, 
is required to disclose his pastoral plan, highlight the key priorities, and describe 
the “proposed means to attain them.”
Third, the research establishes a performance indicator which incorporates the
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primary objective of the Catholic Church and that of the diocesan Bishop's 
raison d’être, namely: the eternal salvation of souls. The Bishop's efficacy of his 
ministry may be evidenced by the laity's adherence to the tenets of their 
Catholic faith; adherence, in turn, is manifested by the laity's reception of the 
sacraments which are “necessary for salvation” (Canon 489). Though it is 
difficult to quantify the number of souls saved, this measure is approximated by 
the reception of the sacraments. The Bishop is required to include this statistic 
in his Quinquennial Report and to provide an in-depth evaluation for each 
sacrament; such a requirement provides another justification as to why the 
reception of the sacraments is a logical proxy for this performance indicator.
Fourth, this thesis contributes to the existing body of knowledge by building on 
the corporate governance research framework proposed by Brennan and 
Solomon (2008). This research broadens the frontiers of corporate governance 
research by building on the six dimensions suggested by Brennan and Solomon 
(2008:889), in the following ways: (1) our examination of the Bishop's personal 
accountability, based on ecclesiastical law, broadens the theoretical concept of 
accountability by focusing it at the 'individual' level; (2) the examination of the 
Canon Law (Roman Catholic Church 1983) and the Bishop's diocesan curia, for 
example - the College of Consultors and the Council of Priest as ecclesiastical 
mechanisms, broadens the range of corporate governance mechanisms; (3) the 
analytical method and approach used in our research promotes the use of 
qualitative, interpretive techniques, as opposed to the popular hypothetico- 
deductive methods; (4) the Catholic Church is in the non-profit, religious sector, 
with mechanisms of accountability which merit further research; (5) as a global
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institution, the Catholic Church certainly transcends the geographical borders, 
though the focus of our research is on the Catholic Church in England; (6) the 
Church's chronological age long precedes the advent of mercantile law.
Fifth, our research provides further insights into the limitations of the existing 
brand of corporate governance. The assumptions which underpin popular 
theoretical frameworks such as agency theory and transaction cost economics 
portray the human person negatively, in terms of the vices which presumably 
give rise to impropriety; however, no attempts are made by theorists, 
practitioners and regulators to promote the practice of the virtues. Company 
executives and board directors appear to be ignorant of the virtues; the moral 
virtues are not embraced by the wider society. Orin (2008:146) theorises that 
this is because morality is no longer taught “in any sort of systematic, 
formalised, or reliable way.” It appears necessary to conceptualise corporate 
governance in terms of the individual's personal accountability and for 
theoretical assumptions to be founded on the moral virtues. A 'virtuous' model 
of corporate governance could then be framed within the context of the wider 
environment in which the company operates: the whole of society.
Another assumption - implicit in the theoretical frameworks, which merits further 
discussion concerns the individual and collective roles of companies, 
governments, regulatory authorities, legislation and codes of conduct: are these 
capable of preventing or overcoming bad behaviour, wrong-doing, and 
scandals? Apparently not, if we take as evidence the recent global financial 
crisis, despite the lessons learnt since Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (One
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Hundred Seventh Congress of the United States of America 2002), the 
Combined Code (Financial Reporting Department 2008), and even Cadbury 
since 1992. Fundamentally, should these instruments, extrinsic to the individual, 
be the first line of defence against the vices? Further reflection also obliges us 
to question the purpose of the company in society. The same too may be asked 
about the role of government.
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9.3 Limitations of the Research
Though this research has succeeded in achieving its objectives, it is not without 
its limitations. The absence of any other ecclesiastical framework with which to 
compare our model of corporate governance presents one limitation. It is our 
hope that this ecclesiastical model be used in subsequent studies by other 
researchers or Church critics interested in the topic of Church corporate 
governance. The repeated application of the model may produce a body of 
knowledge which would eventually facilitate comparison and provide the basis 
of benchmarking. The repeated testing of our ecclesiastical model could lead to 
further insights and the refinement of the assumptions which underpin the 
existing theoretical framework.
Another limitation is the comparatively small sample size; the constraints 
experienced by this research are the result of restricted access and limited 
resources. It is only fair to ask whether our findings would be further confirmed if 
we were able to repeat our research on a statistically significant sample of the 
whole population. Our research appears to be the first of its kind about the topic 
of Church corporate governance. Though this is a limitation in its own right, our 
research methodology and approach could provide the basis for further 
research into Church corporate governance.
Finally, how can we be absolutely sure about the “casual direction” (Abdullah 
2007:68) between mechanisms, compliance, and performance? “Casual 
inference” (Tosi 2008:163), is therefore another limitation because each of
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these constructs include so many factors which give rise to “endogeneity” 
(Vafeas & Theodorou 1998:404), “substitutability” and “multicollinearity” where 
one concept or component could be easily substituted for another (Udueni 
1994:64). However, the problem with casual direction is not unique to this 
research. As discussed in chapter two, this problem is commonly experienced 
in corporate governance research, as discussed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Ferrell (2004:40), Holm and Scholer (2010:33) and Brown and Caylor 
(2004:32), amongst others.
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9.4 Recommendations for Further Research
The results of our findings could provide the basis for further in-depth research 
involving a larger sample of the clergy from a wider number of dioceses. It 
would be ideal if the research involved the support and cooperation of the 
diocesan bishops themselves. With the Bishops' approval, it should be possible 
to conduct longitudinal archival research on the Quinquennial Reports; cross- 
sectionally if the Reports of other dioceses were available. A mixed method 
approach could be used; an initial, high level content analysis of the Reports 
could be made using statistical methods to highlight important themes. This 
could be followed by the use of qualitative methods to focus on the individual 
constructs under investigation.
Our ecclesiastical model of corporate governance could also be applied to the 
level above the diocesan Bishop -  the Holy See in Rome. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, our proposed research is not a novel idea; the first “formal analysis 
of the Church's management performance” was conducted by the American 
Institute of Management and published in 1956 (AIM 1956:2). However, access 
may be a significant challenge, and problematic. The recruitment and selection 
of bishops is a research topic which would certainly provide further insights into 
Church corporate governance; research into the appointment of Bishops is 
more capable of being achieved because it does not need ecclesiastical 
cooperation or the approval of Rome.
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9.5 Concluding Remarks
This thesis contributes to existing knowledge by locating corporate governance 
within the context of a global religious organisation. The pioneering 
ecclesiastical model of corporate governance conceptualises mechanisms, 
compliance and performance in terms of the Church's own laws, doctrine and 
spiritual objectives. There are several major challenges facing the Church 
managers; these include the fall in the reception of the sacraments, the 
relationship between government and society's perception of the institution. 
Underpinning these problems is the quality of the relationship between the 
diocesan Bishop and his management team -  the presbyterate. However, 
advice from the Church's own documents indicate that improvements in 
ecclesiastical performance and transformational change begin with, and is 
dependent on, the Bishop's individual accountability, that is: the Bishop's own 
personal life of holiness and virtue (Roman Catholic Church1983; Pope John 
Paul II 2003; Congregation for Bishops 2004).
We identified two limitations inherent in existing corporate governance theory 
such as agency theory and transaction cost economics; these theories assume 
that human beings are prone to vices; companies are not capable of preventing 
or controlling the perpetuation of such vices. Our findings suggest that the 
frontiers of corporate governance research can be broadened on two fronts; 
first, there is the need to incorporate the moral virtues at the individual, personal 
level; second, there is also the need to re-evaluate the roles of business, 
government and society, as well as their ethical codes. The Church provides an
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example of how moral virtues, at the individual, personal level can be achieved, 
vis-a-vis: the diocesan Bishop; it may also provide insights into the roles of 
business, government and society, as well as the values which each should 
hold. As St. Paul states, “For a bishop, as God's steward, must be blameless; 
he must not be arrogant or quick-tempered or a drunkard or violent or greedy 
for gain; but hospitable, a lover of goodness, master of himself, upright, holy, 
and self-controlled; he must hold firm to the sure word as taught, so that he may 
be able to give instruction in sound doctrine and also to confute those who 
contradict it” (Titus 1:7-9).
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APPENDIX A: DATA COLLECTION - INTERVIEW 
PROTOCOL
This list of questions served as a useful tool during the interview; it was also 
used as a prompt and it helped put the research questions into an ecclesiastical 
context, thus helping the interviewees understand the questions in terms of their 
own experience.
RQ1 (a) What is your perception of the diocesan curia? How well does it
operate?
Prompt/Statement: The diocesan curia is the principal instrument 
at the disposal of the Bishop for the governance of the diocese. 
(Can 469)
Agree/Disagree/Comments
RQ1 (b) Which offices of the diocesan curia play the most critical role in
the Bishop's pastoral management of his diocese ? (For example: 
the Presbyteral Council and the College of Consultors).
RQ2(a) What are the key issues/indicators in the area of teaching?
Prompt [Can 386 §1. A diocesan Bishop, frequently preaching in person,
is bound to propose and explain to the faithful the truths of the 
faith which are to be believed and applied to morals. He is also to 
take care that the prescripts of the canons on the ministry of the 
word, especially those on the homily and catechetical instruction, 
are carefully observed so that the whole Christian doctrine is 
handed on to all.
RQ2(b) What are the key issues/indicators in the area of sanctifying?
Prompt [Since the diocesan Bishop is mindful of his obligation to show an
example of holiness in charity, humility, and simplicity of life, he is 
to strive to promote in every way the holiness of the Christian 
faithful according to the proper vocation of each. Since he is the 
principal dispenser of the mysteries of God, he is to endeavour 
constantly that the Christian faithful entrusted to his care grow in 
grace through the celebration of the sacraments and that they 
understand and live the paschal mystery (the MassUCan. 392 
§2)]
RQ2(c) What are the key issues/indicators in the area of governing?
Prompt [Can. 392 §1. Since he must protect the unity of the universal
Church, a Bishop is bound to promote the common discipline of 
the whole Church and therefore to urge the observance of all 
ecclesiastical laws.
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§2. He is to exercise vigilance so that abuses do not creep into 
ecclesiastical discipline, especially regarding the ministry of the 
word, the celebration of the sacraments and sacramentals, the 
worship of God and the veneration of the saints, and the 
administration of goods.]
Ensure priests correctly fulfill the obligations proper to their state, 
and make available to them the means and institutions which they 
need to foster spiritual and intellectual life (Can 384)]
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